

भारती

Prof. V. S. AGRAWALA VOLUME

BULLETIN OF THE DEPTT. OF ANCIENT INDIAN
HISTORY, CULTURE AND ARCHAEOLOGY



विद्ययांमृतमश्नुते

1968—1971

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Nos. 12—14

Price of this Combined Number : Rs. 40.00

Published by

DEPARTMENT OF ANCIENT INDIAN HISTORY,
CULTURE & ARCHAEOLOGY,
Banaras Hindu University,
Varanasi—5 (INDIA)

P.C. PANT.

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Indian History, Culture & Archæology

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ARCHAEOLOGY, BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY
VARANASI-5 (INDIA)

The present volume of *Bhārati* is dedicated to the
sacred memory of *the Late Professor V. S. Agrawala*

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Professor V. S. Agrawala. (Born 7th Aug. 1904. Died 27th July 1966)

(Photo taken in 1962)

IN MEMORIAM

I

The death of Dr. V. S. Agrawala has left a void in the world of Scholarship which is hard to fill. His knowledge was vast and encyclopaedic and there was hardly any branch of Sanskrit learning which had not received his careful attention. But he was not merely a linguist ; Sanskrit and literature had opened to him a vast unexplored field which in his opinion had to be sifted and interpreted. He was one of the few scholars who knew that for the proper understanding of Sanskrit literature only the proficiency in grammar, lexicography and commentatorial literature was not enough. For the proper understanding of Sanskrit literature it was necessary to develop a critical eye with a view to examine the material in its historical perspective. He was sure that the cultural material handed down to us in Sanskrit grammars, dramas, romances, stories, epics and the Puranas which had undergone many textual changes in the course of their transmission through centuries could only be interpreted correctly with the help of archaeology, anthropology, arts, customs and manners of the Indian people and also by cross references to Prakrit and Apabhramsa literatures. He firmly believed that the great Indian tradition of manifesting itself in story literature, philosophy and arts, though mutilated, distorted and misinterpreted with the changing times could be studied by their outward manifestations.

Dr. Agrawala's intense love for Indian culture led him to the field of Indian art and architecture and he spent some of the precious years (1929-1940) of his life in the service of the Curzon Museum of Archaeology, Mathura and the State Museum, Lucknow (1941-1946). In 1946 he joined as the Superintendent of Central Asian Antiquities Museum, New Delhi, which served as a prelude to the National Museum, New Delhi. There is no exaggeration to say that during the short tenure of his office he laid the basis of collections there. I am personally aware how busy he was in those days persuading the State Governments, the antique dealers and even private collectors to part with the objects in their collections so that a good collection of exhibits embracing almost all the branches of Indian art could be made available to the National Museum. It was not an easy task, but Dr. Agrawala's persuasive ways always won the heart of even the unrelenting.

But his hectic activities as the Officer-in-charge of several museums was only a means to understand and interpret the multiple

facets of Indian culture in their proper setting. His official duties which might have bogged weaker spirits to the desk and files, however, never stood in the way of his scholarship. As the Curator of the Mathura Museum, Dr. Agrawala was very much struck with the aesthetic and historical significances of Mathura sculptures and terracottas of the Kushana and Gupta periods and his research papers on Mathura sculpture and terracottas remain invaluable even today. His Catalogue of Mathura sculpture published in the Journal of U.P. Historical Society shows scientific approach and keen aesthetic understanding of a subject which was not popular at that time.

But Dr. Agrawala's approach to art was only a step in the direct understanding of the kaleidoscopic facets of Indian culture. During his stay at Mathura, besides interpreting Indian art, he relentlessly pursued his literary studies. Sanskrit grammar and the Vedas attracted him the most, but he also realised that while studying Indian culture, one could not nail himself down to a particular course. His stay at Mathura may also be called the period of spiritual preparation which as the years rolled by took him nearer to Vedic thought, which no doubt, is the fountainhead of Hindu culture. But along with all these activities Dr. Agrawala was working hard on his thesis entitled India as known to Panini in two parts, which brought him Ph.D. in 1941 and D.Litt. in 1946. Scholars all over the world have acclaimed this work as an epitome of sound and critical scholarship.

While at Mathura, Dr. Agrawala, impressed by sensuous beauty of Kushana sculptures, also tried to probe the spiritual forces which inspired the sculptural concepts and decorative motifs of Indian art. This kind of enquiry naturally led him to the field of Indian symbolism, which now plays an important part in the study of Indian art, but in those days it was classed along with mysticism.

I came in contact with Dr. Agrawala as early as 1935 when he was Curator of the Mathura Museum. Though I had seen him on several occasions during my Hindu University days when he was known as a very active Arya Samajist and a thorough nationalist clad in roughest Khaddar, yet I had no personal acquaintances with him. When at Mathura I went to the Museum and met Agrawala who not only welcomed and gave a sumptuous meal to me, but also took me round in the galleries and gave me a sound lecture on the basic principles of Indian art—perhaps too sound—for a student like me who had just returned from London after obtaining the Ph.D. degree. I shall always treasure the hours which I spent with him. He not only settled for me the future course of life, but also explained to me his views on the

basic concepts of Indian art and the great contributions Dr. A. K. Coomaraswamy, with whom he was already in correspondence, was making towards the proper understanding of Indian art which in Europe and America was till then a mere anthropological curiosity. Throughout his life Dr. Agrawala was a staunch follower of Coomaraswamy, but he never allowed his independent views to be clouded even by that great authority on Indian art.

While at Mathura, the home of Brajabhasha in which most of the medieval poetry of Bhakti school is written, Dr. Agrawala not only became one of its patrons but also became interested in the folk culture of Braja land manifested in its folk-songs, popular theatre, festivals and other aspects of life. It was, as a matter of fact, the beginning of Janapada movement for the conservation of folk-culture in Hindi-speaking region, though unfortunately it took a political colour and Dr. Agrawala had to withdraw, as he was firmly convinced that politics could hardly solve the problems of folk-culture.

Dr. Agrawala's stay at Lucknow (1940-46) was eventful as it was in his home town that he was able to realise some of his cherished dreams. I did not know that he had joined as Curator of the Provincial Museum, Lucknow, till one day I received a letter from Lucknow that Agrawala was proceeding to the Prince of Wales Museum, Bombay for training. He, of course, hardly required any training! But his stay at Bombay resulted in our close friendship. It was on the strength of this friendship that during World War II when the safety of Bombay was threatened and my Museum was unable to find any suitable place for the removal of its rare and very valuable exhibits that Dr. Agrawala came to our rescue and at once agreed to accommodate them in the basement of his Museum. The exhibits from the Prince of Wales Museum remained stored there from 1940 to 1944 and I was asked by my Museum to visit Lucknow for their supervision almost every month. At the invitation of Dr. Agrawala I always stayed with him and thus began our life-long friendship which has only ended in his death.

During my frequent visits to Lucknow I was in a position to get acquainted with the methodology, aspiration and the vast knowledge of Agrawala of which I took the fullest advantage. Till then he had incorporated the results of his researches in numerous papers both in English and Hindi, but I convinced him that an intellectual of his calibre had to deal with certain problems at length and that was only possible in monographs. In those days Dr. Agrawala was very busy in getting his thesis on Panini typed. Many a happy day I

passed with him hearing to his interpretations of Paninian terms concerned with the socio-political life of the people. His explanations of the geographical and ethnic terms used to be particularly enlightening. As a matter of fact it was he who enthused me to write on the geographical names and economic products mentioned in the *Sabha Parvan*. But Dr. Agrawala's was not a single track mind ; even while busy on his thesis and administration he found time to write research papers and edit the *Journal of the U.P. Historical Society* which during his editorship became one of the finest journals on Indology. He had agreed to bring out a special number of the *Nagari Pracharini Patrika* to commemorate the 2,000 years of Vikram era. He enthused me to join this venture and we decided to include in the number articles on some dynamic aspects of Indian culture. Invitations were issued to scholars, but the response was poor. Dr. Agrawala, however, was determined to bring out the number by himself writing most of the articles. That meant ceaseless labour for days. I protested that he should look after his health, but I knew that once he had decided upon a course of action nothing could stop him. During those years he was also enthusiastic about Janapada movement for the preservation of the folk-culture of India, and was preparing a plan for the collection of linguistic and cultural material from the rural areas of the Hindi-speaking regions. It almost became an obsession with him and I often found him getting up at 2 a.m. working on his scheme or writing long emotional letters to Shri Banarasidas Chaturvedi, then editor of *Madhukar*, a Hindi magazine, which was to publish Agrawala's entire Janapada scheme in a special issue. The Janapada movement did not meet with the success it deserved but it at least encouraged some students of Hindi to collect folk songs, folk stories and to study the rich dialects of Hindi.

Dr. V. S. Agrawala in his later years led the life of a recluse withdrawing himself more or less completely from public activities. But during his Lucknow days he took keen interest in conferences and other social activities. He attended regularly the sessions of the Indian History Congress, the Oriental Congress and the annual meetings of the Numismatic Society of India.

It must be remembered here that along with his accomplishment in literature and art he was an expert epigraphist and numismatist, his papers on these subjects have made important contributions to these branches of Indology. His Presidential addresses as the Sectional President of Technical Literature and Art Section of the All-India Oriental Conference and the Ancient Indian Section of the Indian

History Congress, are not merely progress reports but indicate the lines on which research work has to be carried out and his own contributions to the solutions of certain problems. His address as the President of the Numismatic Society of India is a substantial contribution to that branch of Indology. It contains disquisitions on important literary data on numismatics.

Dr. Agrawala was, however, a restless soul ever ready to explore new fields of research, and with that end in view be helpful in starting new institutions. In 1944 when at the time of the Oriental Congress held at the Banaras Hindu University I asked for his help in setting up the Museums Association of India. He was at once ready to join hands with a group of enthusiasts who had assembled for the purpose. They agreed on the importance of such an institution, subscribed Rs. 10/- each for meeting the preliminary expenses and dispersed hoping for the best. Many difficulties had to be faced, but within a few months the Association became a reality. When the question of the editorship of the Journal of the Association came Dr. Agrawala at once accepted it and worked hard to make it a success. The Association, today a flourishing institution, is playing its due part in the resuscitation and development of museums in India.

Dr. Agrawala's pilgrimage in search of Indian culture continued with unabated vigour after 1944. And therefore, when in 1946 he was invited by Dr. (now Sir) Mortimer Wheeler, then Director General of Archaeology to join as Superintendent, Central Asian Antiquities Museum, Agrawala could not resist the offer, though throughout his life he never bothered about promotions in official hierarchy. His early days of service in the Department of Archaeology were concerned with the museums in charge of the Department. However, the Gwyer Report on the establishment of National Museum of India was out, and though financial and other difficulties stood in the way of its immediate implementation, Dr. Agrawala was certain that at some future date the National Museum of India was bound to become a reality. To give the scheme a concrete shape, as a preliminary step, it was decided by the Government to hold an Exhibition of Indian Art. When in 1948 Indian exhibits loaned to the London Exhibition had returned, Dr. Agrawala was put in charge of organising the Indian exhibition. However, he did not want that it should be a carbon copy of the London Exhibition; he wanted the Delhi Exhibition to be more representative. There was some opposition from certain museums in the initial stages, but at last his indomitable will and persuasive ways won their approval

and the Delhi Exhibition was one of the grandest exhibitions Indian art ever held.

Dr. Agrawala's persistent effort to see that the National Museum took shape at last bore fruit. The Government of India in August 1949 decided to start the National Museum of India. Between 1949 and 1951 Agrawala left no stone unturned to collect from the Government and private sources and through purchases, sculptures, paintings and textiles worthy of the National Museum. It was not an easy task to persuade the Government to allot the necessary funds for the purchase of exhibits ; the members of the Purchase Committee were at times difficult but Dr. Agrawala's persuasive ways always brought success to him.

But all this work hardly left any time to Dr. Agrawala for his researches for which the material was accumulating fast. During his short stay at Delhi he managed to write a lot of popular literature to propogate the cause of Indian art and literature. He also published his monograph on terracottas from Ahichhchatra in Ancient India which even now serves as a landmark in that subject. But with the establishment of the National Museum he thought his work at Delhi was over and that he must devote the rest of his life to research work and teaching. In 1951 the Banaras Hindu University decided to start the Department of Ancient Indian Art and Architecture and at the pressing invitation of Shri Govinda Malaviya, then Vice-Chancellor of the University, he accepted the invitation and thus began the last and most fruitful chapter of his life.

Dr. Agrawala's purpose in taking up entirely a new line was threefold, namely—to impart his knowledge and literature to students and thus ensure a firm base for the teaching of the history of art and architecture, which though regarded as a separate discipline in humanities in foreign countries, was linked with ancient Indian history and culture in this country ; to guide research students in various branches of Indian art and architecture in order to prepare future teachers, archaeological field-workers and excavators and to give an academic background to future museum curators who were entrusted to look after Indian sculptures, paintings, and objects of decorative arts and archaeology ; and to prosecute vigorously his own researches and studies which were left in abeyance due to the exigencies of his official duties which hardly left him much time for research and publication.

After joining his new post whenever I met Dr. Agrawala, I always found him bubbling with enthusiasm for his new work and ever

ready to share his profound knowledge with those who cared for it. He had to organise the Department of Art and Architecture from a scratch and teach and guide the post-graduate students. Above all he got himself busy with his own researches which not only included the history of Indian art and architecture but also the various aspects of Sanskrit literature with which he was in love. The quantum of research he had undertaken made him work on the average fifteen to sixteen hours a day almost ceaselessly, inspite of the protests of the friends that with none the too robust health that grinding work was sure to break him one day. But Dr. Agrawala it seemed was a man in hurry ; perhaps he had a premonition that as many years were not left to him, he must finish his work as soon as possible. I, as one of his closest friends, would remonstrate with him for gradually ruining his health by overwork, but that would only draw a smile from him. At such moments he would open his heart to me and start expanding on the topics least touched by Indian scholarship, and that was sufficient to silence me effectively.

In the very first year of his joining the Hindu University he gave his famous lectures in Hindi on Bana's *Harṣacarita* under the auspices of the Bihar Rashtrabhasha Parishad which were later on published entitled *Harṣacarita-ekī Sāṁskṛtika Adhyayana*. This was the first work in which Dr. Agrawala showed his excelling originality of interpretation. The *Harṣacarita* with its text difficult to understand has been called as tropical growth by Western scholars. Its correct interpretation was often elusive to its English translator Cowell. While interpreting the text with the help of the commentaries and textual variants Agrawala took help of art and archacology which hardly any Sanskrit scholar had employed before him. Later on he undertook the study of cultural material, contained in the *Kādambarī* (1958), the *Matsya Purāṇa—A Study* (1963), and the *Vāmana-Purāṇa—A Study* (1964), which again reveals the breadth of his profound scholarship.

But the trial of his scholarship and to a smaller extent mine came when we were faced with the translation, annotation and introduction of the four burlesques of the Gupta period, published by Shri Ram Krishna Kavi and S. K. R. Sastri in 1922. Its translation jointly by Dr. Agrawala and myself has somewhat a romantic tinge. Almost fifteen years back one day in the office of the National Museum while I was talking with Dr. Agrawala about the low characters of Varanasi and the witty language with its peculiar turns and twists they speak he at once drew my attention to an article by F. W. Thomas entitled *Four Sanskrit Plays* (JRAS., Centenary Supplement, 1924). Thomas

while translating certain witty passages from the plays, called their language as the veritable ambrosia of Sanskrit literature. Later on Dr. Agrawala procured a copy of the *Chaturbhāṇī* for me. I liked the plays—so different to the usual Sanskrit plays—so much that I decided to translate them into Hindi using the dialect of the low characters of Varanasi to bring out the shades of meanings intended by the rakes, voluptuaries and courtesans of the plays. But when the first draft of the translation was ready I was not satisfied as at many places while the translation seemed to be correct, I failed to bring the wittiness or sarcasm intended in the original Sanskrit. I at once decided that it was no use publishing my translation without Dr. Agrawala's help. At first he felt reluctant to associate his name with the work because the burlesques reek with wine, women, rakes and other low characters, who did not come within his purview of Sanskrit literature. But on my insistence he agreed at first to read the plays in the original and then go through their translation. Later on he confirmed that though he found the language easy enough, the meanings of passage after passage were elusive and that it would take him some time to go through the script. The going was heavy but Dr. Agrawala refused to accept his defeat and after a hard labour of almost five years and several drafts the Hindi translation of the text with annotations etc. was ready and was published in 1960 under our joint name as *Śṛṅgarabhāṇa* or *Chaturbhāṇī*.

But inspite of his preoccupation with Sanskrit language and literature, and Indian art, Dr. Agrawala never forgot about the Hindi language and literature. It was his firm conviction that if Hindi was to receive its rightful place in the galaxy of Indian languages its classics must be properly edited, translated and annotated. Here there was an almost unlimited field awaiting scientific edition and interpretation and Agrawala decided to use the same methodology for the study of Hindi classics as he had used for his Sanskrit works. The *Padmāvat*, one of the classics of Avadhi, appealed to him not only for its mysticism but also for the wealth of cultural material it contains. But the study of old Hindi literature not only required a mastery of linguistic apparatus but also a deep knowledge of contemporary culture some phases of which were available in Persian sources only. Undeterred by the difficulties he completed his commentary of the *Padmāvat* which was published in 1955. The importance of this work for the critical study of Hindi literature was at once realised and Agrawala was awarded a prize for the best book in Hindi literature for the years 1955-56 by the Sahitya Akademi. Another Hindi book which received his attention was the *Kīrtīlatā* of Vidyapati, an historical poem in Apabhramsa whose

meaning had eluded several scholars as Vidyapati, the author, had freely borrowed technical words from Apabhramsa as well as from Turkish and Persian. I passed several days with Dr. Agrawala when he was preparing the press copy of the *Kīrtīlātā* and was wonderstruck by the painful and meticulous research which was required in interpreting that difficult text that was published in 1962.

Dr. Agrawala was a store of energy, some of which he spent in editing ancient texts and journals, and in writing research papers and popular articles. He gladly accepted the editorship of the Sanskrit texts to be published by the Nepal Endowment Trust of the Banaras Hindu University, became one of the editors of the Prakrit Text Society and when the *Purāṇa*, a journal exclusively devoted to the Pauranic studies was started by the All India Kashiraj Trust, he became its editor and one of the chief contributors. I wonder how he could manage this work, but he did it with meticulous care.

During his stay at Banaras Hindu University a factor had effected the spiritual development of Dr. Agrawala. He was a deeply religious man and his quest for truth had taken him to the study of the Vedas, the Upanishads and the Brahmanas, the source books of all Indian philosophies and higher thoughts. From the very beginning of his career he was deeply interested in Vedic literature and had contributed some significant articles on the Vedas and Upanishads in his early days, but it was difficult for him to keep pace with the Vedic studies as an officer in charge of the museums as he had to look after the official duties which consumed most of his time. But once he found peace and quietude in the Banaras Hindu University the urge to know more about the Vedic literature came to him with a redoubled vigour. Before entering the field of Vedic scholarship with all his heart and soul he made a deep study of various schools of Vedic interpretation, ancient and modern. He was obviously very much impressed by the work done in this field by Mahamahopadhyaya Madhusudan Ojha of Jaipur and by Pandit Motilal Sastri. He was so much impressed by Sastriji's work that inspite of his multifarious activities he became the Honorary General Secretary of his institution and by his personal efforts collected a good amount of money so that Sastriji's voluminous works could be printed. He also strove hard to see that at least some of the works of M. M. Madhusudhan Ojha saw the light of the day ; he was successful in this as well.

But Dr. Agrawala, while studying and admiring the modern trends in Vedic scholarship, was all the time making preparations

to come out with his own interpretation of the Vedas. Some of his close friends who wanted him to pursue his studies of art and architecture, tried to argue with him, but he was determined to follow his own inclination of mind. From 1959 onwards he published both in Hindi and English books on his own interpretation of the Veda: *Veda-vidyā* (1959), *Vedaraśmi*, *Kalpavṛkṣa* (1960), *Vedic Lectures* (1960), *Sparks from the Vedic Fire* (1962), *Hymn of Creation* (1963) etc. His *Song Celestial* (1963) and *Gītānavanīta* give some new interpretations of the *Bhagavad Gītā* in the light of his new spiritual experiences. He was also a great admirer of the *Mahābhārata* and his *Bhāratasāvitṛī*, in three volumes, is an intensive study of the Great Epic. In these three volumes after summarising the great episodes from the *Mahābhārata* he interprets the symbols and legends contained therein which no scholar had cared to do previously.

In his intensive study of Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhramsa and Hindi literatures, Dr. Agrawala was painfully aware of the inadequacy of the lexicons in those languages. In the sphere of Hindi he felt keenly the lack of an etymological dictionary. He, therefore, began collecting old Hindi words, tracing their etymologies in a scientific manner. He wanted to publish the etymological dictionary of Hindi during his life time, but could not do so owing to other pressing engagements. With the publication of this work a new chapter will be added to Hindi lexicography.

In all this fervent activities, Dr. Agrawala could not devote as much time to Indian art as he had promised to friends when he left Delhi for Banaras. He had, no doubt, made original contributions to the study of Mathura sculpture and Gupta art by the way of handbooks, monographs, catalogues and research articles, but he was very keen that the material for the study of Indian art and architecture which had accumulated with him for almost three decades must be utilised fully in monographs, but his desire could only be partially fulfilled. The *Studies in Indian Art* which is a collection of his important papers on various aspects of Indian art, symbology etc., *Indian Art*, Vol. I, which is a history of Indian art from the earliest time to the third century A.D. and the *Masterpieces of Mathura Sculpture*, all appeared in 1965. He had promised me to devote more time to the history of Indian art but death snatched him away from us in the prime of his intellectual development. His last work is *Śiva Mahādeva* (1966) a dissertation of the philosophic concepts on the great god. It is not a book on art but it deals with the fundamental concepts of Śiva from which the Indian artists drew their inspiration. Agrawala was always inspired by the

mighty conception of Siva and the work which is his last is an act of dedication to Him.

Agrawala by all standards was a great scholar, but as a man he was equally great. His frail personality, clad in the Khaddar, was ever ready to help not only his friends and students but also anybody who approached him. His house was the centre of attraction for scholars and research workers from all over the country and I have seen hardly anybody who returned home unsatisfied from there. Agrawala, owing to very heavy pressure of work, could not afford to be a social being, but whenever he cared to attend social functions he pleased everybody with his genial personality. Perhaps very few persons suspected Dr. Agrawala of humour but among his friends his witty remarks on the strange persons who came to seek his advice and the predicaments in which he found himself after accepting unwittingly invitations for some literary gatherings. In politics he was a thorough Gandhite, and in the early years of his career had boycotted his school and had practised handicrafts. But, while liberal in his views, he had certain fixed ideas about his own self. He regulated his life as far as possible according to the ways of a strict Hindu, though orthodoxy was far away from his nature. He was a vegetarian and even did not take tea and coffee or soft drinks. But he had a sweet tooth which unfortunately made him a victim of diabetes which could have been held in check with modern medicines and diet control to enable him to lead a normal life, but unfortunately he did not believe in modern medicine and that resulted in a tragedy.

In the last five years his friends knew that there was something radically wrong with Agrawala's health. Almost every year he was pressed to hospitalise himself and the doctors always advised that the way to check the disease was regular medication and diet. He would promise us to accept their advice, but somehow he had such an aversion for modern medicine that as soon as he felt relief he gave it up. In December 1964 I received a letter from Agrawala that he was presiding on the 22nd Session of the All-India Oriental Conference to be held at Gauhati from 2nd to 4th January, 1965 and my presence there would cheer him up as he was not keeping good health. I, of course, agreed to his proposal and proceeded to Gauhati. When I met him there I was aghast at the bad state of his health. He was reduced to skeleton and could hardly stand. We requested him to summarise his presidential address within ten minutes, but he refused and delivered his speech standing which the delegates listened with rapt attention. To me it seemed to be the valedictory address of a

scholar who had striven every moment of his life to enhance the prestige of Indian scholarship. At this critical moment we all agreed that if his life was to be saved he must be brought to Bombay and hospitalised. After some hesitation he came to Bombay and though the hopes for his survival were pretty thin, cure was effected by the doctors with a warning that tragedy awaited him if he did not follow their instructions. He told me and other friends that he was fully convinced of the wonders of modern medicine which had snatched him away several times from the jaws of death and that he would follow the instructions of his doctors after his return to Banaras. But as soon as he reached Banaras his promise went to the wind and he became his own doctor. His condition worsened, and when I met him a few months before his death I knew that nothing could save him. Dr. Agrawala also knew that his end was near, but as a brave man he redoubled his effort to finish the works in hand. The end came soon and the mighty soul went to Divyaloka from which there is no return. However, he has left to the posterity a rich heritage which should serve as a beacon light to the coming generations. We offer our salutes to the departed soul to whom death held no terrors—

नास्ति येषां यशःकाये जरामरणजं भयम् ।

—Dr. Moti Chandra

II

I first met Vasudeva Sharana Agrawala when he was the Curator of the Mathura Museum. We almost instantly became close friends and it seemed as though we had known each other long before. This precious friendship continued till his sad death. The basis of our friendship, over a period of more than thirty years, was that we respected each other's viewpoints even if they were wide apart and we could always discuss our problems without impatience or arrogance. This approach is all too often wanting today and in more than one field of the study of Indian art one finds that an expression of differing opinions leads to violent refutations, recriminations and even bitterness. The sense of humour which Vasudeva Sharana possessed while carrying on any controversy is sadly lacking in many scholars.

We spent a week together at Mathura during this first meeting. Every day long before the official opening hours we were in the Museum together going round and round the exhibits and discussing all manner of subjects till the Museum closed. Then Vasudeva Sharana would meet his Sanskrit Pandit for a couple of hours and again we would be together at his house till it was time to retire. Our favourite topics, apart from the exhibits themselves, were the date of Kanishka, the origin of Mauryan sculpture, and the references to art forms and symbols in early Indian literature, a subject over which he possessed an enviable mastery. He was the foremost living authority on the Sunga, Kushana and Gupta art of Mathura and his Catalogues and many articles thereon will for long remain the standard work on these subjects.

We met again at Lucknow Museum when he was the Curator and renewed our friendship and discussed anew various matters which vexed our minds hoping to finding a clue from our exchange of views. Never had Vasudeva Sharana taken it amiss when I used to pass jocular remarks about his bias in favour of the Vedic origin of Mauryan Art. Yet when I became emphatic about the Achaemenid influence on Mauryan sculpture in all its aspects, he would laughingly say that it was excusable for a Parsee to hold that view !

Later he went to Delhi in the service of the Archaeological Survey of India where we often met and when the task of building up the National Museum was to all intents and purposes in hands he joined me with himself in this great project as a member of the Purchase Committee to help him in his labours. From this time onwards

there was a very active period of co-operation between us, in which, Rai Krishnadasa and Moti Chandra were also associated. A number of famous private collections and many individual objects of high importance were acquired by us to lay the foundations of the present collections of the National Museum. We worked in a very informal manner with little or no red tape to hamper us. The result was that when a good thing came our way it could be acquired without delay. Things have changed very much since then and if we had to follow the present day procedures, the National Museum would have been without more than half of its principal treasures. He was quick to realise that if he was to succeed he must have the constant co-operation of those whom he trusted most and whose opinions he respected most and that Committees of high officials, VIPs and even scholars who lacked practical experience of art markets and dealers were of little or no use to him. When finally he left the Survey and no longer retained his connection with the National Museum it could truly be said of him, despite the fact that he experienced many disappointments and lack of official appreciation, that he had been the pivot in the task of building up the collections of the National Museum by the "four musketeers" as he was pleased to call the Committee of himself and his three friends. It was indeed a noble ideal which he had set himself and he pursued it with that integrity and zeal which alone can make fulfilment of such great projects possible.

I remember one occasion when the collection of the Mohenjo-daro exhibits had to be divided between India and Pakistan, he said to me that if it fell to India's lot to make the first selection would my first choice be the Dancing Girl or the so called Priest. I said, "the Dancing Girl even though the Priest is as important", and he replied that it would be and so it was.

Vasudeva Sharana was no mere academician. He had a highly developed sense of aesthetics and on more than one occasion reminded me that if critics of Indian art spent their time wrangling over dates and provenance they would soon forget to see the beauty of what they are wrangling about and that surely the visual appeal of an object mattered most. Though he was a great authority on Indian sculpture, his real acquaintance with Indian painting only began when he functioned with us on the Purchase Committee of the National Museum. But he had such a fine feeling for style that he soon began to make his presence felt in our deliberations. After he left the Survey he joined the Banaras Hindu University and was the Professor of Art and Architecture there till the time of his death. He had a small but

devoted band of pupils and was much loved by those who came to seek knowledge from him. I met him again at Banaras for the last time when he accompanied us to Sasaram.

He was a simple man of profound knowledge, deeply interested in Indological studies and an art historian of the highest order, no matter how controversial some of his views may be. In his death India has lost one of the greatest Indologists of our times. To me this loss is an intensely personal one.

—Karl Khandalawala

III

Dr. Vasudeva Sarana Agrawala left this world of mortals on the night of 26-27 July, 1966. In his death India has lost a great versatile scholar of international fame, a profound and veteran Indologist having a unique command over the various branches of Indian learning, a real interpreter and a true lover of ancient Indian art and culture, and a great and noble soul ever striving to lead a life of perfect simplicity and high morality. Scholars of Indology and Archaeology all over the world had a great regard for his erudition. I came to know Dr. Agrawala through his book, *Urñijoti*, which I got from a local Arya Samajist bookseller when I was a student of the Meerut College, and since that time yearned to meet the author of this book. It was, perhaps the year 1951 when I chanced to meet this great scholar one day at the time of his morning walk and I instantly saw in him a great sage-type scholar of Indology. From that time onward our acquaintance grew. His great love for the Sanskrit learning and his deep insight into the realm of the vast literature of the Vedas and the Puranas always filled me with deep reverence for him.

Dr Agrawala's regard for the Vedas and the Puranas, the two high pillars of the great Hindu religion and the ancient Indian culture, was immense. Even in his student-life he had a great inclination for the study of these two important *Bharatiya Vidyas*. In his career as a Curator, Superintendent and Director of various Archaeological Museums of India (*viz.* Curzon Museum of Archaeology, Mathura, 1929-40; State Museum, Lucknow, 1941-1946; Central Asian Antiquities Museum, New Delhi, 1946-1949; National Museum of India, 1949-1951), he wrote several studies on the Vedas and the Puranas. But in his later life as a Professor of Art and Architecture in the College of Indology of the Banaras Hindu University, he devoted almost all his spare time to the study and interpretation of this important and sacred literature of India. With his profound faith in the words of the ancient Vedic and Puranic Rsis, accompanied with his deep critical insight of most modern type, he worked day and night on this sacred mission of his life with an unabated zeal, and that too inspite of his weak and shattered health.

Dr. Agrawala's almost new symbolical approach to the Vedic interpretation has unfolded many a new truths hidden in the depth of the Vedic thoughts. He held that the symbolical approach "is the open sesame to Vedic exegesis. It opens a new door and puts us in possession of an unprecedented richness of meanings", for, to put in

his own words, "symbols are the language of metaphysics as words are of philosophy ; lexical meanings of words are, therefore, inadequate for the understanding of the Vedas ; it is essentially the language of the symbols that unlocks the real significance of Vedic thoughts." And because the Puranas are held as an amplification, *Upabṛiṃhana*, of the Vedas, and as 'Vedas hold the key to the Puranas,' the correct interpretation of the Vedas leads to the correct interpretation of the Puranas also. So, side by side with his work of symbolic interpretation of the Vedas he took up to write several Puranic studies also, unfolding the real essence of the Puranic conception of various deities, interpreting the various *ākhyānas* and the religious material contained in the Puranas, and bringing out the rich cultural material forming an important part of the vast Puranic literature. For him the Vedas were really the most ancient works on the *Sṛṣṭi-Vidyā* or cosmology and cosmogony which also formed the main topic of the Puranas. This idea of the Vedic *Sṛṣṭi-Vidyā* pervades all his works of Vedic and Puranic studies.

This unique contribution of Dr. Agrawala to Vedic symbolism and Puranic interpretation has been highly appreciated at least in the West, and many Western Indologists regard him as their *Guru* in this field. Here in India also, a time will come when his works on Vedic symbolism and Purana-Vidya will begin to be studied and appreciated more and more. In fact, as Ruskin said, in order to understand and appreciate an author we have also to feel with him.

His contribution to Indian art is of no less value. He interpreted and brought out the religious and spiritual conception of the ancient Indian artists, on which their aesthetic sense had worked to produce the works of inspiring art of exquisite beauty and of permanent value. His approach to Indian art was a real Indian approach, according to which Indian art is not to be studied from a purely aesthetic point of view, but its esoteric and spiritual meanings are also to be studied and unfolded. According to him "The permanent spiritual values of life had been cast into an aesthetic mould that we call art." And he always held it his sacred duty to interpret and unfold these permanent spiritual values of Indian art.

Dr. Agrawala had been intimately connected with the Purana Department and Purana-activities of the All India Kashiraj Trust from the very beginning. In fact, it was he who had prompted the Maharaja Dr. Vibhuti Narain Singh, who himself is a great lover and scholar of the Puranas, to organise the work on the Puranas, a great desideratum of the time, and the Purana-Department was the result. Under his advice a Purana-Committee was formed, and he continued to be an

important member of this Committee, till his death snatched him from us.

In January 1960 he was entrusted by His Highness the work of editing the *Purana* Bulletin, Vol. I. No. 2 issue of which was to be published on the Vasanta Pancami day (in the beginning of February, 1960). Dr. Agrawala undertook to bring out the Bulletin in time. Hardly a month's time was at his disposal. He at once started to write to the scholars of different places for the contribution of the articles to the *Purana*. At his request a sufficient number of articles came. He worked day and night for the Bulletin writing his own articles for it, scrutinising the articles sent by the other scholars, and editing them. It was a Herculean task, indeed, to publish this Journal in such a short time. But he was always true to his words. The hard and continuous work which he had to put up to publish this Bulletin in such a short time did not depress his spirits. I had to assist him in this difficult task, and so I had to stay with him at his own residence in the B.H.U. During this time I had a chance to study him closely. To me he appeared as a great saint and *tapasvin*. It was a real miracle when on the appointed date, the Vasanta Pancami day, he placed a printed copy of the *Purana* in the hands of His Highness Maharaja Dr. Vibhuti Narain Singh Ji. He remained on the Editorial Board of the *Purana* Bulletin up to the end of his life. He contributed learned articles and notes to nearly all the issues of the *Purana*, except when he was confined to bed.

During my stay with him, I used to accompany him on his early morning walk, and found him full of inspiration for the symbolic interpretation of the esoteric meaning of various Vedic and Puranic statements. During this morning walk he often used to halt suddenly and begin to explain the hidden meaning of the Vedic and Puranic *Srsti-Vidya*, which in his opinion, was the main topic of the Vedas. Later on, I found out that the Puranas also hold the Vedas as the works on the *Srsti-Vidya* (cf. Skanda Purana, Avanti-khanda, Reva-khanda, 9.40 and also Vaisnava-khanda, Badarikasrama Mahatmya, 9.10).

When in March-April 1960 he was confined to bed in the B.H.U. Hospital, I always found him there lying calmly and studying the text of the Rgveda. But when in his last days he was again admitted to the B.H.U. Hospital, he often lay unconscious. But whenever he gained his consciousness and I happened to be there at that time, I found him absorbed there in deep meditation with folding hands. If a Sanskrit Pandit came there to visit him, he would request that Pandit to recite some *stotras*, and he would listen to them with deep reverence and with his eyes closed.

Throughout his scholarly life he strived to preserve and follow the *Path of Light* made by the ancient Vedic sages, and thus he actually carried out the sacred injunction of the Veda—ज्योतिष्मतः पथो रक्ष घिया कृतान् (RV. 10. 53.6).

We bow and offer our *namaskara* to the great departed soul in the following words of the Isa-Upanisad :—भूयिष्ठां ते नम उक्ति विधेम ।

—A. S. Gupta

IV

Dr. Vasudeva Sarana Agrawala breathed his last on the 27th July 1966 at 0-30 A.M. in the Private Ward of the S.S. Hospital of the Banaras Hindu University. In him the world has lost a great man and an equally great Indologist.

Dr. Agrawala was born on the 7th August 1904 at Khera, a village in the Meerut district, in a Vaishya family. His grandfather Jhabbamal Shah originally an industrious and hardworking farmer had acquired a landlordship in five villages. His personality influenced a great deal that of young Vasudeva whose father, Gopi Nath Agrawala, stayed most of the time out in connection with his service and business. His grandfather daily recited the Bhagavata and the Vishnu-Sahasranama and in the evening offered a ghee-lamp in a Siva temple. Like him Dr. Agrawala was a Vaishnava, calling himself a Parama-Vaishnava, and had also great devotion to lord Siva. Dr. Agrawala received his early education up to High School at Lucknow, studied in I.A. and B.A. classes in the Banaras Hindu University, did his M.A. from the Lucknow University in 1929, and obtained the Ph.D. and D.Litt. degrees of the same University respectively in 1941 and 1946. For his research degrees he made a cultural study of Panini's Ashtadhyayi under Dr. R. K. Mookerji. His researches on the Ashtadhyayi are contained in 'India as Known to Panini' which he dedicated to his teacher—Dr. R. K. Mookerji—for whom he had deep devotion. He was also a graduate of law. He had a uniformly brilliant academic record to his credit obtaining first class marks and topping the list of successful candidates in all classes except in B.A. where his position was second. His studies were broken as he also actively participated in the movement of 1921 when Mahatma Gandhi called the young Indians to join him. The ideas and philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi influenced and shaped his personality which was characterised by truth, honesty, determination, fearlessness, modesty, plain living, love and compassion. Outwardly Gandhian influence on him was manifest in his exclusive use of khadi. His acts and practices illustrate his inner qualities. Neither he spoke nor heard ill of others. He had no hatred even to animals and birds. He allowed his dogs to sleep in his room and birds to build their nests in his book-shelves. Sixteen-eighteen hours work per day was normal for him. Sometimes, when under pressure of work, he sat and worked as long as thirty-six hours without any break. This had to tell adversely on his health. He was sincerely devoted to his studies and he boldly refused to comply with the orders

of the highest University authorities which were detrimental to Professors' studies in 1961 when there was panic resulting from the firing out of great stalwarts from the B.H.U.

Dr. Agrawala started his career as a Curator joining the Mathura Museum in 1931, about 2 years after passing his M.A., where he worked for about nine years. In 1940 he came to Lucknow as Director of the State Museum there. In 1946 he took charge of the Central Asian Antiquities Museum at Delhi as Superintendent for Museums in the Archaeological Survey of India and worked there for five years. In 1951 he joined the Banaras Hindu University as Professor and Head of the Department of Art and Architecture. He loved ancient antiquities both as source material and as best manifestations of Indian culture. He may be regarded as one of the architects of the Mathura Museum whose contribution to its all-sided development is so considerable. He not only procured more antiquities, but also properly classified and catalogued them, studied them and published numerous articles in Indian and foreign journals and magazines. His efforts enriched the Museum, and acquainted the people with the museum and the art of Mathura. In his studies of the Mathura art he included the terracottas through which the art was democratised. His catalogue of the Mathura Museum bears witness to his laborious and scientific study of the Museum antiquities. The State Museum Lucknow also developed under his experienced and able supervision. Besides general systematisation, addition of a terracotta gallery in the Museum goes to his credit. His experience, studies and vision made him realise the need of a National Museum at Delhi. While at the capital he suggested and supervised an exhibition of select Indian antiquities from different museums of the country which finally proved to be the nucleus of the present National Museum at Delhi. That he was a creative organiser is attested to by the fact that a number of institutions substantially owe their origin or growth to him. Some of them being Braja Sahitya Parishad, Museums Association of India, Hindi Janapadiya Parishad, Rajasthan Vaidika Sodha Samsthana, Parshvanatha Vidya-shram Sodha Samsthana, Prakrit Text Society etc. The Prakrit Text Society was founded and registered by him in 1953 with a view to undertake the publication of the rich Prakrit literature on the lines of the Pali Text Society of London. Up to 1966 the Society brought out nine works the first and the last being Angavijja and Nandisuttam respectively.

He was a respected teacher and an able research guide. He was approached by various research scholars working on different

topics, besides his own, for his knowledge of Indological subjects was almost encyclopaedic and memory very sharp. He not only thoroughly discussed their problems, provided references, and suggested lines for further investigation, but also helped them materially and in all the other possible ways. But, at the same time, he was unwilling to give any time to them whose credentials he doubted. He highly valued his time and utilised each and every moment in worthwhile activities. Though a fascinating conversationalist, a liberal, prompt and effective letterwriter, he was relevant, brief and to the point on this account. In the later part of his life, however, he became more liberal and helped even those who did not fully deserve his help.

He read a lot and had an inquisitive and receptive mind. He always kept a small note-book with him and unhesitatingly noted on it whenever and wherever he heard or saw something worth that. While writing his Samjivani commentary on the Padmavata he was seen many a time walking down to Ruiya Hostel for discussing certain difficult lines involving astronomical details with the senior students there. He worked at his own residence in a spacious study-room housing a rich library which was his own creation.

He was a very sound scholar of Sanskrit, which is also evident from his famous studies on the Astadhyayi, and so Vedic, Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhramsa literature were easily accessible to him. His thorough knowledge of Indian history and culture prompted him to make cultural interpretations of literary works. He started with the Harsacarita which was presented to the Hindi readers as 'Harsacarita—Eka Samskritika Adhyayana', and now to English readers as 'The Deeds of Harsha'. His cultural study of the Harsacarita is followed by those on the Kadambari, the Mahabharata (entitled Bharata Savitri), Meghaduta, Chaturbhani (with Dr. Moti Chandra), Markandeya Purana, Vamana Purana, Matsya Purana, and Linga Purana (incomplete). Besides these, he has also written a commentary on the Padmavata of Jayasi and Kirttilata of Vidyapati. His knowledge of ancient Indian literature and various modern dialects made him a great practical etymologist and equally a great cultural commentator. In his abovementioned cultural studies he has given a new direction to the Indological researches.

Later on, he became engrossed with the Vedic studies. His earlier love and regard for the Vedas was greatly intensified and progressively increased after his contact with the famous traditional Vedic scholar Pandit Madhusudana Ojha of Rajasthan. The last decade of

his life was mostly dedicated to Vedic studies. His interpretations of the Vedic hymns are novel and probe deeper than those of Indian and European scholars which touch only the upper crust of the apparent meaning. He wrote on the Vedas both in Hindi and English and his studies in the field are available in the form of collections of papers and original works. He aimed at reinterpreting the four Vedas but the cruel hand of Death stopped the work when it was just begun, he had completed only the first mandala of the Rigveda. However, he has left a few works such as 'Rigvedic Mythology', 'An Introduction to the Rigveda', 'An Indian Window on the Cosmos' etc. which are more or less complete.

Besides his own contributions he also ably edited a number of journals such as Journal of the U.P. Historical Society, Lucknow, Journal of the Numismatic Society of India, puranam, Bulletin of the All India Kashiraj Trust, Ramnagar, Varanasi, Bharati, Bulletin of the College of Indology, Banaras Hindu University, Journal of the Museums Association of India, Janapada, Nagari Pracarini Pattrika, etc. He was also editor of the Prakrit Text Society Series, Nepal Endowment Sanskrit Series, Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Sanskrit Publications Board Series, and Indian Civilisation Series. A few commemorative volumes also go to his credit which amply speak of his great abilities and organising capabilities as an editor. He has also written scholarly introductions to a number of works on various subjects which are remarkable for their analytical clarity and wealth of information, e.g. those preceding Angavijja, Prakrit Text Society Series No. 1, pp. 57-85 and Sarthavaha by MotiChandra, pp. 1-15. He was associated with the scheme of 'A New History of the Indian People' and contributed the section on the 'Art of the Gupta Period' in 'The Vakataka Gupta Age' the sixth volume of that scheme. He was also to contribute sections on art in other volumes of this scheme, some of which he wrote and are now available in his 'Studies in Indian Art.' 'I am informed that the chapter VII of Bihar Through the Ages dealing with 'Religion, Society and Culture 325 B.C.-A.D. 320' is his contribution.

Due to his profound knowledge of various aspects of Indian culture he could authoritatively review works pertaining to different branches of Indological studies. His reviews are frank yet polite, and full of constructive discussions and original suggestions. His reviews like those of 'Catalogue of the Gupta Gold Coins in the Bayana Hoard' by Dr. A. S. Altekar (JNSI, Vol. XVII, Part I, pp. 114-123), Apte's enlarged Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Bharati, No. 3, pp. 22-28), Franklin Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (Bharati, No.,

pp. 113-119), Priya Bala Shah's Vishnudharmottara Purana (Bharati, No. 6, part I, pp. i-iii), Bhandarkar Oriental Institute's Mahabharata (Bharati, No. 6, pt. I, pp. v-vii), etc. evince his stature as a scholar and are of great value.

Art historian in him was first moved by the aesthetic qualities of sculpture and later fascinated by its symbolism, the change being due to his Vedic studies. He felt that both literature and art alike represent conceptions realised or inherited by contemporary society and therefore one can be studied with advantage with the help of the other. He was pioneer of such a comparative study.

Like Coomaraswamy, he was equally interested in Indian folk art, literature and religion, and regarded them most integral part of Indian culture. He felt the emergent need of their proper study and thus preservation. His efforts in this direction are embodied in 'Janapada', a journal devoted to all the aspects of Hindi folk lore and Bharatiya Lokadharma besides a great number of articles published in various journals. These studies influenced his Hindi diction.

He could write with equal ease both in English and Hindi. But he profusely wrote in Hindi for he regarded his duty first to acquaint the people closer around with Indian culture and his studies in the field. His writings in both the languages are marked by precision and clarity attacking the problems frontally. In his Hindi writings he has used with great advantage most appropriate words from different local dialects. He has also translated into Hindi R. K. Mookerji's 'Hindi Civilization', in addition to two other works, which show his command over the language and the subject.

His immense work gave him due recognition. He was elected President of the All India Museums Association at Patna (1946) and Ahmedabad (1954), of the Bharatiya Braja Sahitya Mandala at Saharanpur (1949), of the Numismatic Society of India at Nagpur (1950), of the Veda Sammelana (1959), of the Ancient Section of the Indian History Congress at Cuttack (1959), of the Fine Arts and Archaeology Section of the All India Oriental Conference at Bombay and of the All India Oriental Conference at Gauhati (1964), of the Bihar Hindi Sammelan etc. He also delivered Convocation Address at the Bombay Hindi Vidyapitha (1947).

—L. K. TRIPATHI

विषय तो पूर्णतया नया था, अतः रुचि या अरुचि का प्रश्न ही नहीं उठता। काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय में डा० अग्रवाल की प्रसिद्धि ने एम० ए० में 'भारतीय कला एवं स्थापत्य' विषय चयन में प्रेरणा दी। उनका शिष्य बनना प्रत्येक विद्यार्थी के लिये गौरव की बात थी किन्तु मुझे विशेष गर्व इसलिये है कि मैं उनके कृपाप्रसाद के फलस्वरूप लगभग दो वर्षों तक उनके सान्निध्य का लाभ प्राप्त करता रहा और कालान्तर में भी मुझे यह स्नेह मिलता रहा।

वात सन् १९५६ की है। भारतीय कला व स्थापत्य का यह पहला घंटा था। पूरी कक्षा उस प्रोफेसर की प्रतीक्षा में थी जिसकी विद्वत्ता लोक-चर्चा का विषय बन चुकी थी। कुछ ही क्षणों में एक विचित्र से वेपधारी व्यक्ति को कक्षा में प्रवेश करते देख छात्र आदर से खड़े होने लगे और मैंने भी उनका अनुसरण किया। यह उनका प्रथम दर्शन था। मैं किसी बड़े दबंग ठाठवाले प्रोफेसर की प्रतीक्षा में था किन्तु मेरी यह कल्पना मिथ्या निकली जब डा० अग्रवाल सादगी की मूर्ति बने शान्त भाव से बैठ गए। खदर की धोती, कुर्ता व टोपी व ऊपर से बाएँ कंधे पर एक हल्के पीले रंग का दुपट्टा और पैरों में चप्पल। इस सादे वस्त्राभरण में एक स्पृहाशून्य व्यक्तित्व स्पष्ट दीख पड़ता था। उनका यह प्रथम दर्शन मेरे लिए विचित्र किन्तु सत्य किंवदन्ती बन गई। गुरुजी के अधिक निकट पहुँचने में मेरे संस्कृत प्रेम ने सहायता की। उनकी भावनाओं, विचारों और क्रिया-कलापों का मूल स्रोत संस्कृत साहित्य था। संस्कृत-सर में अवगाहन हुए पवित्रीभूत छात्र ही आचार्य का वास्तविक आशीर्वाद प्राप्त करने में समर्थ थे। कक्षा में प्रायः वह कुछ लिखाते और मैं उनके लिखाये नोट्स का प्रत्येक अक्षर लिख लेता था। दूसरे छात्रों की गति जहाँ संस्कृत का उद्धरण आने से रुकने लगती वहाँ मेरी पुस्तिका में अंग्रेजी के बीच वह वाक्य मोती की माला में विशाल मणि के रूप में पिरो लिया जाता। उन्होंने मेरी पुस्तिका देखी और जब कोई छात्र अनुपस्थित रहता तो दूसरे दिन पहले दिन के व्याख्यान के लिए मेरी पुस्तिका से सहायता लेने का संकेत कर देते। यहाँ यह स्मरणीय है कि उस समय तक उनकी Indian Art और Studies in Indian Art पुस्तकें प्रकाशित नहीं हुई थीं। अब मुझे अपने नोट्स को और अधिक व्यवस्थित करने के लिये उनके पास जाने का बहाना मिल गया।

वह रौद्ररूप :—एम० ए० में एक प्रश्नपत्र पर शोध-निबंध लिखा जा सकता था किन्तु मैं डाक्टर साहब के व्याख्यानों पर इतना मुग्ध था कि मैंने दोनों प्रश्नपत्र लिये और शोध-निबंध का मोह त्याग दिया। उन्होंने कक्षा में मूर्तिकला पर कम किन्तु स्थापत्य पर विशेष बल दिया था किन्तु प्रश्नपत्र ठीक विपरीत आया। परीक्षा-भवन में सभी छात्र स्तब्ध से रह गये। मैं अपनी तैयारी व अध्ययन के अनुरूप कुछ नहीं कर सका। आधे समय में ही कापी देकर सीधा डा० साहब के बंगले की ओर चल दिया। वह कुछ पुस्तकों के अवलोकन में व्यस्त थे। थोड़ी देर में उन्होंने मेरी ओर देख कर पूछा, 'क्यों आज

परीक्षा नहीं दी'। मैंने बिना एक शब्द बोले प्रश्नपत्र उनके सामने रख दिया। पढ़ते-पढ़ते उनकी भृकुटि तन गई। 'ओह आई सी' से आरम्भ कर उन्होंने अंग्रेजी में देर तक अपना ज्वार उद्गारित किया। मैं गुरुजी के क्रोधी स्वभाव से परिचित था और कई बार डांट-फटकार सुननी पड़ी थी। किन्तु यह प्रचण्ड रूप तो अभूतपूर्व था। किन्तु उनके हृदय में क्रोध व स्नेह दोनों धारारों बहती थीं। बाएँ कंधे पर दुपट्टा डालते हुये उन्होंने मुझसे उपकुलपति के पास चलने का आदेश दिया और कहा कि 'मैं इस प्रश्नपत्र के स्थान पर शोध निबन्ध दिलाता हूँ'। मैं समझ गया कि यह स्नेह व करुणा का परिणाम है किन्तु मेरा साहस न हुआ कि उनके साथ जाता। केवल अपने स्वार्थ के लिए उनके भावावेश का लाभ उठाना मुझे उचित नहीं प्रतीत हुआ। मेरे अनुनय पर वह रुक तो गए किन्तु न वह संतुष्ट थे और न मैं। उनके रौद्र रूप ने मेरा साहस समाप्त कर दिया था। अतः क्षमा-याचना करता मैं चला आया।

साधना :—परीक्षा के उपरान्त मैंने कुछ गुनने का प्रयास किया। गुरुजी को मेरी सेवा मान्य थी। अब मैं उनके परिवार का अंग बनता जा रहा था। लगभग ५ या ६ घंटे तक डा० साहब धारा-वेग से बोलते और मैं लिखता जाता। उस समय कादम्बरी पर टीका चल रही थी, और यदा-कदा स्फुट लेख। वह तो थकते ही न थे और मैं स्वयं को थका दिखाना नहीं चाहता था। एक साथ बैठकर इतना कार्य करने का अपना स्वभाव तो था नहीं, किन्तु एक सप्ताह में ही मैंने अपनी ऊब पर विजय पा ली और मुझे विषय में रस आने लगा। कभी जिज्ञासावश कोई बात पूछ बैठता तो नेत्र बन्द किए आनन्द-विभोर हुए वह मुझे व्याख्या सुनाते। वह घड़ियाँ भी अविस्मरणीय हैं जब चोटी के विद्वानों का समागम उनके आवास पर होता। स्व० म० म० गिरिधरशर्मा चतुर्वेदी व डा० मोतीचन्द्र जी उनमें प्रमुख हैं। डा० अग्रवाल अथक परिश्रमी थे। प्रतिदिन १६ घंटे से भी अधिक वह सरस्वती-आराधना में बिताते। उनका अध्ययन-कक्ष एक अच्छा पुस्तकालय था जिसमें भारतीय इतिहास, कला व संस्कृति पर लिखे दुर्लभ ग्रंथ संग्रहीत थे। किन्तु गुरुजी अपनी साहित्य-साधना तथा घोर परिश्रम को अपर्याप्त ही मानते रहे। म० म० गिरिधरशर्मा चतुर्वेदी और गुरुजी के बीच चल रही वार्ता के बीच मुझे ज्ञान हुआ कि उनका आदर्श राजस्थान के पं० मोतीलाल शास्त्री थे जो १५ दिन तक एक आसन से बिना उठे ग्रंथ-रचना में लीन रहते थे। उन्हें न भूख लगती, न प्यास और न निद्रा। साहित्य-साधना से प्राप्त आनन्द-अमृत उनको जीवित रखता था। मुझे स्वयं तो यह उक्ति पं० मोतीलाल शास्त्री के प्रति उन दो मनीषियों की अतिशयोक्ति पूर्ण श्रद्धांजलि प्रतीत हुई किन्तु ऐसा लगता है कि डा० साहब ने उस आदर्श को व्यवहार में डालने का प्रयास कर अपने शरीर को समय से पूर्व खो दिया।

सर्वतोमुखी प्रतिभा :—यह तो सर्वविदित है कि डा० अग्रवाल सर्व-तन्त्र-स्वतन्त्र थे। इतिहास हो वा संस्कृति, कला हो या पुरातत्त्व, हिन्दी हो या संस्कृत, शिलालेख हो या मुद्राशास्त्र, वैदिक साहित्य हो या लौकिक, शब्द शास्त्र (व्याकरण) हो अथवा सुमधुर काव्य—वह सभी में समान रूप से आनन्दमग्न रहते थे। किन्तु एक दिन मुझे उस समय आश्चर्य हुआ जब मैंने उनकी मेज पर वंगला सहित्य पर जाँचने के लिए आया डाक्टरेट का शोध

निबंध देखा। चपलता-वश उनसे कहा—‘मुझे पता नहीं था कि आप की बंगला साहित्य में भी गति है और वह भी ऐसी कि डाक्टरेट का थीसिस जाँचने के लिए आये’। चुटकी लेते हुये उन्होंने उत्तर दिया ‘गति-वति क्या है, तुम यह समझ लो कि कलकत्ता विश्वविद्यालय ने गलती से मेरे पास यह थीसिस भेज दिया है।’ उनकी विनीत वाणी से मेरे छात्रोचित चापल्य का कगार ढह गया। संग्रहालय एवं मूर्तिशास्त्र का अध्यक्षता होने के कारण मैं डा० अग्रवाल की सर्वतोमुखी प्रतिभा की उपमा सर्वतोभद्र जैन मूर्ति से दे सकता हूँ जो सभी ओर से दर्शनीय एवं कल्याण-विस्तारिणी थी।

मर्यादा :—मेरी श्रद्धा से वह प्रसन्न थे किन्तु सनातन मर्यादा का अतिक्रमण नहीं होने देना चाहते थे। मैं उन्हें करबद्ध नमस्कार करता था। एक बार अपने एक मित्र के साथ डा० साहब के पास पहुँचा। मित्र ने उनका चरण-स्पर्श किया और संकोचवश मैंने भी मित्र का अनुसरण करना चाहा तो उन्होंने पैर सिकोड़ लिए। वाद में अपनी भावना समझाई।

डा० साहब स्वयं कठोर परिश्रम करते व दूसरों से भी ऐसी ही अपेक्षा करते थे। स्मरण है कि १९५७ में जून के महीने की प्रचण्ड धूप और लू में अपने आवास से लगभग ६ मील दूर एक प्रेस में प्रूफ लेने मुझे भेजा था। लौटने पर उनकी स्नेह-सिक्त वाणी और कुछ ही देर में लस्सी के गिलास दोनों ने मेरी थकान दूर कर दी।

शनः-शनैः उनका स्नेह इस सीमा तक पहुँच गया कि अब वह मेरे व्यक्तिगत जीवन के प्रति चिन्तित रहने लगे। उनके शब्दों में ‘संस्कारनिष्ठ ब्राह्मण-कुमार’ का वह कुछ भला करना चाहते थे। व्यक्तिगत जीवन-सम्बन्धी कुछ समस्याओं का उत्तर बड़ी आत्मीयता से दिया करते। एक दिन उन्होंने भारतीय पुरातत्त्व सर्वेक्षण के तत्कालीन संयुक्त महानिदेशक श्री टी० एन० रामचन्द्र के नाम पत्र लिख कर मुझे दिल्ली जाने की आज्ञा दी। मैंने आदेश का पालन किया। कुछ दिन बाद डा० यज्ञदत्त शर्मा को पत्र दिया और मुझे गुरु-प्रसाद मिल गया।

डाँट :—एक बार मैं काशी गया और डा० साहब के दर्शन किये। मैंने उनसे कार्य-विधि का परिचय देते हुए मार्ग-दर्शन की अर्थना की। उन्होंने मुझे कुछ बातें नोट करने को कहा किन्तु मेरे पास डायरी या नोटबुक नहीं थी। उन्होंने कागज बढ़ाते हुए डाँटा—‘एक्सप्लोरेशन क्या करते हो कि नोटबुक तक पास में नहीं।’ मैं ब्रीडा से नतमस्तक हो गया। तब से नोटबुक मेरी चिरसंगिनी बन गई है।

इसी प्रकार एक बार लखनऊ संग्रहालय में कार्य-सम्बन्धी कठिनाई की मैंने चर्चा की जिसे वह चुपचाप सुन गए। और दूसरे दिन फिर बात चल पड़ी तो उन्होंने मुझे आड़े हाथों लिया—‘दो दिन से तुम्हारी कठिनाइयों का ताँता चल रहा है, किन्तु क्या समस्याओं के रहते कार्य नहीं किया जा सकता। कठिनाइयों का पुल बखानना अभिरुचि की कमी बताता है।’ आदर्श वातावरण मिलना असम्भव है। जहाँ समस्याओं से जूझते हो वहाँ रचनात्मक कार्य के लिये भी समय निकालो। मुझे एक दिशा मिली और लखनऊ लौटकर लिखने-पढ़ने में जुट गया। कुछ लेखों के रिप्रिंट भेजकर उन्हें आस्वस्त किया।

उनकी बड़ी इच्छा थी कि जिस प्रकार मथुरा संग्रहालय का विस्तृत सूचीपत्र (Catalogue) निकला है उसी प्रकार लखनऊ संग्रहालय का निकलता। अपनी यह भावना उन्होंने एक दिन बड़े दुःखार्त स्वर में व्यक्त की। मैंने लौटकर सूचीपत्र की एक योजना बनाई। कुछ प्रगति हुई किन्तु वास्तविक कार्य के सूत्रपात में कुछ समय लग गया। आशा है अब गुरुजी की आत्मा को शान्ति मिलेगी।

डा० साहव दिल्ली में कभी-कभी राष्ट्रकवि स्व० मैथिलीशरणजी गुप्त के आवास पर रुकते थे। भारत की दो विभूतियों के एक साथ दर्शन के संयोग से मैं क्यों चूकता ?

उनके यथासमय पत्र मिलने का भी मुझे सौभाग्य रहा है। कुछ पत्र अभी भी सुरक्षित हैं। मेरे विवाह के निमन्त्रण-पत्र के उत्तर में उन्होंने कालिदास के इस वाक्य को लिख कर शुभ कामना व्यक्त की थी 'कालोह्यं संक्रमितं द्वितीयं सर्वोप्रकारक्षममाश्रमं ते'। कालिदास के साहित्य की ओर मेरी अभिरुचि थी किन्तु डा० साहव की अनुठी व्याख्या ने सोने में सुगन्ध का कार्य किया। उदाहरणार्थ एक पद की व्याख्या देता हूँ। रघुवंश के द्वितीय सर्ग का दूसरा श्लोक है—

तस्याः खुरन्यासपवित्रपांसुमपांघुलानां धुरि कीर्तनीया।

मागं मनुष्येऽवरधर्मपत्नी श्रुतेरिवार्थं स्मृतिरन्वगच्छत् ॥

सुदक्षिणा ने गाय के चरणन्यास का उसी प्रकार अनुसरण किया जैसा कि श्रुति का अनुसरण स्मृति करती है। अन्तिम चरण को वह कालिदास के समय (गुप्त युग) को समझने की कुंजी बताते थे। इसी प्रकार कुछ और पदों की व्याख्या की और मुझे साहित्य में शोध की नई दशा मिली। इसी दृष्टि से मैंने कालान्तर में वाल्मीकि रामायण का अध्ययन किया जिससे मुझे सर्वथा नवीन आनन्द मिला।

लखनऊ संग्रहालय में वह मेरी उपस्थिति में केवल एक बार पधारे थे और वस्तुओं के वर्गीकरण का सुझाव दिया था। वहाँ वर्गीकरण हुआ अवश्य किन्तु अभी डा० साहव की रुचि व स्तर के अनुकूल नहीं माना जा सकता।

संस्मरण अनेक है और लिखते-लिखते उनकी सौम्य मूर्ति व स्नेहपूर्ण व्यवहार से नेत्र छलक पड़ते हैं। उस दिन मेरे ऊपर वज्रपात-सा हुआ जब राष्ट्रीय संग्रहालय दिल्ली में श्रीरत्नचन्द्रजी अग्रवाल ने सहसा बताया कि भारतीय संस्कृति-भवन का वह स्तम्भ टूट गया। मुझे न केवल उनके निकट आने का सुअवसर मिला अपितु उन संस्थाओं में कार्य करने का भी सौभाग्य मिला है जिनमें मेरे गुरुदेव ने साधना की थी। लखनऊ व मथुरा संग्रहालय उस 'वासुदेव' के भीने सौरभ से सदा सुवासित रहेंगे। मनीषी की पुण्य-स्मृति उनका क्रियात्मक अनुसरण करने की क्षमता प्रदान करे।

मथुरा संग्रहालय में डा० अग्रवाल का योगदान

डा० अग्रवाल मथुरा संग्रहालय में दो बार नियुक्त हुए। प्रथम बार २२ जून १९३१ से २० फरवरी १९३४ तक और पुनः २३ मई १९३५ से १५ अप्रैल १९३९ तक। इस प्रकार वह कुल लगभग ७ वर्ष मथुरा संग्रहालय के अध्यक्ष पद पर रहे और इस अवधि में उन्होंने अनेक महत्वपूर्ण कार्य सम्पादित किए :—

- १—उनके कार्यकाल में संग्रहालय अपने वर्तमान भवन में सज्जित हुआ और २५ जनवरी १९३३ को तत्कालीन गवर्नर हेली ने उसका उद्घाटन किया ।
- २—उसी अवसर पर उन्होंने संग्रहालय की एक छोटी परिचय-पुस्तिका (Museum Handbook) प्रकाशित की ।
- ३—संग्रहालय की वीथिकाओं में प्रथम बार उन्होंने ही मथुरा मूर्तियों का प्रदर्शन किया ।
- ४—इसी के साथ उन्होंने मूर्तियों पर एक शोध निबन्ध तैयार किया ।
- ५—कुछ गन्वार मूर्तियाँ संग्रहालय के लिये प्राप्त की गईं और प्रथम बार उनका वीथिकाओं में प्रदर्शन हुआ ।
- ६—डा० अग्रवाल ने ही संग्रहालय में मुद्रा अनुभाग (Numismatic Section) का सूत्रपात किया । किन्तु यह अनुभाग दर्शकों के लिये अभी तक नहीं खुल सका है ।

७—एक अन्य चिरस्मरणीय योगदान जो उन्होंने संग्रहालय छोड़ने के उपरान्त किया वह है संग्रहालय के संकलन का विस्तृत सूचीपत्र-निर्माण जो उत्तर प्रदेश इतिहास परिषद्, लखनऊ द्वारा अपनी पत्रिका के पांच अंकों में प्रकाशित किया गया है । इसमें १९३९ तक संग्रहालय में संग्रहीत वस्तुओं का विवरण है :—

1. Catalogue of the Mathura Museum : Part 1, Buddha and Bodhisattva Images, J.U.P.H.S., 1946, pp. 42-98.
2. Catalogue of the Brahmanical Images : Part 2, J.U.P.H.S., 1949, pp. 112-210.
3. Jaina Tirthankaras and other Miscellaneous figures : Part 3, J.U.P.H.S., 1950.
4. Architectural Pieces : Part 4, J.U.P.H.S., 1951.
5. Supplement : Part 5, J.U.P.H.S., 1952.

लखनऊ संग्रहालय में डा० अग्रवाल का योगदान

डा० अग्रवाल लखनऊ संग्रहालय में अप्रैल १९३९ से जनवरी १९४६ तक संग्रहालयाध्यक्ष रहे । संग्रहालय के प्रति उनके योगदान की संक्षिप्त तालिका यह है :—

- १—पुरातत्त्व अनुभाग का पुनर्गठन ।

मूर्तियों का जैन, बौद्ध व ब्राह्मण धर्मानुसार वर्गीकरण । उन्होंने अनुभाग को नवीन सज्जा दी । आज भी मूर्तियों का प्रदर्शन उसी आधार पर है ।

- २—पुनर्गठन के साथ ही उन्होंने अंग्रेजी में एक सचित्र संक्षिप्त परिचय पुस्तिका निकाली :

“A Brief Guide-book to the Archaeological Section of the Provincial Museum, Lucknow.”

अनुभाग के लिए केवल यही पुस्तिका दर्शकों का आधार थी जो पिछले तीन वर्षों से दुर्लभ हो गई है।

३—मूर्तियों को पंजी-बद्ध करने की नवीन वैज्ञानिक पद्धति का उन्होंने ही श्री-गणेश किया जिसके अनुसार पहले वर्ष-संख्या, इसके उपरान्त उस वर्ष में प्राप्ति की क्रम-संख्या दी जाती है। इस प्रणाली का अभी तक अनुसरण हो रहा है। संग्रहालय-शास्त्र की दृष्टि से यह परिवर्तन बड़ा महत्त्वपूर्ण है।

४—लखनऊ में रहते हुये उन्होंने अपने शोध ग्रन्थ लिखे, और अनेक शोध निबन्ध भी प्रकाशित किये।

५—संग्रहालय में प्रस्तर मूर्तियाँ तो पहले से ही बहुल संख्या में थी किन्तु डा० साहव ने मृण्मूर्तियों के संग्रह की ओर विशेष ध्यान दिया। मुख्य रूप से राजघाट की गुप्तकालीन मृण्मूर्तियों से उन्होंने संग्रहालय के पुरातत्त्व अनुभाग को समृद्ध किया।

६—संकलन के साथ ही उन्होंने मृण्मूर्तियों का वर्गीकरण कर उन्हें अनुभाग की ऊपरी वीथिका में सजाया। स्थानाभाव के कारण आज यह वीथिका मृण्मूर्तियों का सुरक्षित संकलन बन गई है और कुछ मूर्तियाँ अन्यत्र प्रदर्शित हैं।

७—डा० अग्रवाल के क्रिया-कलापों की तत्कालीन लखनऊ कमिश्नरी के कमिश्नरों ने जो उस समय संग्रहालय के सभापति होते थे, भूरि-भूरि प्रशंसा की है, यह संग्रहालय की तत्कालीन वार्षिक आख्याओं से पता चलता है।

आज भी चपरासी से लेकर संचालक तक संग्रहालय के कर्मचारी डा० अग्रवाल का स्मरण बड़ी श्रद्धा से करते हैं।

—रमेशचन्द्र शर्मा

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फुल्लालापाः प्रतिपदं पर्यन्ते तीर्थयात्रिणः ।

मुण्ड्यन्ते यत्र पाण्डेयैः तानि तीर्थानि पान्तु नः ॥

—अमृतवाग्भवकृत-सिद्धिमलरहस्यम्

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१९५४ के जुलाई महीने के अन्तिम सप्ताह का एक दिन, भारती महाविद्यालय के एक व्याख्यान-कक्ष में सारा क्लास प्रतीक्षा कर रहा था 'आर्ट' के प्राध्यापक की। लगभग एक वजने को थे, देर हो रही थी, तब तक किसी सहपाठी ने कहा 'आ गये'। और इसके साथ ही प्रविष्ट हुए विख्यात कलामर्मज्ञ डा० अग्रवाल। जोगिया रंग का खदर का कुर्ता, खदर की ही धोती, खदर की ही एक चदर कंधे पर डाले। मनन-यज्ञ की श्रान्ति को प्रतिभासित करता हुआ मुखमण्डल, अध्ययन-तप के कारण दुर्बल शरीर।

यूँ तो पहले से ही हमारा-उनका परिचय था किन्तु आज भारतीय कला की दीक्षा मिलनेवाली थी। सारे लोग उत्सुकता-उत्कण्ठा से उन्हें देखे जा रहे थे। छोटे से व्याख्यान से उस दिन का कार्यक्रम समाप्त हुआ। कक्षा में ही उन्होंने कहा "जिन लोगों ने 'आर्ट एण्ड आर्किटेक्चर' ग्रुप ले रखा है, वे मुझसे मेरे कमरे में मिल लें"। हम तीन लोग थोड़ी देर के बाद उनके कमरे में गये। यही हमारा उनका प्रथम 'विशेष' परिचय था। शील के मूर्तिमान स्वरूप उस कला-मनीषी ने परिचय के बाद कुछ औपचारिक निर्देश दिया; तत्पश्चात् कहा "देखो, जिस गली का अधिक ज्ञान करना हो उस गली में थोड़ा भटक लेना अच्छा रहता है।" अन्य सहपाठियों की बात तो नहीं कहता किन्तु मेरे मन में यह वाक्य देर तक गूँजता रहा, और सच तो यह है कि अध्ययन के सिलसिले में इस वाक्य ने समय-समय मुझे उत्साह और प्रेरणा प्रदान की है।

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एक दिन कक्षा में 'सुन्दर' की चर्चा कर रहे थे और उसी संदर्भ में उन्होंने शिव को 'सुन्दर' की पराकाष्ठा कह दिया। मैं बेतहाशा हँस पड़ा। हँसी में छिपी मेरी मनस्थिति वे ताड़ गये कि उनकी बात मेरे गले के नीचे नहीं हो पा रही है। कहाँ तो विकट भयंकर वेश धारण करने वाला देवता, कहाँ सुन्दर! वस, विषय-चर्चा बढ़ती गई और लगभग पूरे सप्ताह भर इसी विषय पर उन्होंने व्याख्यान दिया। तर्क-कुतर्क करने की मुझे पूरी छूट थी। उन्होंने अपने लिखे लेख 'शिव का स्वरूप' का एक रिप्रिन्ट भी दिया। साथ ही यह भी कहा "अभी चर्चा को समाप्त मत समझो, मेरा यह विश्वास है, और मेरा यह विश्वास एक दिन में नहीं बना"। मैंने सोचा कि बूढ़ापे में विचार वैसे ही रूढ़ हो जाते हैं, कोई खास बात नहीं। कक्षा में चर्चा कभी-कभी फिर हो जाती थी। धीरे-धीरे उस मनीषी ने शिवपरक सौन्दर्य बोध मन में उतार दिया। आज सोचता हूँ कि इस यंत्र युग में यंत्रवत् कक्षा में जाकर इतिकर्तव्यता पूर्ण करने वाले प्राध्यापक तो हैं किन्तु उनमें कितने

ऐसे हैं जो विद्यार्थी को न केवल शास्त्र-बोध कराते हैं बल्कि उन्हें जीवन्त अनुभूतियों से अनुप्राणित भी करते हैं ।

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१९५५ ई० का वर्ष । दशहरे की लम्बी छुट्टी हो गई थी । किन्तु सहपाठियों में अधिकांश घर नहीं गये थे । उत्तर-भारतीय देवायतन-वास्तु कक्षा में पढ़ाया जा चुका था । शिखरों की विभिन्न शलियों का धुंधला-धुंधला प्रकाश मन में था तो, किन्तु वात साफ नहीं थी । अपने सतीर्थ फणि चक्रवर्ती चित्रकार भी थे (अब तो सुना है मूर्तिकार भी हो गये हैं) । उन्होंने एक दिन छुट्टी में ही डा० अग्रवाल से कह सुनाया कि हम तीनों के मस्तिष्क में अभी शैलियों का अन्तर साफ नहीं हुआ है ।

उन्होंने पूछा—चन्द्रभान के भी नहीं ?

‘नहीं, मैं उनके आवास से आ रहा हूँ ।’

‘अच्छा, कल ११ बजे तुम सभी लोग यहीं मिलो ।’

अगले दिन हम तीनों सतीर्थ ‘गुरुगृह’ गये । हमने सोचा था कदाचित् छुट्टियों में उसी विषय को फिर पढ़ायें । पर यहाँ तो कुछ बात ही और निकली । प्रोग्राम बना कि अगले रविवार को कंदवा (कंदमेश्वर) चलेंगे । अगले रविवार डा० अग्रवाल कुछ अस्वस्थ थे । हम तीनों ने आग्रह किया कि प्रोग्राम स्थगित कर दिया जाये । किन्तु ‘योगी-हठ’ के सामने ‘वाल-हठ’ को झुकना पड़ा । वे स्वयं चल पड़े । कंदमेश्वर मन्दिर पहुँच कर जगती से कलश तक एक-एक की व्याख्या करते रहे । ‘शिखर’ पर अधिक देर तक चर्चा करते रहे । फणि ने मन्दिर का एक रेखा-चित्र भी लिया । संध्या होते-होते हम लोग वापस आये । यात्रा की समाप्ति पर उनके क्लान्त मुख-मण्डल पर एक मुस्कान थिरक रही थी जिसमें अन्तर्हित संतुष्टि और गुरु का स्नेह छिप नहीं पा रहा था । क्या आज भी उपाध्यायों में अपने विद्यार्थी के लिये उतना ही निश्चल स्नेह तथा उत्साह है ?

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कक्षा से लेकर उनके आवास तक, व्यक्ति, विद्वान और अध्यापक के रूप में अनेक संस्मरण हैं जिनका वर्णन कहाँ तक किया जा सकता है । भारतीयता के पुजारी, भारतीय आत्मा, प्राचीन ऋषि-गुरुओं की भाँति विद्यार्थी के लिये सहज स्नेहशील, ‘कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेत्’ के आदर्श को अन्त तक निर्वाह करने वाले उस मनीषी के लिये शत शत प्रणाम ।

—चन्द्रभान पाण्डेय

VII

डाक्टर वासुदेवशरण अग्रवाल का निधन भारती विद्या की अपूरणीय क्षति है। जीवेमः शरदः शतम् की कामना वाले माँ भारती के सच्चे सपूत का वासठ वर्ष की अवस्था में ही देहावसान काल का सरस्वती के प्रति द्रोह है। निस्सन्देह वे अकाल मृत्यु को प्राप्त हुए क्योंकि उनकी शक्ति चाहे कितनी ही जर्जर क्यों न थी उनकी प्रतिभा अभी निरन्तर जीवन्मुक्त थी। शरीर को केवल धर्म का साधन मान कर उन्होंने कोई भूल नहीं की क्योंकि उनके जीवन का उद्देश्य शारीरिक अथवा व्यावसायिक उपलब्धियों से कहीं अधिक और परे था। सरस्वती की साधना ही उनका साध्य था और अपनी इस साधना के ही माध्याम से वे प्राचीन भारती विद्या के अमृत तत्व को सर्वसुलभ कर रहे थे। साठ वर्ष की अवस्था में जब वे दीर्घकालीन रूग्णता से मुक्त होकर आये तो उनके शिष्यों ने प्रसन्नतावश उनका सम्मान किया और उनके निरन्तर स्वस्थ रहने की कामना की। कुछ सहयोगियों ने उनसे निवेदन किया कि वे शरीर का ध्यान रखें और आराम करें। उन्होंने जो कुछ किया वह कुछ कम नहीं है। डाक्टर वासुदेवशरण अग्रवालजी ने अपने स्वागत का उत्तर देते हुए कहा कि “यदि मैं आराम करूँ और काम न करूँ तो मेरे जीवन का उद्देश्य ही क्या होगा?” इसी प्रकार “शक्त्या धर्माचरणं” का भी उन्होंने अपना ही अर्थ किया। जब तक उनमें शक्ति थी वे साधना में लगे रहे। अन्तिम साँस तक उन्हें विश्वास न हो सका कि उनकी साधना की शक्ति क्षीण होगी। चिकित्सकों की चेतावनियों की चिन्ता न करते हुए वे अपने में शक्ति के अजस्र प्रवाह की अनुभूति करते रहे। एक क्षण के लिए भी साधना से विरत न हुए। शरीर से विवश हो जाने पर भी उनका मन भारती विद्या की किसी न किसी गुत्थी से उलझा रहा। मधुमेह ने उनके शरीर को जर्जर कर दिया था। किन्तु मृत्यु उनकी आकस्मिक ही थी। मृत्यु के तीन मिनट पूर्व तक वे पूर्णतया स्वस्थ थे। एकाएक उनकी हृद्गति बन्द हुई और हृदय से रक्तस्राव हुआ। कौन जाने ऐसा उनके जर्जर शरीर की उनके चिन्तन-प्रसूत श्रम के बोझ को सह सकने की असमर्थता के कारण ही हुआ हो? मुझे तो लगता है कि वे सच्चे अर्थों में योगी थे जिन्होंने ध्यान की अवस्थिति में ही निर्वाण प्राप्त किया।

बहुमुखी प्रतिभा के धनी डाक्टर वासुदेवशरण अग्रवाल व्यक्ति नहीं संस्था थे। उनमें एकाधिक व्यक्तियों का समावेश था। अर्थविद्या से प्रतीकविद्या तक, पाणिनि के सूत्रों से राजपूत चित्रकला तक, पद्मावत से वेद तक उनकी पहुँच थी। भारतीय विद्या के अनुशीलन के लिए उपादेय सभी साधनों से वे सम्पन्न थे। वैदिक व्याकरण, संस्कृत, साहित्य, पालि, प्राकृत और अपभ्रंश भाषा, सभी प्राचीन विधियों का उन्होंने अच्छा अभ्यास किया था। पुराणों में उनका मन रमता था और वे इसे वेद की कुंजी मानते थे। अपने पुराण भाष्यों से उन्होंने स्पष्ट कर दिया कि पुराणकारों का यह कथन कि पुराणों ने वेदों का उपबृंहण किया है—मिथ्या नहीं है। वैदिक प्रतीकों का तात्पर्य उन्होंने पुराणों से समझा और उन प्रतीकों के सांस्कृतिक महत्त्वों की व्याख्या उनके द्वारा सम्पन्न हुई।

दीर्घतमस् की अलौकिक दृष्टि की छाप सारनाथ के घमेक स्तूप के अलंकरणों में देख पाना यह उनकी ही प्रतिभा की विशेषता थी। अनेक वैदिक प्रतीकों की परम्परा उन्होंने आधुनिक लोकजीवन और मांगलिक उत्सवों में ढूँढ़ी। इस क्षेत्र में उनकी ऐसी अनेक सफलताएँ न केवल यह सिद्ध करती हैं कि वे परमशास्त्रज्ञ थे अपितु इस तथ्य का भी उद्घाटन करती हैं कि उनकी पैनी दृष्टि शास्त्र की ही तरह लोक जीवन के अध्ययन में भी केन्द्रित थी। लोक जीवन और धर्म के मर्मज्ञ होने के नाते ही वे अनेक ऐसे शब्दों का सटीक अर्थ बता सकने में समर्थ होते थे जिनके विषय में कोश मौन रहते थे।

वे वेद के मर्मज्ञ थे और उनका तात्पर्य आधुनिक सन्दर्भों में भी समझाते थे। अथर्व-वेद के पृथ्वीसूक्त पर वे इतने मोहित थे, विशेषकर “माता भूमिः पुत्रोऽहं पृथिव्याः” पर कि इसे उन्होंने अपने जीवन का मन्त्र ही मान लिया। इसका तात्पर्य उन्होंने समझा और इसी मन्त्र को चरितार्थ करने में उन्होंने अपना जीवन उत्सर्ग कर दिया। इस मन्त्र ने उन्हें देश भक्ति के आदर्श स्वरूप का दर्शन कराया था। वे मानते थे कि हर भारतीय जीवन के चाहे जिस क्षेत्र में ही क्यों न हो उत्सर्ग की भावना से अनुप्राणित होकर जो कुछ उसे करने के लिए सौंपा गया है, करता चले। वे कर्तव्य के मूक उपासक थे अतएव उनकी शक्ति साधना ही में केन्द्रित रही और इधर-उधर न बिखर सकी। समाज का ऋण मानते हुए उन्होंने अपनी साधना चलायी, उनकी विद्या-साधना आत्मकेन्द्रित न थी अपितु वे अपने अध्ययन-प्रसूत नवनीत को सर्वसुलभ बनाना चाहते थे। “बहुजन हिताय बहुजन सुखाय” की भावना ने ही उन्हें निरन्तर कार्यरत रखा। यही कारण है कि अकेले एक व्यक्ति द्वारा जो कुछ लिखा पढ़ा गया वह एक व्यक्ति की देन न होकर अनेक की प्रतीत होती है। उनकी रचना की विविधता भी आश्चर्य में डालने वाली है। एक ओर सांस्कृतिक अध्ययनों की भरमार (हर्षचरित, कादम्बरी, वामन पुराण, मार्कण्डेय पुराण, पद्मावत, अष्टाध्यायी आदि) दूसरी ओर वेदों के एक-एक सूक्त और प्रतीक पर स्वतन्त्र चारिका। एक ओर गीता-नवनीत तो दूसरी ओर लोक-कथा और संस्कृति पर लिखे गये मनोरंजक और विचारोत्तेजक निबन्ध। अकेले यदि कला ही के क्षेत्र को लीजिये तो भी कुछ नहीं। मिट्टी की प्राचीन मूर्तियों को कौन कहे ठीकरों से लेकर स्तूप-कला की अनेक वारीकियों को उन्होंने समझा और समझाया। मयूरा और गुप्त कला सम्प्रदायों को तो उन्होंने उन कलाओं की लीला-भूमि में जाकर निरखा-परखा। अभिलेख से लेकर मुद्राओं के अध्ययन में वे अपना सानी नहीं रखते थे। मुद्रा परिषद् के तो वे अध्यक्ष तक रह चुके थे। भारतीय संस्कृति के समग्र स्वरूप पर उनकी दृष्टि थी। अतएव वे स्रोत की एकरसता में विश्वास न करते थे। पुरातत्त्व से लेकर साहित्य के साक्ष्यों की प्रामाणिकता तक सब पर उनका समान विश्वास था। वे साहित्य के महारथी थे और विविध प्राचीन तथा अर्वाचीन भाषाओं के सौमनस्य के लिए प्रयत्नशील रहते थे। अथर्ववेद के ऋषियों की तरह वे चाहते थे कि यह पृथ्वी (भारत) नाना भाषाओं और बोलियों से गुंजित होती रहे (जनं विभ्रती बहुधा विवाच-सम्...)। वे मानते थे कि हिन्दी के प्रति आग्रह का अर्थ दूसरी भाषाओं का विरोध नहीं है। हिन्दी के अनन्य उपासक और प्रवर्धक होते हुए भी उनकी दृष्टि हिन्दी से सम्बद्ध अनेक बोलियों तथा अहिन्दी भाषाओं के भी उन्नयन पर थी। वे अंग्रेजी में बहुत लिखते थे, किन्तु

इसी भावना से कि वह भी एक भाषा है, जिसके बहुत से जानकार अहिंदी जगत् में है । इसी प्रकार प्राचीन भाषाओं पर भी उनकी आस्था थी । संस्कृत पर तो उन्होंने बहुत लिखा है । संस्कृत और पालि से मिश्रित भाषा, जिसका दर्शन हमें दिव्यावदान आदि अवदान या अपदान साहित्य में मिलता है, पर भी उनका अच्छा अधिकार था (दिव्यावदान का उन्होंने सम्पादन किया है, जो अभी अंशतः ही मुद्रित है) । प्राकृत और अपभ्रंश के उद्धार के लिए उन्होंने प्राकृत टेक्स्ट सोसाइटी की स्थापना की । इस संस्था के माध्यम से उन्होंने 'अंगविज्जा' जैसा विशाल ग्रंथ सम्पादित किया ।

वे आदर्श गुरु थे । हजारों पुस्तकों के बीच बैठे एक तपस्वी की भाँति वे साधनारत रहते थे । जब कोई जाता तो वे प्रसन्नता व्यक्त करते हुए उसका स्वागत करते, बैठने का इशारा करते और फिर जो करते रहते उसी में जुट जाते । एक नहीं अनेक आगन्तुक आते-जाते और चुपचाप बैठे रहते । जब फुरसत मिलती तो सबकी सुनते, सुनते और जवाब देते । अहर्निश शास्त्र चर्चा से गुंजित उनका निवास-स्थान वैदिक तपस्वियों का आश्रम बन गया था । वह खुद लिखते (जो शरीर की रुग्णता के साथ ही कम होता जा रहा था) और कभी आशु-लिपिक को अथवा टाइपिस्टों की सहायता लेते । जब कोई न रहता तो अपने पुत्र पृथ्वी को बुलाते और टेपरेकॉर्ड चालू कर देते । तब ऐसी स्थिति आयी कि उनका जो प्रकाशित साहित्य है, उससे कहीं अधिक उनका लिखित साहित्य है । जो वे अपने साथ ले गये उसकी तो बात ही क्या है ?

काशी से उन्हें अपार प्रेम था । काशी उनकी प्रेरणा का स्रोत भी था । मुक्तिधाम काशी में उनका निर्वाण उनकी आस्थाओं के अनुरूप ही था ।

—बलराम श्रीवास्तव

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—[prepared by P. K. Agrawala]



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SĀDHARMYA, SĀDRŚYA AND UPAMĀ

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1. SĀDHARMYA AND SĀDRŚYA, TWO RELATIONS

From a commonplace point of view no difference is conceived to exist between the concepts of *sādrśya* and *sādharmya*. In Sanskrit poetics too, these two essentially different concepts are often identified with and misconceived for each other. It maybe said that very few significant efforts have been made in Sanskrit poetics to point out the real difference between these two and to interpret them in a rigorously logical way. Due to the lack of this exact logical discrimination there were many problems in poetics for which no satisfactory solution was found. This paper attempts to define these two concepts more categorically and suggest a possible solution to the problems based on this distinction with special reference to the definition and classification of *upamā*.

At the outset, it is necessary to study the definitions of these concepts. The best available definitions are given by Śrī Vāmanācārya Jhaḷkīkar in his Sanskrit commentary *Bālabodhinī* on the *Kāvya prakāśa* of Maṃmaṭa. This is perhaps the first rigorous attempt in Sanskrit poetics to bring out the distinction so clearly. In the second edition of his *Bālabodhinī* Jhaḷkīkar gives the definitions as *yaḥ sādharmaṇa-dharmapratiyogikaḥ upamānopameyobhāyānuyogikaḥ sambandhaḥ sa sādharmyam ucyate, yas ca upamānapratyiyogikaḥ upameyānuyogikaḥ sambandhaḥ sa sādṛśyam ity ucyate iti sādharmyasādrśyayor bhedaḥ*.¹ This definition states that *sādharmya* is a relation of the common quality to *upamāna* and *upameya*. In a subsequent discussion Jhaḷkīkar adds a qualification *saṃānadharma-nimittakaḥ* to this definition of *sādrśya*. Thus *sādrśya* is a relation of *upamāna* to *upameya* causally conditioned by the *saṃānadharma* 'common quality'. In the first edition he defines both the concepts as relations between *upamāna* and *upameya*, in the second edition he gives the above stated definitions, while surprisingly enough a footnote in the fourth edition² says that the definitions of the first edition are correct while those of

¹ *Bālabodhinī* on the *Kāvya prakāśa*, by Vāmanācārya Jhaḷkīkar, BSS. published by BORI, second edition, p. 541.

² *Bālabodhinī*, first edition, p. 541, and *Bālabodhinī*, fourth edition, p. 545, fn.

the second edition are not correct. (It is doubtful whether this footnote was added by the author, since the original definitions of the second edition seem to be retained in the body of the text and it is this footnote that makes out the above point. It is possible that it is a note added by the editor of the fourth edition Prin. R. D. Karmarkar.) For the purpose of this paper the above stated definitions of the second edition are of value and the discussion that follows will bring out their intrinsic significance.

The definition of *sādharmya* has been criticised by some scholars.¹ The arguments offered in criticism of this definition maybe summarised as follows :

If *sādharmya* is defined as a relation of the common quality to 'upamāna and upameya' (*upamānopameyobhayānuyogikaḥ sādharmaṇadharma-pratīyogikaḥ sambandhaḥ*), then it follows that (i) it is the relation of the common quality to *upamāna*, and (ii) it is the relation of the common quality to *upameya*. If the relation (i) is *sādharmya* then the common quality and *upamāna* must have some other common quality. So also if the relation (ii) is *sādharmya* then the common quality and *upameya* must have some other common quality. In both these cases there can be no other common quality than *padārthatva*. This common quality as *padārthatva* is certainly not intended to be conveyed. For his reason the above definition is illogical.

If carefully examined, the original statement of the definition does not mean that *sādharmya* is a pair of relations. *Upamāna-and-upameya* is one *anuyogin*, a single relatum. The separation of one relatum into two as it is done above is unacceptable to *nyāya* methods in accordance with which the definition was presented. The relation of A to B-and-C is not the same as the relation of A to B or C or the pair of these two relations. Here B-and-C is one *sambandhin* 'relatum' and signifies the relation of A simultaneously to B-and-C. As far as this relation is concerned B and C as separate entities have no significance. Similarly in this definition *upamāna-and-upameya* is one *sambandhin* having the status of *anuyogin* and there are no two separate *sambandhins* or relata. *Sādharmya* is thus the relation of the common quality simultaneously to *upamāna-and-upameya* and not to *upamāna* or *upameya* or both of these relations.

¹ Marāṭhī edition of the *Kāvya-prakāśa*, by Arjunwadkar-Mangrulkar, first edition, Bombay, 1962, notes section, p. 364. The editors are not sure as to who has given the above referred to footnote in the fourth edition of the *Bālabodhinī*.

The significance of this relation and its nature will be clear in the following discussions in this paper.

It is very interesting to note that the *Tarkasaṅgraha* defines¹ *sāmānya* as *nityam ekam anekānugataṁ sāmānyam*. Apart from the philosophical impact of the element *nityam*, it is clear that *sāmānya* is *ekam anekānugataṁ*. Unless a *dharma* participates in or is related to more than *dharmin* 'substratum' it cannot be designated as *sāmānya* or *samāna*. *Sādharmya* is a relation of participation of a common quality in *upamāna*-and-*upameya* simultaneously. *Upamāna* and *upameya* separately can be said to be participated in by a quality but not by a common quality, since it is the common participation that leads to the designation *common*. The point to be noted is that in the relation of *sādharmya* the common quality is not a causal condition but is directly involved in the relation itself as one relatum. It is a relation 'of the common quality' and not caused by the common quality. The definitions given by Jhaḷkīkar are thus very important and help to have distinct idea of these concepts. The following study into the nature of *sādharmya* and *sādrśya* is based on these two important definitions.

First, the vital and important distinctions between these two concepts must be put forth in clear terms. It can be said that *sādharmya* is directly concerned with the common quality which forms one relatum by itself. It is, however, not a relation between *upamāna* and *upameya* but of both of them simultaneously to *samānadharmas*. *Sādrśya* is defined as a relation between *upamāna* and *upameya* and is causally conditioned by the common quality which does not form a relatum of this relation. In plain language it maybe said that the fact that two things have something common in them corresponds to the relation of *sādharmya*, whereas the result, i.e. the fact that the two things themselves appear similar to each other on account of the common quality that participates in both of them, corresponds to the relation of *sādrśya*. *Sādharmya* is the relation of two objects with a common quality participating in them, whereas *sādrśya* is the relation of one object to another on account of this common quality. The two concepts can be further analysed. Two objects, at the same time, may possess some common qualities and also some non-common characteristically individual qualities. The common qualities will lead to *sādharmya* while the non-common qualities will lead to *vaidharmya* or absence of common participation. Thus the same object can stand as a

¹ *Tarkasaṅgraha*, ed. Athalye-Bodas, second edition, p. 60.

relatum of *sādharmya* relation and also as a relatum of *vaidharmya* relation, and such a position does not involve any contradiction. The term *sādrśya* itself implies the concept of *samāna-darśana* 'synthetic vision of similarity' of the two objects. The two objects appear to be similar and they appear so because they possess some common quality. These two are different considerations and though related to each other must be distinguished out of logical necessity. The observation of the common qualities is a preliminary stage in having a synthetic vision of the similarity of the two objects, a vision in which two things as two wholes appear to be similar irrespective of the differences they have. In this synthetic vision the participation of the common quality is a causal condition, though not the only causal condition as it will be pointed out. It can be said that two objects can have only *sādrśya* with reference to a particular person and particular time and there can not be *vaisādrśya* with reference to the same situation. Two things do not appear similar and dissimilar to a person at the same time. This is what is meant by the synthetic vision of similarity of two things as two wholes. This vision, though causally conditioned by the participation of some particular common quality, does not have that particular reference in itself but is of a generalised nature in which particular common and non-common elements are merged to form a coherent opinion. If the common qualities are effective, the coherent opinion will be inclined to *sādrśya*, while, if the non-common qualities are effective, it will be inclined to *vaisādrśya*. This is what I intend to convey by the term 'synthetic vision'.

Sādharmya and *vaidharmya* wholly depend upon objective observation of a situation. If there are common qualities, an observer has to accept the objects as *sadharmya* and the relation as *sādharmya*. Similarly if there are non-common qualities, one must accept *vaidharmya*. There is very little scope for one's personal opinion. They are basically of the nature of an objective description of two entities with particular reference to what is common to both and what is not common to both of them. *Sādrśya*, on the contrary, does not merely depend upon the participation of the common qualities but depends on some other very important factors as well. There may exist common qualities and even then one may not think that the things are similar. The person has to accept *sādharmya* while he is free to pass his cumulative judgement on the similarity of the two objects : he may or may not accept *sādrśya*. The element of subjectivity in the form of the attitudes, personal inclinations and likings of the observer plays an extremely important rôle in the constitution of the

synthetic vision of similarity of two objects as two wholes. The term *sādrśya* by its etymology makes a reference to *samāna-darśana* in which *darśana* clearly indicates this subjective element of 'vision'. A *darśana* 'vision' always depends on a *draṣṭṛ* 'one who sees'. The term *sādharmya* makes a reference to the existence of the qualities and has no subjective element whatsoever. *Sādrśya* is the cumulative result of the interactions of the impressions of the common and non-common qualities of two objects with the personal element of opinion. The interpretation of a situation results in *sādrśya*. It is this observer in the sphere of poetry who is named as *sahṛdaya* by Sanskrit poetics. *Sādharmya* is analytical in its character, while the nature of *sādrśya* is synthetic. *Sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* can be compared to collecting data, while *sādrśya* and *vaisādrśya* resemble a judgement passed after the consideration of the matter as a whole. *Sādharmya* is a truly logical process while *sādrśya* is of a psychological nature. This logical character of *sādharmya* led *nyāya* and other branches of Hindu learning to attribute to it the position of a logical category, while *sādrśya* is often treated under the discussion of *upamitipramāṇa* in various *śāstra*-works. The treatment of these two concepts in various *śāstras* must be studied briefly to have an idea of the general speculation on this subject.

The basic concepts of *sādharmya* and *sādrśya* did occur to many thinkers in the past. It seems that, though there are few efforts to distinguish these two concepts in *śāstra* traditions, the expressions of many thinkers somehow show the existence of two stages in the realisation of similarity. They indicate a distinction though not well defined. Nāgēśa, who elsewhere distinguishes between these two stages clearly, speaks of *upamānatva* in his *Paramalaghumañjūṣā*¹ as *upamānopameyobhayanīś-thasādhāraṇadharmavatvena*...etc. Here he shows the existence of a relation of the common quality to *upamāna*-and-*upameya*. His expression closely corresponds the definition of *sādharmya* given by Jhaḷkikar as discussed above in the beginning of this paper. It is the concept of *Upamāna*-and-*upameya* as one relatum that is indicated by Nāgēśa's ex-

¹ *Paramalaghumañjūṣā*, M. S. University of Baroda Research Series 7, ed. Pt. Kalikaprāsada Shukla, 1961, p. 121. In his *Laghumañjūṣā*, Nāgēśa has devoted a comprehensive section of his *Nipātārthanirpūṇa* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1925, pp. 617-647) to the consideration of all questions pertaining to *upamā*, *sādrśya*, *sādhāraṇadharmasambandha*, *upamānatva*, *upameyatva* etc. In fact Jhaḷkikar also is much influenced by Nāgēśa's discussions.

pression *ubhayaniṣṭha*. The element *niṣṭha* shows the concept of participation. The *Nyāyakoṣa* by Bhīmācārya Jhaḷkīkar provides very interesting information about these two concepts of *sādharmya* and *sādrśya* as discussed in various *śāstras*. In the opinion of the thinkers of the Mīmāṃsā school,¹ *sādrśya* is different from the well known seven categories such as *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karman*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya*, and *abhāva*. It is to be noted that *sādrśya* has been considered as a separate category other than *sāmānya*. The Navya-nyāya school¹ follows the opinion of the Mīmāṃsā school. *Sādrśya* comes to be defined as *tadbhinnatve sati tad-gatabhūyodharmavattvam* 'a property of an entity of being different from another entity and possessing a number of its characteristics'. This definition is quite a good definition but the definition given by Jhaḷkīkar makes the concept more vivid than this definition. *Sādrśya* is presented in the form of a property rather than in terms of a relation. The same thing is seen in the treatment of *sādharmya* which is conceived to be identical with the *sāmānādharmya* or the common quality, and is not thought of in terms of a relation. In the expression *kamalam iva mukhaṁ sundaram* according to the Navya-nyāya school *saundarya* 'beauty' is the *sādharmya* of the two entities *mukha* and *kamala*. The *Nyāyamuktāvalī*¹ says that *padārthatva*, *abhidheyatva* (substance-ness, namability) etc. are the *sādharmyas* 'common qualities' of all the seven categories mentioned above. *Sādharmya* is defined as a quality that exists in one object and is also found in the objects other than the first.¹ The Vaiśeṣikas, too, agree on this point with the Naiyāyikas. Sadānanda, an eminent Vaiśeṣika author, defines *sādharmya* as¹ *anugato dharmah* 'a quality that continues in more than one *dharmin*'.

Often it is maintained in the works of the Nyāya school, that the determination of *vyāpti* 'pervasion, concomitance' is to be accomplished by means of *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya*. The method comes very close to the method of agreement and difference. The *Ambākartrī*, a recent commentary on the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari² speaks of the function of reasoning as *sādharmyavaidharmyamūlakābhyāṁ dṛṣṭāntābhyāṁ hi tarko vastu sādhayitum prakramate, te ca sādharmyavaidharmye avyavasthite/sattayā hi sarveṣāṁ sādharmyam eva, viśeṣarūpatayā ca sarveṣāṁ vaidharmyam eva iti*: 'taking recourse to illustrations based on com-

¹ All these references are taken from the *Nyāyakoṣa* by Bhīmācārya Jhaḷkīkar, see on *sādrśya*, and *sādharmya*.

² Ambākartrī on the *Vākyapadīya*, I Kāṇḍa, by Raghunātha Śarman, *Sarasvatībhavana-granthamālā* 91, p. 81.

mon and non-common properties the reasoning attempts to establish facts. These common and non-common properties are, however, uncertain. By the property of existence all entities have *sādharmya*, while by individual particularities all entities have *vaidharmya* alone'. The terms *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* are used here not in the strict sense of 'quality' but a property of things in which this *dharma* is involved. It is not clear whether the terms *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* refer to a relation, but they certainly seem to refer to something over and above the common or non-common qualities. In the Nyāya school, the logical fallacy of false analogy is termed as *sādharmyasama*. The term is very significant since it clearly brings out two levels or stages in the realization of similarity of two objects. The entities are considered as *sama* on account of *sādharmya*. A discussion exemplifying the defect of *sādharmyasama* in the *Gautamasūtrabhāṣya*¹ throws some light on the problem. The passage runs as follows: *kriyāvān ātmā/dravyasya kriyāhetugunayogāt/ dravyam loṣṭaḥ kriyāhetugunayuktaḥ kriyāvān/tathā c'ātmā/tasmāt kriyāvān iti/ evaṃ upasaṃhṛte paraḥ sādhar-myenaiva pratyavatiṣṭhate/niṣkriyā ātmā/vibhuno dravyasya niṣkriyatvāt/ vibhu c'ākāśaṃ niṣkriyam ca/tathā c'ātmā/tasmān niṣkriyā iti/na c'asti viśeṣahetuḥ kriyāvatsādharmyāt kriyāvatā bhavitavyam, na punar akriyā-sādharmyān niṣkriyeneti/*: 'The Self is possessed of action. The reason is that a substance is possessed of a quality causing action. A stick is a substance possessed of a quality causing action and is possessed of action. The same holds good for the Self. Hence it is possessed of action. After this conclusion, the other party also defends himself taking recourse to the same device of a common property. The Self is inactive. Indeed, an all pervading substance is inactive. Space is all pervading and is inactive. So is the Self. Hence it is not possessed of action. And there is no specific reason why the Self should be possessed of action by sharing a property with things possessed of action, and not inactive by sharing a property with inactive things'. The passage makes it abundantly clear how things as wholes are considered to be similar due to the fact that they share some common properties. The tendency of the human mind to have a 'synthesis' is reflected in this discussion. Since one observes the fact of common participation in some respect, one forgets the non-common features and thinks of two entities as wholes equalling each other. From this psychological process results the fallacy of *sādharmyasama*. This passage thus shows awareness of the thinkers of the Nyāya school in connection with

¹ See the *Nyāyakoṣa* on the term *sādharmyasama*.

what is discussed earlier as a 'synthetic vision of the similarity of two entities as two wholes'.

A passage¹ from the *Jainendramahāvṛtti* of Abhayānandin, a commentary on the *Jainendravṛtyākaraṇa*, is also very important in this connection. The passage runs as follows: *akārākārayoḥ hrasvadīrghakālabhedena vaidharmye' pi tulyasthānakaraṇatvena sādharmaṃyāṃ astī' ti svasaṅ-jñāvyaṃvahrāḥ sidhyati/yadi ca sādharmaṃyāṃ eva syāt tadā astitvena iva anyair api dharmair sādharmaṃyāṃ sarvaṃ ekaṃ prasajyeta/yadi ca vaidharmyaṃ eva syāt tadā kasyacid astitvaṃ aparasya nāstivaṃ anyasya cā 'nyat syāt :* 'Though the sounds *a* and *ā* are different in short and long time-lengths, they have common participation with respect to identical points of articulation and articulators and hence their designation *sva* (counterpart of Pāṇini's *savarṇa* 'concordant sound') is established. If there would have been common participation alone (in all respects), then along with existentiality all other properties participating in those two entities being common, all would be "one". If there would be absence of common participation (in all respects), then would result existence of one entity, non-existence of the other, and each would be totally different'. This passage brings the concept of *sādharmaṃyā* much closer to what has been stated at the outset. The author speaks of *sādharmaṃyā* and *vaidharmaṃyā* as having reference to the particular properties of the things. He is a step ahead in not identifying *sādharmaṃyā* with the common quality, but maintains it as a separate concept. Similarly he is perfectly philosophical in saying that no two entities have *sādharmaṃyā* or *vaidharmaṃyā* alone in all respects, but *sādharmaṃyā* and *vaidharmaṃyā* exist together side by side, always accompanied by each other. No two entities ever have all properties identical, nor all qualities totally different, but they have something in common with other things and something that makes them different from those other things. This is the realistic and philosophical conception of *sādharmaṃyā*.

2. THE DEFINITION OF UPAMĀ

After discussing the nature of and the distinction between these two concepts one can profitably turn to the definition of the figure of speech called *upamā*. The nature of the problem is the specific choice of the distinguishing characteristic or *vyavacchedaka lakṣaṇa* of *upamā*. Should it be *sādharmaṃyā* or *sādrśya*, and what exact difference does it make if it is either of the two? With the discussion about these two concepts in mind

¹ *Jainendramahāvṛtti* by Ācārya Abhayānandin, Mūrtidevī Jaina Saṃskṛta Granthamālā, Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha, Kāśī 1956, p. 2.

we shall first attempt to formulate our own conclusion, and then to compare it with the important definitions of *upamā* in Sanskrit poetics. In logical terms it can be stated that *sādharmya* is a causal condition leading to *sādrśya*. This *kāryakāraṇa* relation between these two relations helps further analysis. A *kāraṇa* 'causal condition' is always *vyāpaka* 'pervading' with respect to *kārya* 'effect' which is *vyāpya* 'pervaded'. This *vyāpya-vyāpaka* 'pervaded-pervading' relationship maybe represented in the form of three statements. (1) If there is *sādrśya*, then in that instance there must exist *sādharmya*, since an effect must be preceded by its causal conditions. (2) If there is no *sādharmya* or if it is not very effective, then there can not be *sādrśya* since the absence or weakness of the causal condition leads to non-emergence of the effect. (3) If there is *sādharmya*, even then it is not absolutely certain that there must be *sādrśya*, since the function of a causal condition is equally determined by the functions of the other causal conditions involved in the process. From this it is clear that *sādharmya* pervades a larger sphere of instances than *sādrśya*. In the consideration of a distinguishing characteristic or *vyavacchedakalakṣaṇa*, the logicians always speak of three logical defects of a distinguishing characteristic, i.e. *vayāpti* 'too narrow a definition', *ativyāpti* 'too wide a definition', and *asambhava* 'totally not applicable'. A distinguishing characteristic must exist in all instances belonging to the class to be defined, it should not be found in any instance not belonging to that class, and of course it must not be totally missing in any instance of that class. These three tests must be observed scrupulously.

Now we must turn to the nature of this figure as a poetic phenomenon. In poetry the ideas which are charming and beautifully expressed have an important place. A mere factual description is no poetry. In comparing two objects to present them as an instance of *upamā* a poet does not intend to state the bare fact of common participation of a property, but desires to present something beautiful. Often it is a 'synthetic vision of similarity of two objects' that leads to beauty and charm. The analytical element is not prominent. This is, however, a general statement and may not be valid for all instances of *upamā*. It is quite possible that an *upamā* maybe charming and yet it may not create a 'synthetic vision'. The participation of the common qualities itself maybe poetic. Where there is a 'synthetic vision', there the common participation does exist; and where a 'synthetic vision' does not exist, there too a common participation may exist and maybe poetic. Thus the logical necessity leads one

to conclude that it is *sādharmya* that would suit better than *sādrśya* as a *lakṣaṇa* of *upamā*, and it goes without saying that it must be *hr̥dya* 'appealing'. In an illustration such as *khapuṣpam iva manorathah* 'the desire is (baseless) like a skyflower', the desire and skyflower are two objects of comparison. The common quality shared by these two is *apratīṣṭhitatva* 'baselessness'. It is clear that participation of this quality is intended, hence there exists *sādharmya*. The non-existent object such as a skyflower is subjected to no 'synthetic vision' of the two objects as wholes. Thus *sādrśya* in the real sense of the term is not possible. *Sādharmya*, however, can be conceived of since the baselessness as a property can be well thought of as residing in a non-existent object, whose non-existence itself stands as a symbol for vanity. One may think of *āhārya* 'imposed' imaginary 'synthetic vision', but as compared to this abstract *sādrśya*, *sādharmya* is more realistic. The skyflower does not and cannot exist, this itself leads to its having the property *apratīṣṭhitatva* and thus *sādharmya* is more convincing than any abstract *sādrśya*. In fact the skyflower itself is an abstraction, but in connection with *sādrśya* it creates further abstractions. In the example *candra iva mukham sundaram* 'the face is beautiful like moon', theoretically the same problem arises. Since *sādrśya* 'synthetic vision' depends on the attitude of the perceiver, one may say that *candra* 'moon' and *mukha* 'face' do share the quality *sundaratva* 'beauty', but as wholes they do not appear similar to manifest a 'synthetic vision' as such. Thus one accepts *sādharmya* but does not accept *sādrśya*. To another person the moon and the face may appeal so much that forgetting the differences he may enjoy the 'synthetic vision of similarity'. He accepts both *sādharmya* and *sādrśya*. The same *upamā* maybe looked upon by different people with different approaches and may lead to slightly different conclusions. The important point is this that the realisation of *sādharmya* is a common factor in the experiences of all of them. Thus it is *sādharmya* that seems to be the logical discriminant of *upamā*. When there is charming *sādrśya*, the relation of *sādharmya* at its base is also charming; and charming *sādharmya* even in the absence of *sādrśya* is to be accepted as *upamā*. This discussion directs one to formulate the definition of *upamā* as *hr̥dyaṁ sādharmyam*. It has to be noted that we are not concerned here with other factors in the definition of *upamā* given by the *Kāvyaaprakāśa* in the use of the term '*bhede*'.

It may appear from this discussion that by defining *upamā* in terms of *sādharmya* the importance of *sādrśya* or 'synthetic vision' is neglected. This is not the case. The 'synthetic vision' has all its importance in poeetry

and yet that is not the only means to create charm. One may accept gradations of poetic charm, and in general it maybe said that the poetic charm created by 'synthetic vision' would be of a higher grade than the charm created by mere *sādharmya*. Thus using the terms in Sanskrit poetics the difference can be stated as : *sādharmya* is *svarūpādhāyaka* 'a property that endows the very form to *upamā*', while *sādrśya* is *utkarṣādhāyaka* 'a property that endows excellence'. As far as the logical definition is concerned *sādharmya* is more important, while from the viewpoint of excellence *sādrśya* is more important.

The discussion concerning the definition of *upamā* as presented here poses a serious problem when we turn our attention to the traditional definitions of *upamā* as given in treatises on Sanskrit poetics, which employ the terms *sādharmya*, *sādrśya*, *sāmya*, *sādhāraṇādharmasambandha* etc. to express the idea of similarity in the figure of speech *upamā*. When one approaches these definitions with the distinct concepts of *sādharmya* and *sādrśya*, they appear very much different from and even contradictory to each other and create confusion to the readers of those works. It is necessary to see with what exact meaning these terms are used by these authors. In the *Kuvalayānanda*, Appya Dikṣita uses the term *sādrśya* in his definition of *upamā* : *upamā yatra sādrśyalakṣmīr ullasati dvayoh*.¹ In his *Citramīmāṃsā*,² on the other hand, he uses the term *sādharmya* in the definition of *upamā* as *kavisamayaprasidhyanurodhena upamānopameyatvayogyapor eva sādharmyam upamā*.² This shows that in his opinion the two terms are synonyms and one can be replaced by the other in any context. By these two terms he does not conceive two stages or levels and hence if he uses one term in one place and another term in another there is no contradiction. In the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Viśvanātha defines *upamā* as *sāmyam vācyaṁ avaidharmyam vākyaikya upamā dvayoh*.³ He uses the term *sāmya*. Often the terms *vaidharmya* and *vaisādrśya* are used in the same sense and the commentators have interpreted the term *sāmya* as a synonym for both *sādharmya* and *sādrśya*, suggesting in a way that the author and they themselves do not make any distinction between *sādharmya* and *sādrśya*. In the *Kāvyaadarśa*, Daṇḍin enumerates words expressing similarity and the verse II. 69 ends as *śabdāḥ sādrśyasūcakāḥ*. The commentary on the verse runs as : *tatra ivādayo vācakāḥ|tatra'pi*

¹ *Kuvalayānanda* by Appaya Dikṣita, Vidyābhavana Saṁskṛta Grantha-mālā 24, Banaras 1963, p. 2.

² *Citramīmāṃsā* by Appaya Dikṣita, Kāvya-māla Series, p. 7.

³ *Sāhityadarpaṇa* by Viśvanātha, ed. Dr. P. V. Kane, text p. 17.

yathevādiśabdaprayoge sādharmyaṁ vācyaṁ...tulyasadrśādīpadānāṁ prayoge sādharmyaṁ ārtham. It is clear that the commentary substitutes the term *sādrśya* in the original text by *sādharmya* without giving any explanation. This also goes to show that these authors did not have a distinct idea of these two relations and thus both the words become synonyms for them denoting the concept of similarity which was unique. It is, however, Mammaṭa who seems to have some conception of this difference and who seems to have employed these terms with some specific meaning. Such references in the *Kāvya prakāśa* of Mammaṭa will be studied in the following section¹ dealing with the classification of *upamā* in two kinds: *śrautī* and *ārthī*.

3. THE CLASSIFICATION OF UPAMĀ : ŚRAUTĪ-ĀRTHĪ DIVISION

This twofold division of *upamā* is based on the difference in the way of apprehension of similarity from the words. *Śrautī* by etymology means that kind of *upamā* in which the similarity is directly cognized from the word or where the cognition of similarity is a verbal cognition—*śabda-pratīti*, while *ārthī* is the kind in which the similarity is cognized not directly from the word but from the meaning denoted by the word. Here the word similarity is used in a vague sense, because different thinkers mean different concepts by this similarity to be cognized directly or to be deduced from the meaning of the word. However, there is no difference of opinion with regard to the 'signifiers' in these two different varieties of *upamā*. The instances of *upamā* in which the indeclinables like *iva*, *va*, *yathā* etc. are used, we have *śrautī upamā* and where the adjectival words like *tulya* etc. are used, we have *ārthī upamā*. The difference in explaining this classification arises from the difference of opinion with regard to the nature of the similarity and the way it is realized. There are two principal ways of explaining this classification.

First Method

Many authors and commentators of treatises in Sanskrit poetics do not make any distinction between *sādharmya* and *sādrśya* as has been pointed out earlier. Consequently there is only a single concept of similarity which is denoted by these various terms like *sādrśya* and *sādharmya*, and this similarity is the distinguishing characteristic of *upamā*. Sometimes² the duality of *sādharmya* and *sādrśya* is accepted in a vague

¹ See p. 17.

² A Sanskrit article '*Upamāyāḥ śrautyārtitvam*' by Dr. S. D. Joshi, Sanskrit half-monthly *Shārada*, publ. from Poona, July 1964.

sense without making an exact distinction, and also the relation between *sādharmya* and *sādrśya*, as a causal condition and its effect, is admitted. But on the ground of the same *kāryakāraṇa* 'cause-effect' relation, these two concepts are regarded as non-different, following the *Vedānta* doctrine of the non-difference of *kārya* and *kāraṇa*. Thus in *śrautī upamā* it is this similarity that is directly cognized from the word. The indeclinables such as *iva* are termed as *nipātas* by the grammarians and according to them these *nipātas* point out or indicate a relation existing between two word-meanings: *nipātānām itara-sambandhabodhakatvam*. The words *tulya* etc. are *viśeṣaṇas* 'adjectives' or 'distinguishers' and the meaning of these is related with the meaning of the words denoting two objects of comparison, in relation of identity: *nipātātīrīktanāmārthayor abhedānvayaḥ*. In the expression *kamalena mukhaṁ tulyam*, what is denoted by the word *tulya* is non-different from what is denoted by the word *mukha*. The semantic paraphrase in Sanskrit would be: *tulyābhinnam mukham*. Thus adjectives like *tulya* express the 'similar' or the *dharmin* 'property-possessor' the property being the relation of similarity. It does not express the relation of similarity, but the relation of similarity is cognized through the cognition of its relatum, and this cognition of the relatum of the relation of similarity is a direct verbal cognition. The indeclinables such as *iva* etc. do not denote a *dharmin* 'property-possessor' but one directly cognizes the relation of similarity from these words. In the case of *iva* etc. the relation of similarity existing between *upamāna* and *upameya* is directly indicated, while in the case of *tulya* etc it is inferred from the verbal cognition of the relatum, either *upamāna* or *upameya* or both. An explanation of *śrautī* given by the editors of the recent Marāṭhī edition of the *Kāvya-prakāśa*, by Prof. Aravind Mangarulkar and Prof. K. S. Arjunwadkar must be mentioned. It has been argued by them¹ that the translation of *śrautī* as 'direct' is not accurate but it should be translated as 'auditory'. The editors try to explain that it is the 'sound' element in the words *iva*

¹ Marāṭhī edition of the *Kāvya-prakāśa*, see above p. 2, fn. 3, its pp. 373-374 of the notes-section. Here the editors try to point out that the translation of *śrautī-ārthī* as direct-indirect has been offered by Prof. Gajendragadkar, and that it is wrong. To translate *śrautī* as 'auditory' referring to the sound-value of the words like *iva*, and the role played by this soundvalue in conveying *sādharmya* is difficult to be accepted. The explanation offered by the Kūñjikā on the *Laghumañjūṣā* (Chow. San. Series. p. 631) as *upamāyāḥ śābdabodhaviaṣyatvam śrautatvam* is perhaps the most rational explanation.

etc. that leads to the realization of the relation of *sādharmya* and then they offer examples like the sound 'OM' etc. which is supposed to be effective just by its sound-value. Maṃmaṭa's words '*śabdaśaktimahimnā śrutyaiṣa śaṣṭhīvat sambandham pratipādayanti*' are thus interpreted to suggest a *śabdaśakti* 'the power of a word' to point out some significance just by its *śruti* 'hearing of the sound'. It is an explanation that brings in considerations which are totally extra-linguistic and is very difficult to be accepted.

Second Method

Before explaining the second method it is necessary to examine the first method critically. In general it maybe said that once the premises of the method are accepted, the method is quite agreeable, though there are a few points on which better explanations could be given. When one does not make any distinction between *sādharmya* and *sādrśya*, then perhaps this is the best method to account for the division of *upamā*. But the basic conception of similarity is too general and does not account for the stages in its realization as have been discussed above. It is true that the *nipātas* like *iva* do convey a relation existing between other word-meanings (*nipātānām itarasambandhabodhakatvam*), but it is not clear what is meant by conveying similarity. The conception about the denotation of the adjectival words like *tulya* needs more consideration so as to understand the way in which similarity is denoted by these words which are thought to denote the 'similar' alone. While discussing the second method an attempt is to be made to explain these problems.

The process of verbal cognition has to be dealt with to some extent in order to understand how the relation is conveyed by a word denoting a relatum. In actual comprehension of an entity as a relatum the process is as follows. Two things A and B are known first as just two entities. Then on account of some characteristic features possessed by these two entities one concludes to the existence of a relation between them. After the knowledge of this relation the two entities are known as two relata possessing the relation. When a word denotes a relatum, it presupposes the relation between the two entities. A term denoting a relatum does not denote the entity in itself, but denotes the entity as possessed by a relation. It maybe said that a word denoting a relatum, in fact denotes an entity, a relation, and possession, with the entity as the principal element and the other elements such as the relation and possession as invariable associate qualifier elements which are also denoted by the word denoting the relatum. In case of many words the content of the verbal

cognition is not of the nature of a single element, but is of a qualified collective nature. This collective unit has one element principal in it, while the other elements are invariable associate qualifier elements which maybe conveniently called *nāntarīyaka* or *prakāra* as one may take his view in accordance with a specific school of philosophy, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into all those details which vary from school to school. We may take a general view.¹ The conception, with which one is led to use a particular word for a particular entity is called *pravṛttinimitta* of that word. The universal *gotva* 'cow-ness' is a concept in the mind of the speaker with which he uses the word *go* 'cow', and thus *gotva* 'cow-ness' is the *pravṛttinimitta* 'a property governing the use' of the word *go* 'cow'. A word denotes an entity which is a substratum of the property that works as 'a property governing its use'. The word *go* 'cow' denotes *gotvavat go* 'an entity possessed of the property cow-ness'. It is in fact a qualified collective cognition in which the elements stand in relation of principal and subordinate, qualified and qualifier. In case of the word *tulya* the *pravṛttinimitta* 'the property governing its use' is *tulyatva* and hence the word denotes *tulyatvavat* 'an entity possessed of *tulyatva*'. This comes close to the case of the word *go* 'cow' discussed above. In the qualified collective cognition here, the entity, the property *tulyatva* and possession are the elements. It is the relatum that is principal and the relation and possession are invariable associate qualifier elements. Thus this discussion may help to understand that in the use of such words as *tulya* the cognition of *tulyatva* relation is not to be regarded as inferred or derived from the meaning denoted but is equally *śabda* 'derived from a word', that is to say it also forms a part of the denotation of the word. The difference is this that it is not the principal-qualificand factor but is an invariable associate qualifier. In the case of the words such as *iva* the nature of conveying a relation is different.

¹ This general view I prefer as explained by Nāgeśa *taddharmāvacchinna-viśayakaśābdabuddhitvāvacchinnaṃ prati taddharmāvacchinna-nirūpita-vṛttiviśiṣṭajñānaṃ hetuḥ* . . . *guḍādiśabdena guḍatvajātyavacchinno guḍa-pada-vācyaḥ ityeva bodho jātiprakāraḥ* (*Paramalaghumañjūsā*, Baroda ed., p. 27). In the *Laghumañjūsā* (p. 458) Nāgeśa identifies *jāti* and *pravṛttinimitta*, and just at the outset, in the section on the meaning of the nominal stems (p. 1105) he states *tatra ghaṭādīpadebhyo ghaṭatvā-diviśiṣṭavyaktibodhaḥ*. This could be applied to the words such as *tulya*. It is not possible to go into details of the concepts of *vācya-tāvachedaka* etc. in this place.

Before going into the study of the nature of conveying relation in the case of the words *iva* etc. we must introduce the distinction between *sādharmya* and *sādṛśya*. It is *sādharmya* which is the distinguishing characteristic or *lakṣaṇa* of *upamā*. The division of *upamā* into two kinds, *śrautī* and *ārthī*, is concerned with the expression of this *lakṣaṇa* of *upamā*. If the cognition of *sādharmya* is a direct verbal cognition, it is *śrautī upamā*; if the cognition of *sādharmya* is not a direct verbal cognition, but is an inferred cognition, the inference being based on the denoted meaning *ārtha*, then it is *ārthī upamā*. In the use of the words such as *iva* it is *sādharmya* which is directly cognized from the word, while in the use of such words as *tulya*, the relation of *sādharmya* is cognized from the verbal cognition of *sādṛśya* by means of inference. The words such as *iva* are *nipātas*, and the school of the grammarians holds that these have no power of denotation; they are indicators or co-signifiers of relations existing between two word-meanings. If used by themselves they do not denote any meaning. They are classed as *dyotakas* and not as *vācakas*. Nāgośa in his *Paramalaghumañjūsā* defines¹ the concept of *dyotakatva* as *dyotakatvam ca svasamabhivṛyāhṛtapadaniṣṭhaśaktyudbodhakatvam* 'the property of an indicator or co-signifier is a capacity to help the manifestation of the power of denotation of the words uttered along with itself'. *Iva* etc. have no denotation and they are co-signifiers of relations; this itself leads to the conclusion that *iva* etc. must indicate *sādharmya*. *Sādharmya* is the basic relation in the process of realizing the final synthetic vision of similarity. Unless *sādharmya* is known, *sādṛśya* can not be known. The word *iva* being a *dyotaka* 'co-signifier' does not presuppose any concept in the form of a distinctive *pravṛttinimitta*. Thus it is obvious to say that *iva* indicates the relation of *sādharmya* directly while the cognition of *sādṛśya* is an inferred cognition. Therefore the cognition of *sādharmya* is *śrauta* or *śābda* 'verbal', while the cognition of *sādṛśya* if it is there, is *ārtha* 'inferred from the meaning'. In the content of the cognition from the words such as *iva* the relation of *sādharmya* is the principal element, while the relation and possession are cognized in a very general sense and they form the subordinate element.

<i>tulya</i> ——— denotes ———	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{the relatum principal element.} \\ \text{the relation } \textit{tulyatva} \\ \text{possession} \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{subordinate} \\ \text{qualifiers.} \end{array}$
<i>iva</i> ——— indicates ——— or co-signifies	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{the relation } \textit{sādharmya} \dots \text{principal elem.} \\ \text{the relata} \\ \text{possession} \end{array} \right\} \text{—subordinate qualifiers}$

¹ *Paramalaghumañjūsā*, Baroda ed., p. 113.

It has to be pointed out how in the cases in which *tulya* etc. are used *sādharmya*-cognition is *ārtha* 'derived from the meaning'. The words *tulya*, *sādrśa* etc. are synonyms and *tulyatva* or *tulyatā* is identical with *sādrśya*. The word *tulya* has *tulyatā* as its *pravṛttinimitta* 'a property governing its use' and *tulyatā* also forms an invariable associate qualifier in the content of the verbal cognition. This *tulyatva* or *sādrśya* necessarily presupposes *sādharmya*. The speaker first realizes *sādharmya*; it leads him to formulate the concept of *sādrśya*; this *sādrśya* operates as the *pravṛttinimitta* for the use of the word *tulya*. The process of understanding meaning corresponds exactly to this chain. The word denotes a *relata*, an entity possessed of the relation of *tulyatā*. Here the verbal cognition ends, but a different type of cognitive process takes place. Since *sādrśya* is denoted by the word, one concludes that there must be *sādharmya* without which this *sādrśya* could not have been spoken of. This is the process of *ārtha* cognition of *sādharmya* in the use of the words such as *tulya*. It is this distinction that leads to the division of *upamā* as described above.

The *Kāvyaprakāśa* seems to base the division of *upamā* into *śrautī* and *ārthī* on the distinction between *sādharmya* and *tulyatā* or *sādrśya*. In the definition of *upamā*, Mammaṭa uses the term *sādharmya* for the distinguishing characteristic of *upamā*; the definition of *upamā* is *sādharmyam upamā bhede*¹. He remarks that in the case of the words such as *iva* we have a direct cognition of *sādharmya*: *ivādisabdā yatparās tasyaiva upamānatvapratītir iti yadyapy upamānaviśeṣaṇany ete tathāpi śabdaśakti-mahimnā śrutyaiḥ saṁbandham pratipādayanti iti tatprayoge śrautī*². He means to say that *iva*, by its position, indicates that out of the two objects of comparison that which is expressed by the word preceding *iva* is *upamāna*, and the words such as *iva* are *viśeṣaṇas* 'distinguishers' of *upamāna*, and they nevertheless indicate or co-signify, not a *relatum* with which they are connected by position but, the relation that has two entities as *relata*. Now one may ask how a word, structurally connected with another word denoting an entity which is one *relata*, can indicate a relation which is shared by two entities. Mammaṭa replies as an objective linguist would reply that it is the power of word and there is no other explanation than stating the fact as it is found. A genitive suffix which though structurally bound with one word indicates a relation among two word-

¹ *Kāvyaprakāśa*, ed. Ācārya Viśveśvara, Jñānamāṇḍala Granthamālā, 1960, p. 443.

² Ibid. p. 444.

meanings. Mammaṭa uses the expression *śrutyaiṣa* to mean that the cognition of the relation is a direct verbal cognition resulting from the perception of the word. There is no reason to say that by the word *sambandha* it is not *sādharmya* but *sādṛśya* that is intended by the author. This is still clear from another passage from the *Kāvya prakāśa*¹: *sāmyaparyālocanayā tulyatāpratītiḥ iti sādharṃyasya ārtahvāt tulyādiśabdopādāne ārtiḥ*. On this passage Jhaḷkikar² clearly identifies the relation *sāmya* with *sādharmya*, and *tulyatā* with *sādṛśya*. The editors of the recent Marāṭhī edition³ referred to before also present very convincing arguments to interpret *sāmya* as *sādharmya*, and rightly criticize Prof. Gajendragadkar for interpreting *tulyatā* as *sādharmya* and not as *sādṛśya*. Mammaṭa says that in the use of words *tulya* etc. there is cognition of *tulyatā* or *sādṛśya*, and then because a cognition of *sādṛśya* is always based on the consideration of *sādharmya*, *sādharmya* is inferred from the meaning denoted by the word *tulya*; hence it is *ārtha*. This closely corresponds the cognitive process as described above. It is clear that he considers *sāmya* and *tulyatā* to be different, though he does not attempt any definitions. He also appears to accept two levels in the realization of similarity, one causally conditioned by the other. One might object that he speaks of the words *tulya* etc. as being connected with either *upamāna* or *upameya* or both, and that this indicates that the words such as *tulya* denote a relatum alone and they do not denote a relation. Moreover, if *iva* and *tulya* both convey a relation, and if the cognition of the relation in both the cases is a verbal cognition, why should he speak of *iva* etc. alone as *śaṣṭhīvāt sambandham prati-pādayanti*? These objections can be satisfactorily answered. Though the words *tulya* etc. are connected with either *upamāna* or *upameya* or both, they do denote *tulyatā*. In all the three examples such as *kamaleṇa tulyam mukham*, *kamaleṇa mukhasya tulyam*, and *kamaleṇa mukham ca tulyam*, the word *tulya* denotes 'an entity possessed of *tulyatā*' and it is the identity of this entity that may change but its intrinsic meaning remains unchanged. The invariable associate qualifier element of the relation of *tulyatā* is identical in all the cases. Mammaṭa's expression *tulyatāpratītiḥ* has this common factor in view, and it is due to this reason alone that statement quoted above applies to all three cases of *ārthi upamā*. Mammaṭa says that though *iva* connected by position with *upamāna* acts as its distinguisher, it still indicates a relation existing between both, *upamāna*

¹ Ibid. p. 444-5.

² *Bālabodhinī* by Jhaḷkikar, p. 552.

³ *Kāvya prakāśa*, ed. Arjunwadkar-Mangarulkar, p. 377, notes-section.

and *upameya*. To illustrate such an indicator he refers to *ṣaṣṭhī* suffix. A genitive suffix, though structurally bound with one word, indicates a relation between two. This discussion is not to be taken to mean that *tulya* etc. do not denote a relation. They denote a relation, but not *ṣaṣṭhīvat*. A genitive suffix indicates a relation and in the verbal cognition the relation is the principal element ; in the same way such words as *iva* indicate a relation which forms the principal element in the verbal cognition. But the words such as *tulya* denote a relation as the invariable associate qualifier element. Thus there is a difference in the way of conveying the relation.

To conclude with the distinction between two kinds of *upamā*, it is fruitful to study a few discussions in the *Laghumañjūṣā* of Nāgeśa. The whole discussion of the second method is in fact based on the conclusions given by Nāgeśa. Nāgeśa fully discusses all the passages from the *Kāvya-prakāśa* quoted above in his section on the meaning of *nīpātas*. Nāgeśa says *evaṃ ca ivādiyoge sādharmaṇadharmasambandharūpā upamā vācya, sādśyapratītiḥ arthi | sadśāsādīpadaprayoge sādśyapratītiḥ śābdī, upamā tvārthi | sādśyaṃ tu sādharmaṇadharmasambandhaprayojyaṃ sadśāsādīpadaśakyatāvachchakṛatayā siddham*.¹ This quotation sums up in short the whole discussion in this paper. Nāgeśa clearly refers to the cognition of *sādśya* relation in the use of the words such as *tulya* with the term *śābdī* 'verbal cognition'. The commentary 'Kuñjikā' on the *Laghumañjūṣā* also gives the whole distinction between the cognition of *sādharmya* in these two varieties of *upamā* in a vivid manner : *upamā dvividhā śrautī arthī ca | upamānopameyayor sādharmaṇadharmasambandharūpāyā upamāyāḥ śābdabodhaviśayatvaṃ śrautatvaṃ | arthāpattiviśayatvaṃ arthatvaṃ | ... tathā hi 'candra iva mukham' ityādaṃ ramaṇīyatvādisambandham aviśayīkrtya tu na paryavasānaṃ, yathādisābdānāṃ dharmaviśeṣasambandha eva śaktatvāt | candreṇa tulyaṃ mukham' ityādaṃ tu sāmānyatas tulyatvaṃ bodhayitvā viśrānte tasmin dharmaviśeṣaṃ vinā katham tulyateti śaṅkāyāṃ dharmaviśeṣasambandhapratītiḥ iti*.² The second method of explaining this division of *upamā* appears to be more comprehensive.

¹ *Laghumañjūṣā*, pp. 334-335. It is interesting to see that the commentator of the LM (*Kalāṭīkā*) presents a very general concept of the sphere of the verbal cognition when he says *yāvatām arthānāṃ śābdajabodhe'-nvayas tāvatām tacchabdavācyaṭā ityeva bhūṣyatātparyam* (p. 630). This remark is very significant.

² Pp. 631-632.

The results achieved by the discussions in this paper may be summarized as follows. *Sādharmya* and *sādrśya* are two distinct concepts. *Sādharmya* is to be interpreted as the logical discriminant of the figure of speech *upamā*, rather than *sādrśya* ; and the *śrautī-ārthī* division of *upamā* is based on the difference between *sādharmya* and *sādrśya*, and the way the relation of *sādharmya* is cognized.

IMAGES OF VIṢṆU IN THE KUṢĀṆA ART FROM MATHURA

N. P. JOSHI, *Lucknow Museum.*

It has now been well established that in the first century of the Christian era Mathura had become a centre of the Bhāgavata Cult.¹ Viṣṇu is the main deity of this cult ; Saṅkarṣaṇa, Aniruddha and Pradyumna are the other three forms of the same Divinity. All the four together have been named as Chaturvyūha. Among these the image of Saṅkarṣaṇa or Balarāma—as he is commonly known—has been found from Mathura and attributed to c. 2nd century B.C. (State Museum, Lucknow, No. G. 215). None of the Śuṅga images of Viṣṇu has yet been reported, and therefore, our present study begins from the Kuṣāṇa period. In India proper Mathura was the only biggest and the most important centre of Kuṣāṇa art, hence for the present purpose we shall confine ourselves to the images hailing from this place only. Early images from other sites will, however, be referred to for comparison.

A detailed account of Kuṣāṇa Viṣṇu images in the Mathura Museum was first published by Dr. Vogel in 1910 in his Catalogue of that Museum, which was subsequently revised by Dr. V. S. Agrawala and published in the Journal of the U.P. Historical Society in the year 1948 to 1952. Here Dr. Agrawala has included the material up to the year 1939 only. For the present study subsequent additions up to the year 1967 in that Museum and unpublished material from the State Museum, Lucknow, have been taken into account. As many of the images discussed here have not seen the light of the day, they have been enlisted with short descriptions and references if any in the Appendix I.

It is proposed to study these images under the three following heads :

- (i) General characteristics,
- (ii) Emblems, ornaments and dress,
- (iii) Types of Viṣṇu images.

For indicating chronology the following system has been accepted :—

Śuṅga Period—c.2nd century B.C. to c. 1 B.C.

Kuṣāṇa Period—c.1st century A.D. to c. 200 A.D.

Later Kuṣāṇa Period—c.200 A. D. to 320 A.D.

¹ Agrawala, V. S., मथुरा कला, कन्हैयालाल पोद्दार अभिनन्दन ग्रन्थ, मथुरा, Saṁ. 2010, pp. 784, 789.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

In spite of certain variations in the style of holding the emblems, types of ornaments and dress in the figures of the Kuṣāṇa and later Kuṣāṇa periods, the following can be enumerated as common features :—

- (i) Red sandstone with white spots is the usual medium used for carving these figures. Normally the figures are handy and small with their height varying in between 2½" to 15". There is only one image in the Mathura Museum (No. 14. 392-95), which in its original form might have been approximately three feet in height.
- (ii) All the figures, with exception of three, are four-armed and starting from the upper right hand hold Gadā, Chakra and Śaṅkha or water vessel in their hands clockwise. The normal right is seen in *abhaya* pose and is raised to the shoulder.¹

In this connection it deserves to be mentioned that this position of the emblems continued to enjoy popularity not only in the Kuṣāṇa period but in a majority of Gupta figures as well. In a few texts dealing with iconography twentyfour forms of Viṣṇu have been described² on the basis of specific changes in the arrangements of his emblems, in which lotus or Padma plays an important rôle. But the entire absence of lotus and uniformity of arrangement of the emblems in the Kuṣāṇa and later Kuṣāṇa periods, suggest that the theory of the twentyfour forms was, at least in the regions of Mathura, not current in these periods.

- (iii) Viṣṇu's right hand raised in the *abhaya* pose and the left drawn near the waist, suggest that these figures have been copied from the contemporary or pre-Kuṣāṇa figures of the Yakṣas and Bodhisattvas. Apart from that types of Viṣṇu's fluted headgear, *ūrṇā* mark on the forehead and type of the upper garment running round the waist also go in favour of this theory.
- (iv) None of the Viṣṇu figures of the Kuṣāṇa age bears Śrīvatsa mark on the chest. This in itself is a problem, because the use of Śrīvatsa mark as one of the auspicious symbols and also to adore chests of the Tirthaṅkara figures was quite common in

¹ Exceptions to this are Lucknow Museum No. J. 610 and Mathura Museum No. 39.2858.

² *Agni Purāṇa* (Mor Ed.), Chapter 48, pp. 91-2; for the lists in the *Padma Purāṇa* and by Hemādri, see B. B. Bidyavinoda, "Varieties of the Viṣṇu Image," *Memoirs*, ASI., No. 2, Calcutta 1920.

the Kuṣāṇa period. Even in case of a solitary Varāha figure of this age the mark is clearly visible on the chest.¹

- (v) The same can be said about the use of halo (*prabhāmaṇḍala*), depiction of which, either in plain form or with a scalloped border or even with full blown lotus decorations, was a common practice in the Kuṣāṇa age. It is conspicuous by its absence in case of the Viṣṇu figures. It is only in the Gupta age that we come across Viṣṇu with a halo.
- (vi) The same can be said regarding depiction of palms. The open palm of Viṣṇu's right hand is quite plain, while in case of the Buddha and Tīrthaṅkara figures of this age the palms unexceptionally have auspicious marks on them such as *chakra*, *svastika*, *śaṅkha*, etc.²
- (vii) Carving the figures in round was a popular practice in the Kuṣāṇa age. In case of such figures either the physical view of the body and the dress was depicted or there would be some tree with branches and foliage. In case of Kuṣāṇa Viṣṇu figures, when they have been carved in round, normally the former practice has been adhered to.³ Only in one case Aśoka tree with a parrot perched on its branches is seen (Mathura Museum No. 14. 392-95).
- (viii) Other Viṣṇu figures are in bold relief, but in a few cases there is a curious mixture of both the styles. For example, in figure No 19. 1168 of the Mathura Museum seat and portion below the knee is in bold relief, while the upper portion is in round.
- (ix) Style of depicting the additional hands also deserves special attention. In case of round figures it can be noticed that the additional hands raised above have been separated from the shoulder joint and not merely shown attached to the elbow as is the case with later Gupta and mediaeval sculptures.

EMBLEMS, ORNAMENTS AND DRESS

Now we proceed to study the different ornaments and items of dress in details.

¹ Joshi N. P., "Kuṣāṇa Varāha Sculpture," *Arts Asiatiques*, Paris, Tome xii, 1965, pp. 113-19.

² Joshi N. P. "Use of Auspicious Symbols in the Kuṣāṇa Art at Mathura", *Mirashi Felicitation Volume*, Nagpur, pp. 311-17.

³ Mathura Museum Nos. 49. 3502, 15. 948, 15. 956, 29. 2002, etc.

Fluted Headgear and Crown

In sculptures of the Kuṣāṇa period depicting either Bodhisattva figures, figures of noble men dressed in Indian fashion, or deities like Lokapālas, Kārttikeya, etc. use of a cap-like tightfitting headgear with a very prominent heart-shaped crest embossed with a full blown flower, fixed normally in the centre or sometimes to the left, was very common. The beauty of the heart-shaped crest was further enhanced by a group of fringes seen suspended in a triangular form from the centre of the crest. The cap was beautifully decorated and often studded with pearls and jewels. In case of most of the early Viṣṇu figures this very type of headgear is to be seen (Plates II, III, VII). In it probably lies the origin of the later type of crown known as 'Mukuṭa' or 'Kiriṭa' so common with the Rāsa parties of Brijā and with the followers of the Vallabha or Puṣṭi-Mārga sect.

In case of later Kuṣāṇa figures the headgear changes its form. The cap without any crest takes the form of top hat without brim (Plate VIII). All the three sides of the high crown are richly decorated, in a few cases the central part is deeply pressed inside and appears like a rectangular high crest (Plate IV). On the sides above the ears there often appear circular medallions bearing floral designs. In a few cases this type of headgear is completely plain and like a simple cap.

Vanamālā

Association of Vanamālā with Viṣṇu is clearly established from early literary sources. According to the *Harivaṃśa*, the Tail Chapter of the *Mahā-bhārata*, a Vanamālā would contain the flowers of Arjuna, Nīpa, Kadamba and Kandala trees.¹ According to another tradition it is supposed to be a garland of Tulasī leaves along with the flowers of Kunda, Mandāra, Abja and Pārijāta. Lexicographers explain the word Vanamālā as a garland reaching the knees made of all seasoned flowers with central pendants of thick Kadamba flowers.² In a good number of Viṣṇu figures in the Kuṣāṇa period Vanamālā has been composed of buds, leaves and a few flowers among which Kadamba and lotus can be well identified (Mathura Museum Nos. 49. 3502, 28. 1729, 29.2002, etc. (Plate VIII). Here the sculptors have very clearly depicted the Vanamālā in its true literary sense, i.e., a garland of the jungle flowers. In a few other specimens Vanamālā takes the form of purely floral garland with pendants of bigger flowers and leaves (Mathura Museum 15.956, 34.2487).

¹ *Harivaṃśa* (Gitā Press Ed.), Viṣṇu., 11.8

² Apte, V. S., *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, see Vanamālā.

Both these types are not so long as to reach the knees. The longer variety is rare in the Kuṣāṇa period though a few exceptions can be cited (e.g. Mathura Museum No. 15. 1010 ; 50. 3550). In the later Kuṣāṇa age the number of this variety increases, and by the time of the Guptas it becomes the fashion of the day.

It is also interesting to note that whenever in the Kuṣāṇa period the longer variety of Vanamālā is seen, it is generally accompanied by the shorter one.

Gadā

In the sculptures under review Gadā has got the definite place. It always appears in the upper right hand of Viṣṇu.¹ The Kuṣāṇa Gadā is shaped like a heavy club, broad at the base and tapering towards the top terminating in its handle (Plate VI). The *Brahma Purāṇa* at one place describes² it as 'rising flame of fire', which obviously agrees with this shape. In another type the broad end of Gadā has been further provided with a heavy ball known as *kumbha*. At equal intervals the shaft of the Gadā has been decorated with narrow bands. Grasp of Gadā by Viṣṇu, either held straight or topsyturvy, presents the following four varieties :

- (i) Supporting the weapon with upraised hand from front (Mathura Museum No. 34. 2487 (Plate II).
- (ii) Supporting the upper end of the weapon placed topsyturvy by the palm of the raised right hand (Mathura Museum, Nos. 00.U. 5, 39.2858 etc. (Plates I, IV, V).
- (iii) Catching hold of the handle of the weapon placed in the normal position with the fist turned inwards (Mathura Museum, Nos. 00.U. 77 ; 15. 596, etc.).
- (iv) Supporting the weapon with right hand suspended downwards (Mathura Museum, No. 15. 933).

Cakra

The wheel is normally held in the upper left hand by its rim supported by the thumb from out side and by the four fingers passing through the

¹ The only exception known to the author is Viṣṇu appearing on a seal said to be of the time of Huviṣka, where Gadā is seen in his normal right hand, other emblems being a ring in the upper right, conch or fruit in the upper left and big wheel in the normal left. See Banerjea, J. N., *Development of Hindu Iconography*, Calcutta, 1941, Pl. vii, Fig. 4.

² *Brahma Purāṇa* (Mor Ed.), 68.48

inner part of the rim (**Plates II, IV**). In a majority of sculptures the wheel has been either broken or highly worn out. In one specimen it has sixteen spokes (Mathura Museum No. 34. 2487), while in the other the number is seventeen (Mathura Museum No. 15. 956). The wheel has been held either enface or in profile. In a singel case (Lucknow Museum No. J. 610) (**Plate I**), however, it appears in the upper left hand, which has been suspended below.

Water Vessel or Amṛta-ghaṭa

Unlike the upper two hands of the deity there is no uniformity in case of the object in the normal left, which always appears near the hip. In a few specimens it holds a cylindrical bottle-like vessel (**Plate IV**) which is much akin to that appearing in the hands of the contemporary figures of Bodhisattva Maitreya. Some scholars take it to be a vessel borne by the ascetics.¹ Taking in consideration the lesser number of images with such a vessel it can be well surmised that these figures represent the early phase, when the images of Bodhisattva Maitreya were serving as model for the forthcoming Viṣṇu figures. In the present collection under review there are only five figures of this type. It also deserves mention that literary references seem to be practically silent about this vessel of Viṣṇu in his normal form.

Śaṅkha

There is copious evidence in literature to show the close association of conch with Viṣṇu. In the Kuṣāṇa and later Kuṣāṇa periods it is held in the normal left hand, which always remains folded and either touches the left hip or remains near it. The conch, which is always plain, and has its channel to the left (*vāmāvarta*) has been held in the following ways :

- (i) Placed horizontally or diagonally on the palm (Mathura Museum Nos. 50. 3550, 15. 956, 15. 1168).
- (ii) Placed vertically on the palm (Lucknow Museum No. J. 610) (**Plate I**).
- (iii) The fingers of the hand hold it by its channel (Mathura Museum No. 39. 2858) (**Plate VII**).

Abhaya pose

Barring two figures known up till now (Mathura Museum No. 39. 2858 and Lucknow Museum No. J. 610) (**Plates I, III**) the right hand of

¹ Banerjea, J. N., op. cit., Calcutta, 1950, p. 400, fn., 3

Viṣṇu raised to the shoulder is seen with open palm pointing to the sky. Technically the pose is called *abhaya*, 'protection offering', or perhaps what Varāhamihira names as *śāntida*,¹ 'peace imparting'. Depiction of right hand in *abhaya* pose is rather a universal practice with the Kuṣāṇa divinities irrespective of the fact whether they belong to the Buddhist, Jaina or Brahmanic pantheons. Viṣṇu could certainly be no exception to it.

Absence of Padma or lotus

As has been already said in this early phase of Viṣṇu figures Padma is totally absent. Modern tradition accepting existence of this emblem in the fourth hand does not seem to be as old as the Kuṣāṇas. Early classical references also suggest the same thing. The point would further be clear from the Table of literary references given in the Appendix II. It would be sufficient to remark here that a majority of the references in the early texts describe Viṣṇu as holding *śaṅkha*, *chakra* and *gadā* only. They are silent about the fourth hand. Naturally, following the contemporary tradition, the sculptors of the Kuṣāṇa and later Kuṣāṇa periods continued to show the fourth hand of Viṣṇu in just the *abhaya* pose holding nothing.

The sacred thread

Viṣṇu is seen with clear sign of a sacred thread in five figures of our collection,² while in others there are no traces of it. I fail to find out any definite reason for this distinction. Later works on iconography such as the *Aparājītaprāchhā* classify the images suitable to Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, etc.,³ but in absence of any clear evidence it would be faulty to presume that there existed any such thinking as early as the Kuṣāṇa period.

Other ornaments

The crown has already been referred to. Apart from it earrings, armlets, bracelets and necklace are the other ornaments seen here; but excluding the crown and earrings, none of the others seem to have been taken as indispensable for the Viṣṇu figures.

¹ Varāhamihira, *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, 57.34.

² Mathura Museum Nos. 49.3502; 34.2487; 15.956; 50.3550; 39.2858.

³ *Aparājītaprāchhā*, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda, 215. 2-5, p. 549.

Waist band or Kāyabandhana

This is one of the old items of Indian dress. It finds mention in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*,¹ which informs us that it was commonly used by both the males and females. The fact is well supported by the sculptures of the Śuṅga and the Kuṣāṇa periods. Carved in the same tradition it is to be seen in the Viṣṇu figures also. We can see it tied round the waist with both its ends suspended on the right thigh (Mathura Museum Nos. 28, 1729; 15. 948; 50. 3520).

Lower Garment

Round figures of Viṣṇu indicate that the lower garment or dhotī—*pītāmbara* would be the right name on the literary basis—was worn in *sakachchha* style. One of the ends of the dhotī, used as *kachchha*, was half tucked behind with portion seen peeping above the wrapped part of the garment. From the front side the other end would be gathered together and allowed to remain suspended in between the two legs.² (Plates I, II, V). This style was again the common practice of the age and did not specifically pertain to the Viṣṇu images.

Upper Garment or Uttariya

The same can be said about the fashion of putting on the *uttariya*. In the contemporary age it was worn in different styles, but curiously enough, for the Viṣṇu figures only one style seems to have been selected. Here it has taken the form of a heavy twisted rope running diagonally in front to reach the left thigh and ending in a lateral knot to the left with its ends suspended by the same side. Thirteen figures of our collection have the *uttariya* worn in a uniform style (Mathura Museum Nos. 19. 933; 28. 1729; 15. 948; 34. 2520; 42-43. 3024; 49. 3502; 15. 919; 34. 2487; 00. U.5; 15. 596; 15. 956; 00. U. 67; 46. 4225).

TYPES OF VIṢṆU IMAGES

On the basis of difference in ornaments, and styles of holding the weapons as well as variations in poses and styles of carving out the figures, the entire collection of the Viṣṇu images available to the writer, can be grouped under five different heads with several sub-types.

¹ Joshi, N. P., विनयपिटक के आधार पर भारतीय भौतिक जीवन की एक झलक, JUPHS., Vols. xxiv-xxv, p. 247

² Mathura Museum Nos. 15.956; 49.3502.

(I) *Four-handed figures of Viṣṇu*

Normally the images are standing. Only one specimen (Mathura Museum No. 29. 2858) of seated type is known to us. All these figures can be further sub-divided as follows :

- (i) Viṣṇu carrying Gadā, Chakra and water vessel. There are five figures of this type (Mathura Museum Nos. Viṣṇu in 34. 2520 ; 42-43. 3024 ; 28. 1729 ; 15. 948 ; 15. 912). Gadā has been held from above and the vessel is in the left hand. In one specimen (Mathura Museum No. 15. 933) of this type Gadā is being supported by the suspended right hand.
- (ii) Gadā placed on the ground is being supported by the hand and the conch appears on the open left palm (**Plate II**). There are three specimens of this type (Mathura Museum Nos. 15. 883 ; 34. 2487 ; 49. 3502), of which two depict the sacred thread.
- (iii) The Gadā has been placed topsyturvy and held as in (i), while the left hand holds the conch vertically (**Plate I**). Four specimens of this type are there (Mathura Museum Nos. 00. U.5 ; 15. 1901, 15. 919, Lucknow Museum No. J. 610).
- (iv) A change is now introduced in the headgear. The cap with crest type is now substituted by the crown looking like a brimless top hat. Slight changes in the fashions of holding Gadā and Śaṅkha also occur. Gadā has been held either in full fist or as in (iii). This subtype can be seen in two specimens (Mathura Museum Nos. 15. 956 ; 15. 596) (**Plate IV**).
- (v) Two more figures are similar to the above type but they do not show any upper garment (Mathura Museum Nos. 00.U. 77 ; 15. 1168).
- (vi) In this type the knee-reaching *vanamālā* is seen for the first time. Both the types of headgear have been used along with it and the upper garment is not indispensable. There is some change in the grasp of the conch also (**Plate VI**). (Mathura Museum Nos. 00. U. 67 ; 20. 2007 ; 54. 3821).
- (vii) Now can be evinced some inclination towards the Gupta style. Two specimens of this type show similar headgears, but in one case Gadā has been held by the fist, while in others it has merely been supported from the above (Mathura Museum Nos. 29. 2002 ; 57. 4426).

(viii) Stylistically this type is more inclined to the Gupta art, so much so that in one case traces of halo can also be visualised (Mathura Museum Nos. 57. 4266; 56. 4225. The latter shows the halo).

Chronologically speaking the first three types can be placed in the full-fledged Kuṣāṇa age, while the remaining seem to belong to the later Kuṣāṇa periods.

There is a unique specimen of four-handed Viṣṇu seated on a lotus seat (Mathura Museum No. 39. 2858) (Plate V). Apart from its seated posture the figure is important for the position of its normal right hand, which appears here in boon-imparting or *varada* attitude.

(II) Two-handed figure of Viṣṇu

We have only one specimen of this type (Mathura Museum No. S. No. 950) and that too is half finished. Only the conch in the left hand is somewhat clear. The knee-reaching *vanamālā* and the crown are, however, distinct. The figure seems to be a work of later Kuṣāṇa period. In this connection attention is drawn towards the colossal two-armed image said to have existed at Rupbas near Agra and was first noted by Carlyle.¹ It was later on recognised as two-armed Viṣṇu by Dr. Banerjea.² This figure holds Cakra in the other hand.

(III) Eight-armed Viṣṇu

Three figures of this type are known to have been found from Mathura of which two are in the Archaeological Museum, Mathura (Nos. 15. 1010 and 50. 3550) and one in the State Museum, Lucknow (No. 49. 247 (Plate VI). This form of Viṣṇu has been described in the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, but for earlier references attention is invited to the *Harivaṃśa*,³ which describes this form at three places. Among the weapons mentioned therein the arrow and the conch are seen in some of the present sculptures. The other references to this form are in the *Brahma*, *Viṣṇu*, *Matsya* and *Agni Purāṇas*.⁴ This much is sure that this form was quite known to the Kuṣāṇa

¹ *Arch. Survey Rept.*, Vol. VI, p. 20.

² Banerjea, J. N., op. cit., p. 401

³ *Harivaṃśa* (Gita Press Ed.), *Harivaṃśa Parva*, 42. 23, p. 157; *Viṣṇu Parva*, 40. 39, p. 364; 48. 23, p. 395.

⁴ *Brahma Purāṇa* 50.5-7 (Mor Ed.). Repetition of the word 'cakra' and the exact sense of 'ugra-pāṇinam' in the verse 'śaṅkha-cakra-dharam devam gadācakrograpāṇinam' requires examination. For others see Appendix II. 'Eight-armed form'.

age. It is also not less interesting that all the three available figures appear to have been made after a common formula.

(IV) *Viṣṇu on Garuḍa*

This single figure (Mathura Museum No. 56. 4200), though miniature in size, is unique of its kind. The deity is seen seated on Garuḍa who is in the bird form with wings wide spread. The type seems to have been described in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*.¹

(V) *Incarnations of Viṣṇu*

In the Kuṣāṇa Iconography the theory of ten incarnations of Viṣṇu does not seem to have gained ground but solitary forms of Viṣṇu were certainly known. The *Harivaṃśa*, major portion of which seems to be a composition of the Kuṣāṇa age, often refers to the Varāha, Narasiṃha and Vāmana forms of this deity.² Up till now only a single image of Varāha of the Kuṣāṇa period, hailing from Mathura, is known to us.³ Narasiṃha is yet to be found. The one in the State Museum, Lucknow, hitherto unpublished, is likely to be identified as that of Trivikrama, a form of Vāmana for the following reasons (State Museum, Lucknow No. J. 610)

(Plate I) :

- (i) Viṣṇu has no crown. His hair has been shown in small curls as it has been shown in the cases of ascetics like the Tirth-aṅkaras and the Buddha.
- (ii) The right hand has been stretched forward as if to accept something, which is very unusual in contemporary Viṣṇu figures.
- (iii) Just near this hand appears a kneeling figure of a crowned male in the pose of offering something.
- (iv) The size of the deity is much bigger than that of the donor. Though it was a common practice to depict the central figure bigger than the devotee or the worshipper, in the present case the arrangement may be of special significance in the light of the Trivikrama form of Viṣṇu.

¹ *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (Gita Press Ed.), 3. 17. 35

² *Harivaṃśa* (Gita Press Ed.), *Harivaṃśa Parva*, 40. 16-18, p. 140; 25. 32-33, p. 296; *Viṣṇu Parva*, 55. 62, p. 425, etc.

³ Joshi N. P., "Kuṣāṇa Varāha Sculpture," *Arts Asiatique*, Paris, Tome xii, 1965, pp. 113-119.

It is also interesting to note that the story of Trivikrama is much older and finds mention in ancient texts.¹

The eight-armed Viṣṇu, described above, has also been taken as an incarnation by the *Harivaṃśa*,² which was subsequently deleted from the accepted list.

Among other incarnations, Kṛṣṇa has not been unknown in the Kuṣāṇa age. Kṛṣṇa-līlā scenes have been found both in sculptures and terracottas.³ Independent image of this deity attributed to this period, has not yet been reported; but in the opinion of the present writer this problem needs re-consideration. In short, his line of thinking is as follows:

Depiction of Kṛṣṇa standing in cross-legged form and playing on flute is a thing of very late period, when due to the efforts of Vallabhāchārya and others *Madhurā-bhakti* of Kṛṣṇa was widely propagated. Prior to that Kṛṣṇa has either been portrayed as a deity with four hands or with two hands in *gopaveśa*. Four-handed Kṛṣṇa is acceptable to the mediaeval sculptors, as is clear from the Khajuraho sculptures.⁴ Before that the Gupta artists were also thinking on the same line. The famous lintel piece from Garhwa, now in the State Museum, Lucknow (No. H. 88) showing four-handed Kṛṣṇa witnessing wrestling between Bhīma and Jarāsandha, can be cited as one of the few examples. Early literary sources like the *Mahābhārata* very often describe Kṛṣṇa with four hands holding Śaṅkha, Chakra and Gadā only.⁵ As we have seen, this very closely agrees with the Kuṣāṇa Viṣṇu figures discussed above. It is, therefore, quite possible that among these very figures Kṛṣṇa might have been lying concealed. At least the fact is very strongly supported by the recent discovery of a plaque definitely of the Kuṣāṇa period depicting the goddess Ekānamśā standing in between Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa.⁶ Here the figure of Kṛṣṇa is exactly the same as that of Kuṣāṇa Viṣṇu.

¹ Banerjea, J. N., op. cit., Calcutta, 1950, p. 417.

² *Harivaṃśa*, *Harivaṃśa Parva*, 24. 23, p. 140 to be read with *Viṣṇu Parva* 48. 23, p. 395.

³ Joshi, N. P., *Mathura Sculptures*, Mathura, 1965, Pls. 58, 64. Agrawala, R. C., "Unpublished Sculptures and Terracottas from Rajasthan", *Journal of Indian History*, XLII, Pt. 2, 1964, p. 540.

⁴ Kanwar Lal, *Immortal Khajuraho*, 1964, Asia Press, Delhi, Pls. 34 and 35 showing Śakāśura-vadha and fight with Chāṇūra.

⁵ Appendix II.

⁶ Joshi N. P., "Mathurā-kalāyām Ekānamśā", *Viśvaśaṃskṛtam*, Hoshiarpur IV, 2, pp. 131-134



Plate I Vishnu, Lucknow Museum,
No. J. 610.



Plate III Vishnu, Mathura
Museum, No. 2858.



Plate II Vishnu, Mathura Museum,
No. 15.956.




Plate IV Vishnu, Mathura
Museum, No. 15.933.



Plate V Viṣṇu, Mathura Museum,
No. 2487.



Plate VII Vaiṣṇava Vyūha, Mathura
Museum, No.



Plate VI Eight-armed Viṣṇu,
Mathura Museum.



Plate VIII Viṣṇu Mathura Museum,
No. 28. 1729.

According to some lists of the Purāṇas, Saṅkaraṣaṇa or Balarāma has also been described as one of the avatāras¹ of Viṣṇu. In the Kuṣāṇa age we have at least eighteen figures of this deity mostly with a crown with three crests and wearing only one earring. Out of them fifteen figures (both including the Brahmanic and Jaina forms) are in the Archaeological Museum, Mathura and three in the State Museum, Lucknow. Discussion of these in more details would be a digression for the present purpose.

(VI) *Viṣṇu in Caturvyūha form*

There is again a single example of this unique type. The figure in the Mathura Museum (No. 14. 392-95) (Plate VII) was up till now being recognised as that of Indra,² but a closer examination of it revealed that it is Viṣṇu holding *abhaya*, *gadā* and *śaṅkha* in the existing hands. From the right shoulder of Viṣṇu rises the image of Balarāma with a snake canopy on head and wine flask in left hand. Another figure, though headless, is seen crowning Viṣṇu's head. On the corresponding side of Balarāma there must have existed the fourth figure coming out from the left shoulder. Thus the intention of the sculptor to depict Viṣṇu with Saṅkaraṣaṇa, Aniruddha and Pradyumna is very clear. From the early times the Pāñcharātra school was quite popular in the regions of Mathura, and, therefore, existence of such an image need not be looked upon with surprise.

The above discussion of Viṣṇu images of the Kuṣāṇa period is mainly based on the sculptures in the Museums at Mathura and Lucknow. As many of these figures are yet unpublished, all of them have been briefly enlisted in Appendix I. I could not get any information regarding similar figures existing in the other Museums of the country and the world outside. The results of the above study, therefore, cannot be stamped as conclusive, but it certainly can give a good lead for further studies in the field.

¹ *Agni Purāṇa* (Mor Ed.), 49. 1-9; *Bhāgavata*, I. 3.6-22; *Hārīta Smṛti*, 7. 142-43.

² Agrawala. V. S., "Catalogue of the Mathura Museum", *JUPHS.*, XXII, pp. 144-45.

APPENDIX—I

LIST OF THE KNOWN VIṢṆU FIGURES ATTRIBUTED TO THE KUṢĀṆA PERIOD

Archaeological Museum, Mathura

- 00. U. 5 — Figure in relief, *gadā* held topsyturvy. Waterworn. C. 2nd to 3rd century A.D.
- 00. U.34 — Figure with high crown. Waterworn. C. 3rd century A.D.
- 00. U.35 — Figure in relief with high crown, very crude. C. 3rd century A.D.
- 00. U.67 — Figure in relief with knee-reaching *vanamālā*. C. 3rd century A.D.
- 00. U.77 — Figure in relief showing *gadā* with *kumbha*. Waterworn. C. 2nd to 3rd century A.D.
- 14. 392- — Chaturvyūha form with Balarāma seen rising from the right
95 shoulder. C. 3rd century A.D. (Plates VIII and IX).
- 15. 596 — Figure in relief showing high crown and *gadā* with *kumbha*. C. 3rd century A.D.
- 15. 781 — Bust with high crown, badly mutilated. C. 2nd to 3rd century A.D.
- 15. 883 — Upper part of the figure in relief showing the club being supported by the right hand. Interesting feature. C. 1st century A.D.
- 15. 891 — Figure preserved above the waist. Waterworn. C. 2nd century A.D.
- 15. 912 — Figure in relief showing the goddess Ekānamśā and Kṛṣṇa. Balarāma no more exists. The piece is highly interesting from iconographic point of view. Kṛṣṇa carries a water vessel. C. 1st to 2nd century A.D.
- 15. 919 — Corpulent headless figure in relief. C. 3rd cent. A.D.
- 15. 933 — Figure in relief broken below the knees ; water vessel variety. C. 1st to 2nd century A.D. (Plate 3).
- 15. 948 — Torso in round ; water vessel variety. Back portion is well preserved. C. 1st to 2nd century A.D.

15. 956 — One of the beautiful and well preserved specimens. The figure is in round and shows high crown, short *vanamālā*, and all the emblems in tact. The back portion showing the style of providing extra hands deserves special mention. C. 2nd to 3rd century A.D. (Plate 4).
15. 1010 — Viṣṇu in his *aṣṭabhuja* form. C. 2nd to 3rd century A.D.
15. 1168 — An interesting figure showing a curious mixture of the two styles, viz. figure in round and figure in relief. The pedestal fashioned after a rectangular *yonī* of a Śiva-*liṅga* is a special feature. C. 2nd century A.D.
18. 1729 — Headless figure in round with beautiful short *vanamālā*. Water vessel variety. C. 1st to 2nd century A.D.
20. 2002 — Figure carved in round wearing high crown. C. 2nd to 3rd century A.D.
20. 2007 — Figure in relief with high crown and long *vanamālā*. C. early 4th century A.D.
20. 2008 — Upper part of the figure in round only with crowned head and two extra hands. C. 2nd to 3rd century A.D.
34. 2487 — Complete and very well preserved figure in relief. All Kuṣāṇa characteristics of Viṣṇu are visible here. The *ūrṇā* mark on the forehead deserves special mention. C. 1st to 2nd century A.D. (Plate II).
34. 2520 — Four figures in relief, an eclectic iconographic document, as has been described by Dr. V.S. Agrawala. Apart from Viṣṇu this interesting slab depicts three other deities, of which Śiva in Ardhanārīśvara form and Gaja-Lakṣmī with the two miniature elephants can clearly be identified. The last and the fourth figure deserves careful examination. Dr. Agrawala, with whom agrees Dr. Vogel, takes this to be Kubera, but to me it more looks Kārttikeya with his spear. C. 1st to 2nd century A.D. (Agrawala, V.S., "Catalogue of the Mathura Museum", *JUPHS.*, XXII, 142).
39. 2858 — Seated type. Figure in round with high crown, right hand suspended below in *varada* pose. C. 2nd to 3rd century A.D. (Plate V).
- 42-43. 3024 — Badly mutilated figure in relief. C. 3rd century A.D.

50. 3550 — Eight-armed Viṣṇu. C. 3rd century A.D.
54. 3821 — Badly mutilated figure with long *vanamālā*. C. 3rd century A.D.
56. 4200 — Viṣṇu seated on Garuḍa. C. 3rd century A.D.
56. 4225 — Mutilated figure in relief. Here a few of the Gupta characteristics are apparent. C. early 4th century A.D.
57. 4267 — Figure in relief with high crown; Gupta features are gradually creeping in. C. early 4th century A.D.
57. 4426 — Upper portion of the figure carved in round. C. 3rd century A.D.

Surplus No.

- 950 — Two armed figure in relief with crowned head and long *vanamālā*. The figure is half finished. C. early 4th century A.D.
65. 15 — Headless figure of Varāha in bold relief. The figure is unique and bears an epigraph in one line. C. 2nd century A.D.

The figure has been published by me in *Mathura Sculptures*, Pl. 101, Appendix ii. The inscription has been re-read and published by Dr. Janert in *JRAS.*, April, 1966, pp. 7-8.

- No. 2052 — Upper part of a small Viṣṇu statuette; upper hands holding mace and *chakra*, lower right in *abhaya*, left lost. Whereabouts of this figure are not now known, but till 1939 it was in the Mathura Museum and has been described by Dr. Agrawala in his Catalogue (*JUPHS.*, XXII, p. 106).

Lucknow Museum

- J. 610 — Architectural fragment showing Viṣṇu in relief. C. 1st century A.D. (Plate I).
49. 247 — Eight-armed Viṣṇu. C. 2nd to 3rd century A.D. (Plate VI)
- B. 127 — Stone fragment showing a four-armed figure without any emblem. The normal two hands are in *namaskāra mudrā*, while the extra two are seen suspended downwards with clenched fists. C. 2nd to 3rd century A.D.

APPENDIX—II

The evidence collected here from the Epics, a few Purāṇas such as *Brahma*, *Agni*, *Matsya*, *Viṣṇu*, *Liṅga*, *Vāya*, and *Varāha* and also from some of the Smṛti texts, can never be taken as comprehensive and complete. But in spite of its limitations it definitely indicates the following facts specially when put in comparison with the available sculptures :

- (i) Among about 105 references collected here *Padma* or lotus as an emblem of Viṣṇu appears only in 15. Even if these fifteen are closely examined, very often there is something to show that the reference is fairly late. For example Chapter 257 of *Matsya* enlists all the details of a mediaeval Viṣṇu figure such as *pādamadhya Prthvī*, *Śrī* and *Puṣṭi*, *Deva-dundubhi*, *Gandharva-mithuna*, *Patrāvalī*, *Siṃha-vyāghra*, etc. The same is the case with *Liṅga Purāṇa*, *Pūrvārdha*, Chapters 36, 37, which mentions *Śrī*, *Bhūmi*, *Deva-Daitya*, etc. also along with Viṣṇu. Same is true with *Agni*, Chapters 11 to 14. In 44. 47-49 it even describes *mālā-vidyādhara* in the *Prabhā-maṇḍala*. Mention of *Padma* in *Vṛddha Hārīta Smṛti* in connection with Kṛṣṇa is more interesting as the same verse mentions the pearl suspended from the nose (*mauktikānvita-nāsāgram*). This is exactly the nose ornament known as 'BULAK' of the Muslim period.

Thus it becomes evident that *Padma* is definitely a later addition say of Later Gupta or even Post Gupta age.

- (ii) Apart from the common four-armed form of Viṣṇu the two, six-eight and even twenty armed forms were known, but in earlier stages along with the four-armed form, the eight-armed form had become popular. We get as many as eight references to it here.
- (iii) The iconography of Kṛṣṇa becomes quite clear. Generally he has been described with four arms carrying *Śankha*, *Chakra* and *Gadā*. His other weapons were the bow, sword and arrow.
- (iv) These references bring to light the following technical terms in connection with the iconography of Viṣṇu :
 - (1) *Trikūṭamiva Kirīṭa* (high crown)—*Matsya.*, 171.23

- (2) *Pralamba bāhu* (suspended arms)—Viṣṇu., VI. 7.82
 (3) *Udbāhu* (upper or extra hands)—Vṛddha Hārita Smṛti
 (4) *Sama-karnānta-vinyasta chāru kuṇḍala* (Ornaments inserted
 in the parallel ear-lobes)—Viṣṇu., VI. and 81
 (5) *Pañcha-rūpā Vaiṣṇavyantī*—Viṣṇu., I. 22. 72

(6) Motifs :

*Pādamadhya Prthvī**Deva-dundubhi**Gandharva Mithuna**Patrāvalī*

—Matsya., 257. 11-15

*Simha-vyāghra**Kalpalatā**Prabhā-maṇḍalastha-**malā-vidyādhara*

—Agni., 44. 47-49

Padmastha (standing or

seated on the full

blown lotus)

—Agni., 307. 13.

(7) *Pārśvaga* (by the side)—Agni., 49. 11.(8) *Viṣṇu-chihna* (emblems of Viṣṇu)—Viṣṇu., V. 34. 5.(9) *Vidyādhara-samanvita-toraṇa* (gateway with Vidyādharas)

—Matsya., 257. 13.

APPENDIX—III

WEAPONS OF VIṢṆU AS DESCRIBED IN THE CLASSICAL LITERATURE

Source	Reference	Name or form of Viṣṇu	Emblems :—
			S.—śaṅkha C.—chakra G.—gadā.
Vālmikīya Rāmāyaṇa (Gita Press)	Bāla., 15. 16	Viṣṇu	S. C. G.
	Bāla., 45. 22		S. C.
	Yuddha., 118. 13-23		C. Sword, Bow.
	Uttara., 6. 13		S. C.
	Uttara., 6. 30		C. G.
	Uttara., 6. 65		S. C. G. Bow, Sword.
	Uttara., 6. 68		S. C. Bow, Sword.
	Uttara., 7. 36		S. C. G.
	Uttara., 8. 5		S. C. G.
	Sabhā (S), 38, p. 796	Vāsudeva	S. C. G. sword.
Mahābhārata (Gita Press)	Sabhā (S), 38, p. 805	Kṛṣṇa	S.C.G.
	Sabhā., (S), p. 806	S. C. G. Sword.
	Sabhā., (S) 83, p. 822	Kṛṣṇa	S. C. G.
	Sabhā., (S) 83, p. 824	Kṛṣṇa on Garuḍa	S. C. G. Sword.
	Vana., 189. 40	Nārāyaṇa	S. C. G.
	Vana., 272. 73-4	Kṛṣṇa	S. C. G.
	Anuśāsana (S), 124 p. 5876	S. C. G.
	Anuśāsana., 147. 15	Viṣṇuten-armed	mentions only C., Sword and Bow.
	Sauptika., 12. 18	Kṛṣṇa	C. G. Bow. Spear.
	Śānti., (S) 47, pp. 4536-7	Kṛṣṇa	S. C. G.
	Mausala., 8. 59	S. C. G.
	Sabhā., (S) 83, p. 818	Kṛṣṇa on Garuḍa	S. C. G.
	Droṇa., 82. 17	Kṛṣṇa	S. C. G.
	Karṇa., 87. 106	Kṛṣṇa, two-armed	
	Karṇa., 90. 55	Kṛṣṇa, two-armed	

Source	Reference	Name or form of Viṣṇu	Emblems :—
			S.—śaṅkha C.—chakrā G.—gadā.
Viṣṇu Purāṇa (Gita Press)	Anu., 148. 22	Kṛṣṇa, four-armed	
	Anu., 149. 50	Padmī	
	Anu., 149. 120	S. C. G. Sword and Bow.
	Anu., 167. 37	S. C. G.
	Aśvamedha., 55. 23	Kṛṣṇa	S. C. G.
	I. 4. 12		S. C. G.
	I. 9. 66		S. C.
	I. 9. 67		S. C. G.
	III. 17. 35	Hari	S. C. G.
	V. 3. 10	Kṛṣṇa	S. C. G.
	V. 31. 8	Kṛṣṇa	S. C. G.
	I. 4. 31	Varāha	S. C. G. Sword.
	I. 9. 31	Viṣṇu	C. G.
	I. 9. 89	Viṣṇu	C. G.
	I. 12. 45	Acyuta, six-armed	S. C. G. Bow, Sword, Vara or Śara (?)
	I. 22. 68-71		S. C. G. Bow
	I. 22. 73-74		Śara or Arrow, Sword
	V. 37. 52	Weapons of Kṛṣṇa	S. C. G. Bow, Sword and Quiver of arrows (<i>tūṇī</i>)
	V. 18. 39	Kṛṣṇa as seen by Akrūra	four-armed with C.
	VI. 7. 82	Viṣṇu, eight-armed	S. C. G. Bow, Sword, Akṣa- valaya, Vara, Abhaya
Varāha Purāṇa	183. 2-3	Vāsudeva, terracotta figure.	
	163. 21-	Kapila-Varāha figure at Mathura	
	4. 20		S. C. G.
	7. 42		S. C. G.
	13. 24		S. G.
	155. 8	Viṣṇu, two-armed	
	156. 8		S. C. G.
	174. 74		S. C. G.

Source	Reference	Name or form of Viṣṇu	Emblems :— S.—śaṅkha C.—chakra G.—gadā.
Matsya Purāṇa	54. 13 p. 149	Viṣṇu, four-handed	S. C. G. Sword
(Mor Ed.)	68. 23, p. 179		S. G. Vara. G.
	171. 24-25 p. 501	Eight armed	S. C. G. Sword, Śara, Bow, Śakti, Citraphala.
	177. 3, p. 517	Four-armed	S. C. G.
	247. 12, p. 689	Four-armed Varāha	C. G. Bow, Sword.
	+257. 4 p. 716		S. C. G. PADMA.
	+257. 7-8 p. 717	Eight handed	S. C. G. PADMA. Sword. Shield, Bow, Arrow.
	+ 257. 9	Vāsudeva	X. C. G. PADMA.
	257. 10	Kṛṣṇa	X. C. G.
Liṅga Purāṇa	+ Pū. 36. 1-3		S.C. G. PADMA.
(Mor Ed.)	+ Pū. 37. 28	Ananta	S. C. G. PADMA.
	+ Utt. 5. 23-25		S. C. G. PADMA.
	Utt. 5. 31, 33		S. C. G. Sword.
	+ Pū. 69. 52		S. C. G. PADMA.
	Pū. 69. 73	Kṛṣṇa	S. C. G.
Agni Purāṇa	+ 21. 6		S. C. G. PADMA.
(Mor Ed.)	23. 15-6	Eight-armed ??	S. C. G. Bow, Quiver of arrows (<i>iṣudhi</i>), Sword, Shield.
	24. 56	Viśvaksena	S. C. G.
	+ 44. 47	Vāsudeva	S. C. G. PADMA.
	+ 48. 2-12	24 forms	S. C. G. PADMA.
	49. 10-11	Vāsudeva, four-armed	S. C. G. Vara ?
		Vāsudeva, two-armed	S. C. G. Vara.
	49. 17-16	Eight-armed	S. C. G. Sword, Shield, Bow, Arrow, Vara.
	49. 19-20	Trailokya-Mohana, Eight-armed	S. C. G. Sword, Club (<i>musala</i>), Noose, Goad, Bow.

Source	Reference	Name or form of Viṣṇu	Emblems :—
			S.—śaṅkha C.—chakra G.—gadā.
	49. 21, 22	Twenty-armed, four-faced	S. G. Bow, Noose, Tomara, Plough, Battle-axe, Staff, Dagger, Shield, Mud- gara, Noose, Spear, Śūla, Arrow,
	49. 26 307. 19	Hayagrīva Trailokya-Mo- hana, eight- armed	S. C. G. Veda C. S. Bow, Sword, G. Musala, Goad, Nose.
Brahma Purāṇa (Mor Ed.)	68. 48-49		S. C. G. Bow.
	61. 43-43	Six-armed	S. C. G. Bow, Sword, Quiver
	182. 14		S. C. G.
	45. 64		S. C. G.
	49. 19		S. C. G.
	50. 43		S. C. G.
	56. 48	Nārāyaṇa	S. C. G.
	73. 9		S. C. G.
	79. 12	Varāha	S. C. G.
	109. 43	Along with Subbadrā and Saṅkarṣaṇa	S. C. G.
	177. 2, 3	Kṛṣṇa	S. C. G.
	50. 43-44		S. C. G.
	57. 39-40	Kṛṣṇa, two- armed	S. C. G.
	207. 15-17	Paundraka Vā- sudeva	S. C. G. PADMA —A copy
		Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva	S. C. Bow— Original
	50, 5-7	Eight armed	S. C. G. Bow, Arrow, C. ? Ugrapāṇi ?
	122. 44	Vāsudeva	
	107. 7-10	Vāsudeva	
	107. 24		S. C. G.
Vāyu Purāṇa (Mor Ed)	Uppo., 24. 9		S. C. G.

Source	Reference	Name or form of Viṣṇu	Emblems :—
			S.—śaṅkha C.—chakra G.—gadā.
Viṣṇu Smṛti	Smṛti Sandarbha	I. p. 405	S. C. G.
	+ „ „	I. p. 46	S. C. G. PADMA.
Vṛddha Hārta	+ „ „	III. p. 24	S. C. G. PADMA.
Smṛti	+ „ „	III. 22. 224	S. C. G. Padma.
	„ „	III. 305-13	C. S. in upper hands (<i>udbāhu</i>), Embracing wife with other two.
	„ „	v. 202, 253 Viṣṇu	S. C. G. PADMA.

DEMYTHOLOGIZATION AND THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS*

GERALD JAMES LARSON

A Personal Preface

Although I am influenced by the Phenomenology of Religion and as such am somewhat typical of American students of the History of Religions, I nevertheless also ask other kinds of questions which place me in an intermediate position between the Phenomenology of Religion, on the one hand, and the general philosophy of religions, on the other. Hence, I feel the need to indicate to you the context from which I approach or interrogate the History of Religions. I do not pretend to suggest that my standpoint is a fully reflected upon or philosophically tight standpoint. It is, rather, a tentative beginning of reflection—at this point perhaps little more than a personal perspective. At any rate, I wish to share it with you.

Heidegger, both in his early and later writings, suggests that modern man, as world-historical man, has somehow “fallen out of being”. Man has forgotten Being. The light of Being is hidden and concealed, and, as a result, the world is becoming progressively darker. Says Heidegger,

...the world is darkening. The essential episodes of this darkening are : the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth, the standardization of man, and the pre-eminence of the mediocre.¹

And, in another context, Heidegger says,

At a time when the farthestmost corner of the globe has been conquered by technology and opened to economic exploitation ; when any incident whatever, regardless of where or when it occurs, can be communicated to the rest of the world at any desired speed ; when the assassination of a king in France and a symphony concert

* This paper was presented originally in the form of two lectures for a Seminar sponsored by the Department of Indian Philosophy and Religion, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, on January 16th and 23rd, 1969.

¹ Martin Heidegger, “The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics,” in *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 3, eds., William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken (New York : Random House, 1962), p. 246.

in Tokyo can be experienced simultaneously ; when time has ceased to be anything other than velocity, instantaneousness, and simultaneity, and time as history has vanished from the lives of all peoples ; when a boxer is regarded as a nation's great man ; when mass meetings attended by millions are looked on as a triumph—then, yes then, through all this turmoil a question still haunts us like a specter : What for ?—Whither ? And what then ?¹

Heidegger calls men to rediscover the presence and nearness of Being, and he asserts that Being may be uncovered by going back to the beginning of thought—or that time when Being simply manifested itself in its “self-blossoming emergence”.

Heidegger also writes about the disappearance of the “holy”, and he implies that a rediscovery of Being is intimately connected to a recovery of the experience of holiness. It is at this point that I, as a student of religions, become fascinated with Heidegger's programme. For I not only agree with Heidegger that the holy has disappeared ; I have *felt* the disappearance in my own experience. Moreover, I sense that most religious men, whether in New York, Tokyo, or Banaras, have felt a similar disappearance. Hence, like Heidegger, only in a slightly different direction and in a humbler manner, I wish to go back to the beginning in order to discover how the holy has appeared. Thus, I have become interested in the History of Religions. But for me the interrogation of the History of Religions is not merely to determine the historical development of religion or to construct a science of religions. It is, rather, to see how the sacred or the holy or that which is religious has appeared *in history*. One of the primary tasks of the History of Religions, as I conceive it, is to allow that which *was* religious—that which *was* holy—to speak or to appear. I suspect that such an interrogation may be relevant for contemporary man's religious experience.

But there is a strange and frustrating problem in this search for what *was* holy. I cannot appropriate that which appeared in the past in my own life now, and that for two reasons. (1) The object of my search is not an object. As a contemporary historian of religions, I must take the phenomenological reflections of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre seriously. There is no such thing as an object or a subject. That which appears to me is inextricably tied up with my consciousness that *intends* it. The old sub-

¹ Ibid., p. 242.

jective/objective dichotomy is no longer a reasonable philosophical option. (2) I am forever at an "historical distance" from what I study. As a contemporary historian of religions, I must take Hegel, Marx and Freud seriously. Historical existence is not merely a theme of modern philosophy. It is, rather, a fact of human existence. I perhaps can approximate the experience of Plato, of Paul, of Yājñavalkya, etc., but my world and my existence is forever separated from theirs by an abyss of centuries. "Historical distance" prevents me from appropriating their experience and their apprehension of the holy.

Hence, I am in the peculiar position of interrogating the past in order to open some new possibilities in my future; I am in the peculiar position of being a reasonably religious man without a reasonably articulated religion; I am in the peculiar position of having to admit at the outset that I can find no "true" religion or religious experience in what I study but that the inquiry or questioning itself may lead to a "rebirth of the gods" for me or a new manifestation of the holy at some point in the future. I must, of course, also entertain the notion that such a rebirth may, in fact, not occur!

So much for my Personal Preface to this paper!

The Holy and a Mythologized World-View

Modern research in the History of Religions has revealed that one of the more productive approaches in any attempt to analyze religious experience is in the direction of describing man's awareness of the "holy" or the "sacred". Rudolf Otto was one of the first to describe the "holy" or the "numinous", and the subsequent research of scholars like Pettazzoni, van der Leeuw, C. F. Bleeker, and Mircea Eliade has not only provided additional data but also further reflection about the structures of the "sacred."¹

The holy or the sacred is an object or a place or a time in experience which is strange, unusual, extra-ordinary. The holy is the weird, the "eerie", something that appears in experience and grasps man with a strange power. According to Otto, this holy or numinous is mysterious, profoundly

¹ For the following discussion, I have used some of the "classic" studies in the field of the History of Religions: R. Otto's *The Idea of the Holy and Mysticism East and West*; M. Eliade's *Cosmos and History, Patterns in Comparative Religion, Shamanism, Yoga; Immortality and Freedom*; G. van der Leeuw's *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*; R. Pettazzoni's *Essays on the History of Religions*; C. F. Bleeker's *The Sacred Bridge*; etc., etc.

terrifying, yet paradoxically compelling. Man finds the holy "aw-ful" in the original sense of the term—i.e., "full of awe". Yet man is also fascinated by the holy and feels drawn to it.

The holy or the sacred for archaic or ancient man may appear in a variety of forms or shapes. A sudden clearing in the woods, a branch falling from a tree, a river or a stream, the birth of a child at a certain time; all of these and much more may be the occasion for the manifestation of the sacred or the holy. In any of these manifestations, however, the main point is that a new pattern of meaning or significance enters man's experience. Archaic or ancient man interprets the meaning of his experience around these manifestations of the holy or the sacred. Eliade has suggested that the experience of the sacred represents an archaic ontology. The everyday profane world is an endless chaos or wilderness which is suddenly illuminated by the appearance of the sacred. Suddenly this appearance of the holy sheds light or gives meaning to the profane world. Here at this particular point of the appearance of the sacred man finds a norm or criterion for interpreting his existence. Thus, sacred time and sacred space become the means for interpreting all of time and all of space.

Archaic man, therefore, remembers these manifestations of the sacred. Taking, for example, the earlier reference to the "sudden clearing in the woods", let me illustrate this remembrance. Archaic man recalls *when* he discovered the clearing—perhaps in spring or early summer. He thus may return to the clearing at a certain time each year. Moreover, archaic man recalls how he approached the clearing. He remembers his *actions*, and thus on future occasions he may try to imitate or re-enact his first set of actions—i.e., a kind of ritual may be associated with the clearing in the woods. Archaic man also recalls what he thought or *uttered* when he first encountered the sacred in the clearing. Perhaps he uttered a prayer or a verse of some sort, and this utterance may be repeated each time he approaches the clearing. Etc., etc. Although this is a simplified illustration, perhaps it gives some indication of how worship, prayer, and ritual re-enactment can easily become part of the experience of the holy.

The experience of the sacred for archaic or ancient man is also closely allied with myth. Eliade has pointed out that the term "myth" for religious man, unlike its use in poetry or art, refers to a profoundly true story. It relates or narrates how the world or man or some part of the world came into existence. Thus, myth in the History of Religions is never a fiction or a legend or a fairy-tale. It is, rather, a profoundly true account of how

things came to be. A myth takes place in sacred time and sacred space. It looks back to the time before the beginning of the world and relates how the world or man came to be. Moreover, each time the myth is re-enacted, what happened in the time before the beginning of time is actually re-enacted. As archaic man remembers, recites and re-enacts the myth, he is himself transposed into sacred time and space ; he is transposed back to the beginning ; and his re-enactment actually re-constitutes his existence. Archaic man, therefore, lives in a mythologized world of the sacred. The meaning of his existence appears in the manifestation of the sacred within the world, and his salvation requires the periodic re-enactment of these mythic motifs. Such re-enactment re-constitutes, re-news, and re-creates him. The world exists because of the myth, and archaic man exists because of his re-enactment of the myth.

Let me illustrate this mythological world-view briefly with the creation myth of the Ancient Near East, known as the *Enuma Elish*¹. According to the myth, the primal Mother, Tiamat, and the primal Father, Apsu, beget all of the gods and goddesses before the beginning of time. Apsu, however, becomes annoyed by the noise of his offspring and decides to kill them. One of the lesser gods hears of this and decides to strike first ; he proceeds to kill Apsu. Tiamat, enraged at the murder of Apsu, vows to destroy all the gods and goddesses. Marduk, one of the lesser gods and later the high god of Babylon, decides to meet Tiamat in combat. Tiamat and Marduk engage in a vicious battle, and Marduk eventually kills the primal Mother. From the upper half of her dead body, he creates the firmament and the heavens. From the lower half of her body he creates the earth, etc. What is interesting for our purposes is how this creation myth is used in the Ancient Near East. On new Year's Day in Babylon the king recites the *Enuma Elish*, and, according to the ideology of Mesopotamian religion, the king's recitation represents the actual re-enactment of the primal conflict. His recitation of the myth actually re-creates the world on New Year's Day. The world comes to be anew each year in the re-enactment of the myth. Hence, on the day before New Year's Day, and the evening before, there is a general slackening in the community's morality and functioning. All the usual regulations and inhibitions of the culture are

¹ J. B. Pritchard, ed., *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (Princeton : University Press, 1955 ; 2nd edition). For an excellent discussion of the text and its ritual significance in Babylon, see E.O. James, *The Ancient Gods* (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), pp. 140-145.

suspended. Why ? Because there is to be a new creation of New Year's Day. Implicit also in all of this is the belief that the king must recite or re-enact the myth, for otherwise the world will simply not exist.

Thus, archaic or ancient man lives in a mythologized world. The sacred or the holy manifests itself at various points in this mythologized world, and man repeats, recites, and re-enacts these appearances. By so doing—i.e., by so re-enacting—he reconstitutes the world and maintains his own existence. The world, man and the sacred are inextricably entwined with one another.

The Holy and Demythologization

But the History of Religions must move beyond this archaic or ancient context. The History of Religions must address itself to what happens when this mythologized world-view begins to collapse. For, fortunately or unfortunately, this is precisely what begins to happen. In time this mythologized world or this world, which is the locus of the holy, undergoes a transformation in the consciousness of man. In a variety of contexts, the world is stripped of its holiness, and holiness manifests itself in a new locus, a new place. That which appears in the world becomes radically profane and secular. The myth is broken ! The world as it appears and man as he appears no longer bear the holy. Or again, the holy abandons man and the world. Yet interestingly, this abandonment of the world by the holy, or this flight of the gods, brings with it in every context a new manifestation of the holy, and this new manifestation can only appear so long as the myth is broken. In other words, the new, vital, and dynamic experiences of the holy in the History of Religions appear to be linked or connected with a process of what I would like to call "demythologization."

I am not using the term "demythologization" as it has been used in some kinds of contemporary Christian theology—e.g., in Bultmann, who attempts to de-mythologize the New Testament so that the biblical text makes sense to modern man. I am, rather, using the term in a much broader sense. "Demythologization" in my use of the term refers to a way of experiencing the holy in the History of Religions.¹ The holy appears in the

¹ A similar use of the term "demythologization" was first suggested to me by Professor Jacob Taubes in a series of lectures on Hellenistic Religions at Columbia University, New York City, Winter 1963. As used in my presentation, the term demythologization is closer to the work of H. Frankfort's *Before Philosophy* and F. M. Cornford's *From Religion to Philosophy* than it is to Bultmann's programme of demythologization with respect to the New Testament.

breaking of the myth. The holy comes to man with the flight of the gods. The holy shows itself as a new and vital experience as the world is de-mythologized.

As mentioned earlier, this demythologization occurs in a variety of contexts. The breaking of the myth can be traced in any cultural setting, and the manner in which the myth is broken differs in each case. Since it is neither possible nor desirable in this paper to attempt a detailed analysis of this process of demythologization, I have selected only four moments in the History of Religions which not only illustrate the process itself but also reveal the striking differences which appear in man's experience of the holy. I have chosen to comment briefly on demythologization in one dimension of the history of ancient Israel, of ancient India, of ancient Greece, and of ancient China. Naturally, I am not attempting an exhaustive or definitive presentation; my comments are meant, rather, to be provocative and suggestive—an attempt to look at certain moments in the History of Religions from a somewhat new perspective.

One final remark before turning to the discussion of ancient Israel. I am focusing on the process of demythologization in the History of Religions. As such I am focusing primarily on demythologization as an event in the history of religious consciousness or religious experience—i.e., how religious man experiences a new manifestation of the holy or the sacred. It might also be of interest to ask how these shifts in religious consciousness take place from the standpoint of cultural history, psychology, sociology, etc. I only point out that I am not asking these latter questions except occasionally in a very indirect manner.

(1) *Demythologization and the Religious Experience of Israel*

The religious experience of the Israelites appears as one moment in the History of Religions in the Ancient Near East. A careful study of the Old Testament reveals influences on Israel's faith not only from the surrounding Canaanite religion but also from the religions of Babylonia, Assyria and Egypt. The garden in Paradise, the flood narratives, the tower of Babel, the motif of the serpent, etc., all have their counterparts in the general context of Ancient Near Eastern religions. Even the myth of creation and the myth of the fashioning of man are traceable to the creation myths of Mesopotamia—i.e., *Gilgamesh* and the *Enuma Elish*.¹

¹ J. B. Pritchard, ANET, loc. cit.

Yet, strangely, Israel's experience of the holy or sacred arises as a kind of reaction against its own Ancient Near Eastern heritage. The holy appears to Israel only at the point when Israel is able to set itself free from its own heritage. Israel's consciousness of the holy manifests itself only when it has rejected the general Ancient Near Eastern experience of the holy.

The experience of the holy in Canaanite religion and Mesopotamian religion is closely tied in with fertility, seasonal change, and kingship as a reflection of the natural order¹. So, as mentioned earlier, on New Year's Day in Mesopotamia, when the king recites the creation myth, the world, in fact, is re-created, is reconstituted, or comes to be. That is to say, the holy or the sacred is closely allied to a mythologized world, and the sacred is quite inconceivable apart from the mythologized order of things. In ancient Egypt also religious experience is inextricably allied with a mythologized world. Pharaoh is ontologically the son of God or the son of the sun. The shining sun is the worldly appearance or manifestation, in fact, of divinity, of the holy. Man sees the holy with the rising and setting of the sun, and the presence of Pharaoh, is, in fact, the presence of the sacred in the human order.

In Israel's experience, however, this Ancient Near Eastern apprehension of the holy is rejected². The world is radically secularized. The sun, the moon, the seasons of the year, human sexuality, etc., all become profane. The myths, which look back to the time before creation, are denied, and the exploits of heroes and gods in the time of beginning are no longer significant for religious experience. In other words, the world and every thing in it, including man, is radically demythologized. The world is no longer charged with the holy or the sacred.

In the midst of this experiential rejection, however, Israel offers a new affirmation—or perhaps better, Israel experiences the holy or the sacred in a new mode. The holy now appears in this strange god, Yahweh, who is *beyond* the world and man. In a sense, the holy or the sacred is “kicked upstairs” and is experienced in a divinity who dwells in isolation from his creation. Moreover, this Yahweh is *sexless*; he has no consort or family. Then, too, this Yahweh has no other gods with him; he is jealous and angry if other gods are brought before him.

¹ E. O. James, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 ff.

² By “Israel's experience” here and following, I am, of course, referring to the experience of the literary prophets primarily (Amos, etc.) beginning from the 8th-century B.C.

Because Yahweh or the Israelite experience of the holy is beyond the world and man, a kind of abyss exists between him and the world. Man can no longer taste, smell, touch or see the sacred. Now there is only one means of communication, and that is the sense of hearing. Hence, Yahweh communicates by means of his *Word*. Only the Word of God is able to penetrate the distance or the abyss separating the world and the sacred. Hence, man must *hear* the Word if he is to experience the holy. The Word of God becomes the main theme of the Israelite apprehension of the holy.

This new apprehension of the sacred in Israel also brings with it a radical sense of *human inadequacy*. The holy is totally beyond man and the world—its locus is now in Yahweh. Man in his new secularity, in his new profaneness, must *submit* to the holy. Man is now *powerless*. He can no longer imitate the holy and thus reconstitute himself; he is now dependent on that which is completely beyond him—that which “transcends” him. Hence, Israel’s experience of demythologization is closely bound up with the experience of *submission*. Man submits to the sacred.

Moreover, this Yahweh, who demands submission, speaks his *Word* not in the mythological time of the beginning, but rather in an event *in history*. The religion of Israel affirms, of course, that God created the world, but that is not the crucial event. The crucial moment for Israel is, rather, the *Exodus*—the deliverance from Egyptian captivity—i.e., an event in history. Israel does not remember a mythical story which occurred before the beginning of time. It remembers instead an event in history. Israel’s life is not constituted, does not come to be, in mythical time; it is constituted, it comes to be, in history itself.

Of the many texts in the Old Testament which could serve as documentation for this process of demythologization, perhaps the most revealing is the story of Elijah in the wilderness as set forth in the book of Kings.¹ Elijah prays for Yahweh to reveal himself; he yearns for an experience of the sacred. According to the Old Testament text, a sudden storm appears, and Elijah hopes to encounter Yahweh. But, as the text goes on to suggest, Yahweh is not to be found in the storm, in the earthquake, wind, or fire. Yahweh does not reveal himself in the context of the world or the things of the world. He appears instead, according to the traditional English translation of the text, in the “still small voice”—i.e., the Word that penetrates

¹ I Kings 18-19.

the abyss separating the world and the sacred. Or, as some biblical exegetes suggest, Yahweh appears "in the sound of a gentle stillness." That is to say, this holy Yahweh may even be beyond hearing, and thus may appear in a gentle *silence*. One could also point to other revealing passages in the Old Testament—e.g., the theophany on Mt. Sinai in Exodus 19 wherein God appears not as a natural phenomenon but as the Holy One who *speaks* the ten commandments; or again, the famous creedal utterance of Israel in Deuteronomy: "*Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God!*"

Demythologization and the Christian Appropriation of Israel's Faith

I have been suggesting that the religion of Israel provides a striking illustration of how a radical demythologization of the world is allied with a new manifestation or appearance of the holy, an experience of the sacred in a new mode or the sacred on a new level of consciousness. Before proceeding further let me add just a brief comment on the later Christian appropriation of Israel's faith. As in Israel's experience, so, too, in Christian experience, the *Word* is central. But in Christian experience the *Word* is radically reinterpreted and this reinterpretation represents a rather striking reversion to a mythologized world-view. That is to say in Christian experience a kind of re-mythologization seems to unfold. According to Christian ideology the *Word* becomes "*flesh*" and dwells among us. Interestingly this *Word* which for Israel expressed the distance of the holy or the sacred, comes to express in a Christian context the re-immersion of the holy into the world. Once again, man bears the holy; human existence becomes sacred once more. Similarly, sexuality re-enters the experience of the holy, although in a restricted sense. The Mother of God becomes an important figure in Christian piety, but she is a *virgin* Mother. So, too, a kind of mythical re-enactment is reintroduced. In the holy communion, the Christ is sacrificed, and the believer actually experiences in faith the breaking of the Christ's body and the shedding of his blood. This is especially noticeable in the Roman Catholic idea of transubstantiation—i.e., the substance of the bread and wine is mystically transposed for the believer into the body and blood of the Christ. Also, in Christian thought we begin to hear about the pre-existent Son or Logos, who does his work in the time before the *beginning* of time and will return at the *end* of time. These motifs recall the notions of sacred time and space and the mythic story which is to be traced to the time before the beginning of time. In other words, many of these Christian notions represent a reversion, a hearkening back to a mythologized world-view.

(2) *Demythologization and Brahmanic Speculation*

Pettazzoni, the Italian historian of religions, has suggested that there are two cradles of civilization from which much of subsequent religious experience takes its inspiration : Israel and India. Israel is the environment for the development of the Hebrew, Jewish and Christian traditions, and is most influential in the later development of the Islamic heritage. India is the environment for the rise of Brāhmanic, Jain, Buddhist and Hindu religious experience, and later, by means primarily of Mahāyāna Buddhism, influences profoundly the religious traditions of China and Japan—not only, it should be noted, Chinese and Japanese Buddhism, but also state Confucianism, neo-Confucianism, esoteric Taoism and neo-Taoism. Thus, having first discussed demythologization in Israel, it seems most appropriate to turn next to India. Unlike Israel, which has a few easily discernible religious traditions, India has a striking variety. I shall confine myself, however, to the tradition of brahmanical speculation, culminating in two of the oldest Upaniṣads : *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya*.

It seems clear that brahmanical speculation arises out of the Vedic sacrificial system and is a product of the priestly class.¹ Originally the saving power of the sacrifice resided in the sacrifice itself together with the gods and the myths about the gods for whom the sacrifices were performed. W. Norman Brown, Edgerton, Gonda, and other specialists in ancient Indian history and religion have clearly demonstrated that Vedic man lived in a mythologized world of the sacred. In time, however, a radical transformation begins to occur. The focus shifts from the sacrifice, the gods, and the myths to the *priests* performing the sacrifice. The precise knowledge and recitation of the formulas and rubrics of the sacrifice take on saving power. By *knowing* the details of the sacrificial process and by *executing* them properly, the priest could compel the gods and bring about the desired results. This “knowing” and “doing” of the priests was to some degree of a magical nature. The priest’s knowledge not only “controlled” the sacrifice, but also “controlled” that which the sacrifice symbolized—i.e., the gods, the sun, the forces of nature, etc. The holy or the sacred no longer manifests itself in the mythologized world of nature but

¹ For excellent discussions of the history of brahmanical speculation, see the following : F. Edgerton, *The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1965) ; J. Gonda, *Die Religionen Indiens*, 2 vols., (Stuttgart : W. Kohlhammer, 1960 and 1963) ; and J. W. Hauer, *Der Yoga* (Stuttgart : W. Kohlhammer, 1958 ; 2nd edition).

manifests itself now in the knowledge and action of the priests. The world is demythologized, and this demythologization is accompanied by a new manifestation of the sacred—i.e., in the knowledge and action of the priests.

This process of demythologization in the brahmanic tradition leads in several directions. (1) On the one hand, attempts are made to explain every detail of the ritual in order to insure the priest's knowledge of the process. This line of speculation can be traced in the *Brāhmaṇas*. (2) On the other hand, attempts are made to relate the old mythologized world to this new realization of the holy power of the priests. If the priest by his "knowledge" and precise "doing" is able to control the sacrifice and that which the sacrifice symbolizes, then one naturally becomes concerned with what kind of world is being controlled. This line of speculation can be traced in Vedic hymns concerning the structure, support and origin of the world. Many hymns, of course, reveal the older mythologized world-view—e.g., the victory of Indra, in mythic times, over the demon, Vṛtra, as set forth in RV. I. 32. Other hymns, however, reveal a new tendency to move away from the mythologized world in the direction of developing a new conception of the ultimate principle or basis of the world—e.g., Prajāpati or Brahmanaspati (RV. X. 121 and RV. II. 25 respectively). Still others emphasize an abstract first principle such as Skambha (AV. X. 7) or Viśvakarman (RV. X. 81). One even finds attempts to establish the world on the basis of a primeval sacrifice with a kind of primal, cosmic "man" (*puruṣa*) as the victim (RV. X. 90). Probably from the very beginning of these speculations, attempts were made to relate one tradition to another. (3) Yet a third direction of speculation is the attempt to explain the basis or foundation of the priest's own capacity for knowledge—i.e., speculations concerning the speech of the priest, its foundation in his inner nature or body, etc. This line of speculation can be traced not only in the *Brāhmaṇas* but also in some of the speculative hymns concerning speech, the speaker, breath, etc. The very word *brahman* seems to be related to the root-notion of "prayer", "speech", "utterance".

As mentioned earlier, from the very beginning there was probably an attempt to relate these various lines of speculation to one another. If one could make an identification between the power of the priest, the sacrifice, and the world, then the goal of absolute control would be assured. The new locus of the holy in the priest himself would then be firmly established. That such a "logic" of identification developed is quite clear

from such hymns as RV. X.90, X.71, X.125, etc. Similar identifications together with crude magical charms and formulas can be found throughout the hymns of the *Atharva Veda*.

Thus, it is neither surprising nor an accident, that at a later time the identification is made between the basic principle in man—i.e., his deepest selfhood, or *ātman*—and the basic principle of the world—i.e., *brahman*. The identification, *brahman-ātman*, is surely the logical outcome of a way of thinking, a way of experiencing the holy, first initiated in the context of the demythologization of the older mythologized world and the ancient sacrificial ritual. This process reaches its culmination in the oldest Upaniṣads wherein Yājñavalkya instructs his wife that she is “dear” because of the love of the Self (*ātman*) and wherein Śvetaketu’s father repeats the famous refrain, *tat tvam asi, Śvetaketu!*

Unlike Israel, which *exteriorizes* the holy or the sacred, India, in its brahmanical traditions, radically *interiorizes* it. Unlike Israel, which *submits* to the holy as the totally transcendent Yahweh, India, in its brahmanical traditions, encourages man to *appropriate* or *become* the holy. Unlike Israel, which must *hear* or *listen* to the Word of Yahweh across the abyss separating the world and the holy, India, in its brahmanical traditions, encourages man to *speak* or *utter* the holy from the depths of his own existence.

(3) *Demythologization and the Rise of Greek Philosophy*

As in Israel and ancient India, so, too, in ancient Greece, it is possible to illustrate the contention that the process of demythologization in history is linked with a new manifestation or appearance of the sacred or the holy. Moreover, just as Israel and India reveal quite different—even opposite—experiences of the holy, so the Greek traditions reveal yet a third kind of apprehension; and this new apprehension, so it seems to me, receives its most illuminating articulation in the rise of Greek philosophy.

Already in Homer and Hesiod, the process of demythologization is beginning to take place. The sacred heroes, gods, and myths more and more resemble ordinary individuals, and the actions and attitudes of the mythic figures—at one time the paradigm or ideal for human re-creation and salvation—tend to become mere reflections of the pettiness and jealousy which colour the fabric of ordinary human life. In addition, the gods themselves are subordinate to a kind of impersonal fate—*Moirai*—which clearly robs them of their primal power.

As Heidegger, Burnet and others point out, however, it is with the Pre-Socratics in the sixth century B.C. that the process of demythologization clearly manifests itself. The old mythologized world collapses, and man looks at nature and the world with a fresh vision. This new vision of nature, however, does not derive from the world itself but rather from man's *experience* of the world. Heidegger describes this new experience of nature as follows:

The Greeks did not learn what *physis* is through natural phenomena, but the other way around; it was through a fundamental poetic and intellectual experience of being that they discovered what they had to call *physis*....

Hence, *physis* originally encompassed heaven as well as earth, the stone as well as the plant, the animal as well as man....

Physis means the power that emerges and the enduring realm under its sway. This power of emerging and enduring includes "becoming" as well as "being" in the restricted sense of inert duration. *Physis* is the process of a-rising, of emerging from the hidden, whereby the hidden is first made to stand¹.

Coupled with this new experience was the other experience of the collapse of the mythologized world or the "flight of the gods". W. T. Stace describes this latter experience in a somewhat exaggerated yet provocative manner.

Belief in the gods was almost everywhere discredited. This was partly due to the moral worthlessness of the Greek religion itself. Any action, however scandalous or disgraceful, could be justified by the examples of the gods themselves as related by the poets and mythologers of Greece. But, in greater measure, the collapse of religion was due to that advance of science and philosophy....

A wave of rationalism and scepticism passed over the Greek people. The age became one of negative, critical and destructive thought....

All morality, all custom, all authority, all tradition, were criticized.... What was regarded with awe and pious veneration by their fore-fathers, the modern Greeks now looked upon as fit subjects for jest and mockery².

¹ Heidegger, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-228.

² W. T. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1965), pp. 107-108.

This flight of the gods together with the new, although groping, intellectual vision of the Pre-Socratics, receives its mature articulation in the reflection of Plato and Aristotle. This new experience is not so much a knowledge of the world as it is a way of looking at or thinking about the world. The basic experience is the realization of *logos*, talk, discourse, intellectual questioning. It is no accident that Plato's works are in the form of dialogues. Men discourse together, *talk about*, justice, goodness, nature, etc. It is in this very *discoursing* that truth is discovered. Thought, reason, or the life of the mind, unfolds itself or manifests itself in this discourse or *logos*. Ideas and concepts emerge from this rational talking. By means of this critical discourse, Plato develops his theory of ideas, his notions of justice and goodness, and his theory of the state. By means of this critical discourse, Aristotle begins to question the principles of discourse, the possibilities in propositional talk, and develops the first formal logic and system of metaphysics.

This *logos*—this rational or critical discourse between men—is not simply a dry exercise of the mind or some kind of intellectual game. For both Plato and Aristotle it is a passionate and all important activity which leads to the discovery of truth and renders intelligible and meaningful that which is. It becomes a *technique*, a significant method, for uncovering the truth about the functioning of man and the world. Moreover, it is a technique which demands the total energy, the total integrity and the total commitment of man. It is a technique which demands the critique of the gods in so far as they violate reason or truth. It is, above all, a saving technique in that it provides a way for man to achieve his highest potential, his highest virtue or his noblest functioning. In other words, reason, critical reflection, rational discourse, becomes a new manifestation or appearance of the sacred. As such the rise of Greek philosophy represents one of the most striking and illuminating events in the History of Religions.

That critical discourse is the locus of the holy is revealed perhaps most clearly in Plato's work. Of the many passages which one could cite, perhaps the allegory of the cave in the *Republic* (VII) is the most illuminating. When man is unchained from the level of appearance; and after he is slowly led to the entrance of the cave; he is shocked and blinded by the revelation of the sun. He is overwhelmed and terrified by the ultimate truth. He wishes to run from it and return to the darkness. But, as Plato later tells us, this brilliant sun, this ultimate truth, is nothing other than the "idea of the Good". The revelation of the ultimate truth, of that which

is holy, of that which ultimately is, is identical with the highest idea, the idea of the Good.

(4) *Demythologization and the Confucian Vision*

I propose, finally, to turn to one moment in the history of ancient Chinese religion and culture as one more illustration of the contention that the experience of demythologization is allied with a new manifestation or appearance of the holy; and once again I claim that this new manifestation of the sacred *in history* is quite different from the others already discussed.

The sixth-century B.C. in China was a time of chaos and disorder. The formerly powerful and respected Chou rulers had lost control, and China was split into numerous feudal states many of which were continually engaged in disputes and small wars with one another. This period in ancient China was also a time of intellectual awakening. There were numerous "schools" or traditions of speculation engaged in an attempt to reassess and preserve the older cultural achievements. One of these "schools" or traditions was known as the "school of literati" of which Confucius was to become the main exponent.¹

In this politically chaotic and intellectually fluid environment, there was also evident a discrediting or a turning away from the older religious traditions. Unfortunately, we know very little about these ancient religious traditions. What is known can be summarized for our purposes under the following points:

- (1) Ancient Chinese religion involved an elaborate domestic cult or ritual closely allied with the clan or "extended family" and somehow associated with the clan's ancestors.
- (2) Ancient Chinese man believed in spirits—called *shen*—which sometimes were the souls of men, sometimes the life-force in animals, sometimes a holy force in inanimate objects, and sometimes even celestial gods, the highest of which had the name, Shang Ti.
- (3) Ancient Chinese, in addition to adherence to an elaborate set of rites and a belief in a world of spirits, also utilized a complicated system of magic and divination involving milfoil stalks, tortoise shells, etc.² Thus, even though our knowledge of ancient

¹ Fung Yu-lan, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, trans., Derk Bodde (Princeton : University Press, 1962), I, 50 ff.

² Ibid.

Chinese religion is very limited, it seems clear that ancient Chinese man lived in a mythologized world of the holy.

The experience of Confucius, however, as revealed in the *Analects*, represents at once a radical demythologization of this older mythologized world and a new apprehension of the locus of the sacred. This experience of Confucius, I would like to suggest, is most helpfully illuminated by examining some of the key terms or words in his sayings. I am not attempting in this analysis to offer a systematic interpretation of Confucius' thought. I am only exposing certain illuminating tendencies in his thinking.

In numerous passages of the *Analects*, the term *li* or "ritual" appears. The term obviously has reference to the older domestic cult in ancient Chinese religion, but it is revealing to see how Confucius uses it. The content or substance of the ritual is considered to be quite irrelevant for Confucius. What is most important, he says, is the proper external observance of the ritual procedure. This procedure encourages an ordered and structured personal and family life, and this order is the main intention. Confucius has a similar attitude regarding the gods or supernatural powers. When asked about his attitude, he simply says that he knows nothing of such mysterious forces. He, rather, looks only to what he can comprehend—i.e., the realm of human interaction. Confucius does not deny the existence of the gods or the content of the ritual; he simply considers them to be irrelevant.

Another term which reveals Confucius' experience of the sacred is *cheng ming* or the "rectification of names". According to Confucius, a gap exists between the functioning or actuality of a thing or person, on the one hand, and the name assigned to the thing or person, on the other. Hence, says Confucius,

the ruler is not the ruler, the minister is not minister, the father is not father, and the son not son.¹

Or, according to Fung Yu-lan, leading interpreter of the history of Chinese thought,

It was because the actualities of things no longer correspond to their names, Confucius believed, that the world was suffering from disorder, and therefore the names must be rectified.²

¹ Arthur Waley, ed. and trans., *The Analects of Confucius*.

² Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., I, 60.

Confucius suggested that this rectification should begin with what he called the "five basic relationships": ruler-subject, father-son, elder brother-younger brother, husband-wife, and friend-friend. Only when these relationships are clearly defined and acted out will there be order and peace in the world. In other words, the world could be re-organized and ordered not by an appeal to the gods or by an appeal to myth or ritual, but rather by an appeal to *human interpersonal relationships*. By clarifying through discourse about basic interpersonal relations, man, the family, the state and the cosmos could be brought into a meaningful and harmonious unity. The "rectification of names", therefore—i.e., discourse about interpersonal relationships—is the primary focus of the Confucian vision of holiness.

Closely allied with *cheng ming* are two other terms which further describe the Confucian vision: the terms *chün-tzu* and *jen*, meaning something like "gentleman" and "humanity" respectively. The ideal man, according to Confucius, the "gentleman" is the perfectly disciplined man, disciplined in the sense that he knows how to function in any interpersonal situation. He is able to assume a wide variety of roles: a good scholar, an obedient son, a wise father, a loyal friend, etc. In fact, one gets the impression that the very definition of "gentleman" involves this plurality of roles. Man is nothing apart from his interpersonal relationships. There is a kind of social *a priori* at the foundation of the Confucian vision. The same can be said about the meaning of the term *jen* or "humanity". The term appears to refer to that unique quality which is found only in men. But what is that unique quality? It is, of course, propriety, personal cultivation, serious study, loyalty, etc. But more than any of these—or perhaps better, bringing together all of these—is the notion that the man who has "humanity" is the man who knows how to act and interact with other men. All social relationships are somehow sacred or holy. This is as true of the king, who is the head of the state, as it is true of every father, who is the head of a family. A sensitivity regarding how to act and interact with other men in any context is a prerequisite for a meaningful human life. A sense of decorum, propriety and insight in one's dealings with other people becomes the foundation upon which can be maintained a happy family, a well-functioning state and a stable and harmonious cosmos. In other words, the new manifestation of the holy in the Confucian vision appears to reside in man's social or interpersonal relationships—i.e., not outside of man and the world as in Israel, nor within the innermost depth of personal selfhood as in India, nor in the life of the mind or reason as

in Greece, but rather in the realm of personal relations—the interaction of man to man on a personal level. Unlike the Greeks who employ speech or discourse in order to penetrate to the realm of propositions and ideas, the Confucian vision employs speech or discourse in order to define and prescribe the social environment, the roles and attitudes one should assume in personal interactions with other men. The *social context* becomes the new locus of the holy!

Conclusions

Having completed my examination of demythologization in certain moments in the History of Religions in Israel, India, Greece and China, I would like now to bring together these four moments with the following suggestion. Each moment has something to do with discourse, speech or language. The spoken word, although separate from the sacred, is nevertheless inextricably associated with the new manifestations of the holy. So, in Israel, the Word of God—that which can penetrate the abyss separating the world and the sacred—is the focus. In India, that which speaks the word—the speaker, the priest and ultimately the principle of speech, the *brahman* or *ātman*—is the focus. In Greece, men speaking with other men in critical discourse—the *logos* as meaningful speech and as the means for finding intelligibility—is the focus. And in China, the “rectification of names”—the talk which clarifies man’s interpersonal relationships—is the focus. I would express this linking of the holy with speech or discourse in yet another way. In Israel, the holy manifests itself as the talk or word of God or *theo-logy*. In India, the holy manifests itself as the talk or speech of man’s innermost selfhood or *psycho-logy*. In Greece, the holy manifests itself in man’s discourse with man or *anthropo-logy*. In China, the holy manifests itself as man’s talk or discourse about interpersonal relations or *socio-logy*. I am obviously not using the terms theology, psychology, anthropology and sociology in the modern sense of intellectual disciplines, but rather in a very literal sense and in an attempt to summarize in one word where the locus of the holy resides in each of these historic contexts.

In closing I would like to offer two observations. First, I have emphasized how different the appearances of the holy are in each of these four moments in the History of Religions. One could find other kinds of manifestations in other cultural contexts or in different dimensions of the contexts I have selected. This argues forcefully, it seems to me, for the taking of history seriously in any discussion of the holy. The sacred takes

on a peculiar inflection in each historic manifestation, and the very notion of the holy is inseparable *in essence* from its historical articulation. Hence, the all-religions-are-one-syndrome and the all-men-should-have-the-one-true-faith-syndrome appear to be abstract and empty fantasies from the perspective of the History of Religions. Second, I have emphasized how each new manifestation of the holy in these four moments in history has been connected with a radical demythologization of the older world-view. Now, of course, a more detailed analysis would have to be pursued in other contexts to demonstrate that this is true essentially. But perhaps I have suggested enough in order to suggest the argument that modern man's experience of the disappearance of the holy need not be reason for despair. It may, rather, be a ground for hope—hope not for the recovery of a past experience of the holy, but, rather, for a unique appearance of the holy in our own time and in our own history.

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

CHACKO VALIAVEETIL

INTRODUCTION

In a philosophical seminar recently held in Banaras on 'the concept of philosophy' some veteran professors of philosophy were heard complaining: "gone are the days when the study of philosophy was considered the noblest of pursuits and philosophers were looked upto by men for guidance and inspiration in the solution of life's problems". This complaint arose from the fact that the nature and function of philosophy as understood in all the cultures of the world and especially in India from time immemorial is questioned if not categorically rejected as pure 'nonsense' by the so-called 'modern' philosophers. If in the ancient days philosophy was exalted and venerated as the 'Queen of sciences', seeking the knowledge of Ultimate Reality, today she is made 'one of the sciences' or even a handmaid of the sciences, her only rôle being the analysis of language and clarification of concepts used by the special sciences. Many expressed the wish that philosophy be not allowed to be swallowed up by language analysis but be reinstated to her noble pedestal. We fully sympathise with this wish. Our contention in this paper is that this reinstatement can be done only if we go back to the traditional conception of philosophy as man's quest for the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality.

Philosophy is 'love of wisdom'.

The term philosophy means love of wisdom. Pythagoras who invented the term did not want to be called a wise man for he believed that wisdom in the strict sense belonged to God alone. He was content with the more modest appellation a 'friend' or 'lover' of wisdom¹. So we may say philosophy is the quest for wisdom or knowledge.

But wisdom or knowledge is not the exclusive concern or property of philosophy. Sciences seek knowledge and so also in a way, does religion. Also mankind in general knows things by common sense which embraces the knowledge of everyday life, beliefs and opinions more or less well founded. The knowledge or wisdom that philosophy seeks is related to and distinguished from these other branches of knowledge. We shall try to see the relation of

¹. Jacques Maritain, *An Introduction to Philosophy* (Translated from the French by E. I. Watkin; Sheed and Ward, London, 1946), p. XIII.

philosophical quest for knowledge to common sense, to science and to religion and in this attempt we hope to bring out what the nature and function of philosophy is.

I. PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE

Before we know things scientifically by reflecting upon them we know them imperfectly. Such imperfect knowledge, though not scientific, implies a solid kernel of genuine certainties. Such are first, the data of the senses (for example, that bodies possess length, breadth and height); secondly, self-evident axioms (for example, the whole is greater than the part, every event has a cause) and thirdly, consequences immediately deducible from these axioms. Such knowledge is found in all men alike and so it may be said to belong to the common perception, consent, instinct of men, or in other words, to the common sense of mankind.

What should be the attitude of philosophy to this common knowledge or common sense of mankind? Towards the end of the eighteenth century the Scottish school of philosophy had held that philosophy must be founded on common sense understood simply as the common consent or universal witness of mankind. They had considered common sense as a special faculty purely instinctive and unrelated to the intellect. On the other extreme we find philosophers despising common sense *a priori* as if nothing is true or scientific unless it taught the contrary of what mankind at large believes to be true. Thus Rene Descartes would admit only 'the clear and distinct ideas' of his mind. For the Logical Positivists everything that cannot be verified empirically, at least in principle, is meaningless. The dialectical method used by Nāgārjuna in his *Mādhyamika Kārikā*, and by Bradley in his *Appearance and Reality* to discredit everyday experience give scant respect to the common sense of mankind.

One of the tests of a true system of philosophy is that it does not contradict the common experience of men. It is related of Diogenes that when Zeno the Eleatic was arguing in his presence against the possibility of motion, his sole reply was to get up and walk. Śaṅkarācārya, the greatest philosopher India has ever produced, though accused, often unjustly, of world denial, was a great believer in common sense. He refutes the idealism of the Vijñānavādins by appealing to common sense. He has no respect for the idle speculations and dialectics of the Mādhyamikas which destroy everything of common experience through dialectical criticism but fail to construct

anything positive. It is mere 'vitandāvāda', to be condemned wholesale.¹ Śaṅkarācārya goes even further to say that even Scripture, which eventually is his ultimate authority, cannot go against the testimony of common experience. In his *Gītā Bhāṣya* he says:

“नहि श्रुतिशतमपि शीतोऽग्निरप्रकाशो वेति ब्रुवत्प्रामाण्यमुपैति”

‘Not even a hundred texts which declare fire to be cold or without light, can be valid or acceptable’. *Gītā Bhāṣya*, xviii. 66.

Philosophy is built upon common sense, not just in the sense of the universal consent or common instinct of mankind, but considered as the understanding of self-evident principles. But it is superior to common sense and goes beyond it as it is scientific and critical. To refute Zeno effectively his arguments against the possibility of motion had to be refuted showing where they went wrong though we cannot deny that the answer of Diogenes was a cogent one. The pure intellectualist philosophers from Parmenides to Hegel fail to give due respect to common sense whereas the empiricists and the positivists fail to rise far enough beyond it.

Philosophy is not constructed *a priori* on the basis of some particular fact selected by the philosopher (for example, Descartes' 'cogito'), or on some principle arbitrarily laid down by him (examples: Spinoza's Substance, Fichte's Pure Ego, Schelling's Absolute, Hegel's Idea). As Jacques Maritain rightly points out: “Not a whimsy spun out of his own brain, but the entire universe with its enormous multitude and variety of data must be the philosopher's teacher.”²

II. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENCES

There was a time when philosophy was extolled as the 'Queen of the Sciences'. Today the title is being questioned if not positively denied to her. For, living as we are in a scientific age we turn to science for a solution to the problems that confront us and we are certain that only science can furnish an answer to these problems. Just take a look at the various faculties in a University and it will not require very close examination to notice the mad rush for the study of science, technology and medicine while the philosophy class rooms remain practically empty.

¹ Cf. N. K. Devaraja, *An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge* (Motilal Banarasi Das, Varanasi, 1962), p. 13

² J. Maritain, op. cit., p. 107.

Yet on closer examination we see that, after all, science cannot lead us very far. Science can tell us about the electrons and protons, about outer space and rockets, about the moon and the stars. But beyond the physical realm the voice of science is hesitant. It cannot tell us much about the fundamental problems which have a bearing upon our life and which we are interested in : about life, its origin and destiny ; about the world in which we live, its origin and purpose ; about moral, religious and aesthetic values. Science is not even sure of the first principles on which are based its own theories and discoveries. It is to philosophy that we must turn to find an answer to these problems and difficulties.

Herbert Spencer defined philosophy as "completely unified knowledge" distinguishing it from science which is partially unified knowledge. Spencer meant that philosophy is an attempt to unite the special sciences : physics, chemistry, biology etc. into a unified system. This, we must admit, is a defective view of philosophy. Philosophy goes far beyond the unification of sciences. Its scope is wider. It must satisfy not only our scientific interests but also our moral and religious needs, our spiritual longings and aspirations. It wants to find out the ultimate explanation of things, their cause, their meaning, value and purpose. In this sense philosophy is called also *Metaphysics*. But besides *Metaphysics* philosophy includes in its purview other subjects like *Epistemology*, *Logic*, *Ethics* and *Aesthetics*.

The greatest philosophers of the world were metaphysicians. They were seeking the knowledge of the ultimate reality. This has been the pre-occupation of the philosophers from the time of Thales, the first Greek philosopher, up to our own days. To this end laboured Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and a host of others.

If we turn to India we find the same burning question concerning the ultimate reality occupying the minds of the Vedic seers and sages. On the one hand they looked for the nature of the ultimate reality underlying this world of change, and on the other they wanted to know the true nature of the Self. The former they called *Brahman* and the latter *Ātman*. The Upaniṣadic seers reached the ultimate solution in the identification of *Brahman* and *Ātman*.

Philosophy, further, differs from science in the method it uses. Science uses the method of observation and experimentation. It builds its theories on sense data and verifies them through experiments. Philosophy also uses the scientific method and is one with science in its honest and laborious search for

truth. But philosophy does not limit itself to sense data. It chafes at the limitations inherent in science and insists upon penetrating into regions lying beyond the field of science. And in these regions the method of observation and experimentation cannot be of much help. The theories of philosophy are tested in the laboratory of life and are verified through critical reflection and interpretation.

Another function of philosophy is to complete science by critically examining and analysing the concepts which special sciences take for granted. Such, for example, are the concepts : matter, mind, energy, space, time, cause, law and the postulates : the independent existence of things, their intelligibility and order in the universe. The physical sciences assume the universality of the law of causality : every event is determined by a preceding event. But philosophy asks the question whether every event in the world is determined ? Is the law of causality universal ? Does it apply to human action ? Again, science does not ask what a cause is. To the ordinary mind causality is nothing more than a sequence in time. Philosophy asks : is there not some inner connection between cause and effect ? Science tells us *how* things act according to the law of uniformity. Philosophy must answer the other and more important question *why* they act so ? Hence the need of supplementing science by philosophy.

In fine, if sciences limit themselves to partial views of life and experience, philosophy takes the whole of human experience into consideration. It is an interpretation of the whole of life. Mathew Arnold said of Sophocles that "he saw life steadily and saw it whole" expressing in this pithy sentence both the aim and the method of philosophy.¹ The aim of philosophy is to see life as a whole without the slant of the business man, poet, artist or scientist and the method is to see it steadily without bias or prejudice. We may recall here the words of Plato in *The Republic* : "The philosopher is the spectator of all time and all existence ; he is one who sets his affections on that which really exists."²

Before we end this section we shall briefly consider some of the objections raised against the traditional conception of philosophy by some ancient and modern thinkers. They consider the exalted claims of philosophy to search for the knowledge of the ultimate reality, to supplement science, to find the meaning and purpose and value of life as highly presumptuous if not

¹ Cf. G. T. W. Patrick, *Introduction to Philosophy* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1952), pp. 9-10.

² Ibid. (footnote)

wholly preposterous. Frightened or repelled by the vastness of the problems of philosophy these thinkers have refused to enter upon their study. Such are the sceptics and the positivists.

The Sceptics of ancient Greece despaired of knowledge. Gorgias, for instance, said that "nothing exists ; if it did we could not know it, if we could know it we could not communicate our knowledge to others." The sceptical school of Pyrrho thought it better to suspend judgment on all questions that the philosophers had discussed about God, the world and the soul and thereby attain to themselves mental poise and tranquillity. For, the contradictions in the opinions of philosophers led them to conclude dogmatically that knowledge is impossible. David Hume, the sceptic of modern times, in his high-flown language consigns all metaphysics to the flames protesting that they contain "nothing but sophistry and illusion."

Scepticism does not need any refutation. It stands self-condemned. For, it is an impossible position practically as well as theoretically : practically, for even to live in the world we need to know many things ; and theoretically, because it contradicts itself : the sceptic *knows* at least that nothing can be known.

Comte, the founder of Positivism, taught that the human mind must confine itself to the phenomena or appearance of things. It is useless to try to find out what lies at the back of the phenomena. The search for first causes and ultimate reality and all such things is wholly in vain. Science is the final stage of human thought and it deals with what is certain, useful, positive, especially with what is useful for perfecting our social institutions.

If the ancient Sceptics and earlier Positivists despaired of the study of metaphysics as impossible, the Logical Positivists of our own day reject all metaphysics on logical grounds. According to them no statement is meaningful unless it can be empirically verified. "The meaning of a statement is simply the method of its verification", says Wittgenstein. What is beyond empirical verification does not deserve to be called scientific or philosophical. Using this criterion one may at best relegate metaphysics to the field of poetic and aesthetic imagination. But some Logical Positivists would grudge even this concession. According to A. J. Ayer, for example, even the title of 'misplaced poet' is beyond the deserts of the metaphysician.¹ The language used by the poet has, in most cases, literal meaning, but the metaphysician

¹ Alfred Jules Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (Victor Gallancz Ltd. 1948), p. 44.

indulges in pseudo-speculation and so his statements are utterly meaningless.

The Logical Positivists, however, would wish to preserve the name of philosophy for their favourite theories. It is a philosophy purged of all 'metaphysical nonsense.' The only function left for such a philosophy is the "analysis of the statements asserted by the scientists" (Carnap) and "the logical clarification of thoughts" (Wittgenstein).

Our answer to the Positivists of all variety is human experience itself. Taken in its totality human experience tells us that there is a world of values which transcends our sensory experience. The criterion of empirical verification cannot be applied to this world. Moreover the verification principle itself cannot escape the charges levelled against the first principles by the Logical Positivists as some of the supporters of this principle are constrained to avow: it is an 'a priori' assertion, 'a tautology', 'a metaphysical theory.'¹ Finally, one cannot help asking the Logical Positivist why he wants the name 'philosophy' appended to his system if that name signifies nothing but nonsense to him? (Ramsey says that 'the chief proposition of philosophy is that philosophy is nonsense' and takes Wittgenstein to task for pretending that 'it is important nonsense')²

Aristotle puts a dilemma before those who despair of philosophy: "You say one must philosophize. Then you must philosophize. You say one should not philosophize. Then (to prove your contention) you must philosophize. In any case you must philosophize".³ Bradley maintains that the man who is ready to prove that metaphysics is impossible is a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of his own.⁴ Yes, it is impossible to live without some philosophy of life, without having some view of the world, some idea of God—that He exists or does not exist—and some theory of value and of life. Since we are all to have some theory of life and the world it will be well to have as intelligent a theory as possible which does not leave out any part of human experience but takes the totality of reality into consideration.

III. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Philosophy has always been the intellectual part of Religion. It was an effort to understand critically the answers given by Religion. This

¹ J. O. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956), pp. 167 ff.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 107.

³ Cf. J. Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁴ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946).

attempt we call Theology. If we take a look at the conception of philosophy found in all the cultures of the world we see that they do not separate philosophy from religion. This is perfectly true in the case of Indian philosophy and this applies also to the Greek, Arabic, Christian, Chinese, and Jewish philosophies. They have always considered "that the Queen of all human forms of knowledge, the ultimate wisdom about the universe, including ourselves and God, was Theology, which they often called Philosophy and sometimes Metaphysics."¹

The greatest of the world's philosophers were not only believers but they built up a system from their own faith using reason as instrument. Śaṅkarācārya in India and Thomas Aquinas in the West are classical examples. Śaṅkarācārya does not claim to propound a system of philosophy based on reason alone. On the contrary he disclaims all originality—this is true also of other orthodox Indian thinkers—to say that he is only an exegete, a Mīmāṃsaka, of the sacred scriptures. His philosophy aims at laying a rational foundation to the teachings about the Ultimate Reality found in the scriptures.

The term *darśana* used for philosophy in India means an integral insight into reality. The Vedic seers were in search of that Reality "by knowing which everything else is known."² This knowledge was supposed to liberate one from the miseries of earthly existence and bring one to *mokṣa* or salvation.

If we turn to the Greeks we see that for them philosophy was not only connected with religion but was the true Religion. For Plato philosophy is a standing preparation for death, death being the beginning of the real, everlasting life. According to Aristotle the philosopher is a 'philomythes', a lover of myths, for in them we find expressed in a popular way the meaning of life and the idea of being. According to Epicurus the wise man is he who works for the salvation of his soul.³

In the Middle Ages philosophy is considered the 'ancilla Theologiae', the hand-maid of Theology, a term not infrequently misunderstood by modern scholars. They think that the medieval philosophers were biased by their faith and were thus prevented from making a free use of their reason.

¹ R. Panikkar, "Does Indian Philosophy need Reorientation?" in *East and West* (Year VIII. n. 1—April, 1957), p. 24.

² Vide N. K. Devaraja, *op. cit.*, Ch. 1.

³ R. Panikkar, *loc. cit.*, p. 25.

It was 'philosophy in the service of Religion' and as such to be condemned.¹ In fact the reasoning of the medieval philosophers was perfectly free and could stand any criticism on rational grounds. Only they were guided by the light of faith and their rational conclusions were confirmed by the truths they knew from revelation.² In fact Descartes who claims to cut himself loose from all Theology and to start from *tabula rasa* and his successors Malebranche, Leibniz, Spinoza and even Kant were clearly influenced by the idea of the Biblical Creator-God.³

True philosophy does not despise religion but helps it to put its fundamental beliefs on a solid intellectual basis. The study of philosophy will strengthen our religious beliefs rather than shake them. If we do not find this statement verified in our philosophical pursuits it is time for us to look for the causes. "It is true", wrote Bacon, "that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men's mind about to religion."⁴

The break with the traditional concept of philosophy was prepared by the Nominalists of the Middle Ages, properly started by Descartes, and continued even today by the modern philosophers. We in India also are suffering from the consequences of the divorce started by Descartes. Descartes wanted to give philosophy a firm and secure foundation so that we could reach scientific and mathematical certainty in philosophical questions. For, he found on the one hand the spectacular success science was making in his time (the middle of xvii century) and on the other the decadence in which philosophy had fallen through indulgence in irrelevant discussions and idle speculations. His intentions were all very good. Only Descartes did not realize that the scientific method he was introducing was reducing philosophy to *one* of the sciences. For, if truth is identified with what I perceive 'clearly and distinctly' then I cut myself off from everything that is above, below or behind my perceiving faculty.

From the moment philosophy was made *one* of the sciences she became non-committal regarding the problems of human existence. She could no

¹ Cf. N. K. Devaraja, op. cit., p. 49 (footnote).

² Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (Gifford Lectures 1931-32; Sheed and Ward, London, 1950) passim. (An excellent work worth studying for a right understanding of the medieval philosophical thought.)

³ Ibid., pp. 13-19; 406-7

⁴ Quoted in G. T. W. Patrick, op. cit., p. 38.

longer seek integral knowledge or ultimate truth, she no longer possessed any saving power.¹ Even to continue in existence she had to find a *raison d'être*. And that is given to her in the rôle of linguistic analysis mercifully left to her by the special sciences.

Not content with despoiling philosophy of all her previous possessions some thinkers would fain to do the same with the philosophers of old. According to A. J. Ayer "the majority of those who are commonly supposed to have been great philosophers were primarily not metaphysicians but analysts."² Our question is why one should strain so much to make the venerable philosophers analysts? Is it not far better to deny them the title of 'philosophers' altogether? Indeed, they were not philosophers if all that philosophy is supposed to do is to analyse sentences!

However, the great ancient philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, Lao-tze and Confucius, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, Avicenna and Alagazel, Philo and Maimonides—all were real philosophers in the real sense of that word precisely because they were not asking for the understanding of a part of reality. They took into consideration the entire experience of man—not only the empirical and the rational but also the religious, moral and aesthetic experience—and attempted an answer to the integral problems of human life and existence.

Such in our view is the nature of philosophy and we feel sure that by understanding her function in this light philosophy will once again become the noblest of pursuits and philosophers a source of inspiration to men.

¹ Cf. R. Panikkar, loc. cit., p. 27.

² A. J. Ayer, op. cit., p. 52.

THE CONCEPT OF 'APRATISAÑKHYĀNIRODHA' IN THE ABHIDHARMAKOSĀ OF VASUBANDHU

BUDDHA PRAKASH

The fundamental feature of Buddhist thought is its psycho-ethical approach to reality. It holds that, besides its physical aspect, the world has also a form which the mind of man gives it. Whereas, in its physical aspect, it continues to exist inspite of the action or intention of man, in its character as the construction or interpretation of the human mind, it is capable of being started or arrested or in any other manner controlled or altered by man. When, therefore, we speak of escaping from the cycle of birth and death, we refer to it not as a physical process, but as a psychical construct associated with the operation of desire, attachment and yearning. Getting rid of the trammels of physical existence, in fact, means the deliverance from that state of mind which is engrossed and preoccupied with them and makes us feel attached to them by numerous bonds of emotional involvement. The moment we put an end to this involvement we observe that the physical condition, inspite of its continued existence, has no interest for us, and, thus, we can consider ourselves free from it.

The aforesaid standpoint of Buddhism would be clear from the fact that it concedes the continued physical existence of the arhat through a readjustment of his constituents (*skandhas*) after the dissolution of their composition on death inspite of his attainment of arhathood which means the deliverance from that view of existence which proceeds from the working of the mind in terms of attachment or yearning. Of course, the Buddha parried the question whether the Tathāgata continued to exist after death in the *Cūḷa-Mālukkyāsutta*,¹ but his pupil Sāriputta quoted him to say, in reply to an argument of Yamaka, in the *Khanda-samyutta*,² that, even in the case of a saint (*khīṇāsavo bhikkhu*), the continuity of individual existence goes on with the combinations of the *skandhas*, both of course, being subject to the law of change. What ceases to exist in his case is the *Upādāna* aspect of the *skandhas*, or the constituents of individuality as conceived by a mind full of attachment and yearning (*tanhā*), rather than the *anupādāna* aspect of them which means their existence as cosmic facts or natural process

¹ *Majjhima Nikāya* (ed. V. Trenckner), Vol. I, pp. 426-432.

² *Samyutta Nikāya* (ed. Léon Freer), Vol. III, pp. 109-112.

devoid of any shadow of desire. In the words of C. D. Chatterji, "to think that the elimination of the five *skandhas* as objects of thought or mental concentration means the elimination also of them as the constituents of existence or individuality is to make a confusion between the psychological and the biological standpoint."¹ The essence of deliverance (*vimutti*) or extinction (*nibhāṇa*) is that we get rid of the desire that binds us to the world rather than escape from it as a physical process. Even for the delivered (*vimutta* or *nibbata*) existence goes on as a biological or a physical fact, as in the case of the undelivered, the only difference is that he ceases to have any attachment to or yearning for it with the result that it does not interest or involve him emotionally and does not disturb his balance of mind by frequent attractions and distractions. Thus, extinction is not of the world but of our desire in respect of it or of the form which our desire gives to it.

From these premises action comes to acquire a volitional aspect.² As Buddhaghosa puts it, action is solely the consciousness of good or bad or merit and demerit.³ Hence Moggaliputta Tissa combats the idea that an act, even if unintentional, involves retribution.⁴ With this outlook, Buddhaghosa states that the Buddhists are like lions, who, when shot, attack the hunter, whilst the heretics are like dogs, who, when hit, attack the stick, meaning thereby that the former refer to the basic cause and character of a problem, namely, its origin in a particular state of mind, whereas the latter bother only about its secondary nature, or its effect or incidence in material contexts.⁵ For example, to tackle the problem of pain, the Buddhists get at its root in desire, which can be curbed by training the mind, whereas others strive for its cessation through physical control or self-mortification.

¹ C. D. Chatterji, "A Point of Distinction in the Conception of *Khandha* in Buddhism", *Bhārata Kaumudī*, Part I, p. 179.

² *Aṭṭhasālinī* pp. 88 ff. चेतनाहं भिक्खवे कम्मं वदामि ।

³ *Visuddhimagga*, Vol. II, p. 614. कम्मं नाम कुसलाकुसलचेतना । See also *Dhammapada* (ed. S. Radhakrishnan), pp. 58-59. मनोपुब्बंगमा घम्मा मनोसेद्धा मनोमया ।

⁴ *Kathāvatthu*, XX, 1.

⁵ *Visuddhimagga*, p. 507.

Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa of Vasubandhu, tr. E. Lamotte, "Le traité de l'acte de Vasubandhu", *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* IV (1936), p. 89 : "It is due to the thought behind it that a physical or vocal act is wholesome or unwholesome".

This position of Buddhism is admirably summed up by Kenneth K. S. Ch'en as follows: "Karma to the Indians means the deed performed and the results that arise from it. To this conception of Karma Buddha made a significant addition. He taught that Karma involved not just the deed and the reward but also the intention behind the deed. For Karma to be generated there must be intention, and he considered this intention to be much more important than the deed. If the deed is unintentional, he said, no Karma is generated, but if intention is present, then Karma is produced even though the deed itself is not actually performed. The Buddhist definition of 'Karma' is, therefore, intention plus the bodily action that follows the intention."¹

What follows from the above discussion is that the Buddhist view of the origination and cessation of things or the actions in respect of them is purely psychical or in terms of mental construction. It does not state that things originate or cease to exist as parts of nature or constituents of the cosmic process, it only adumbrates that the view of them which the mind forms or the image of them which the process of thinking or feeling produces can be the subject of origination or cessation through the conscious mental exercise of man. This view becomes clear from a consideration of the concept of cessation (*nirodha*) in the *Abhidharma* texts, particularly the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu, written in the fourth century A.D.

The *Abhidharmakośa* is a treatise of *Sarvāstivāda* school which classifies things (*dharma*s) into two categories, constituted or compounded (*saṃskṛta*) and unconstituted or uncompounded (*asaṃskṛta*), and accepts their existence in all the three periods of time, past, present and future.² Accordingly, besides the constituted or compounded things (*saṃskṛta dharma*s) it enumerates the three unconstituted or uncompounded things (*asaṃskṛta dharma*s), namely space (*ākāśa*), cessation brought about by contemplation (*pratisaṅkhyānirodha*) and cessation brought about without contemplation (*apratisaṅkhyānirodha*).³ Of these two kinds of cessation, the former is that which ensues from a deliberate effort, from contemplation of the true character of things, from realisation of their momentary nature, while the latter is that which comes about without any deliberate

¹ Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, *Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey*, p. 5.

² A. C. Banerjee, *Sarvāstivāda Literature*, p. 8.

³ *Abhidharmakośa*, 6 (Narendra Deva's Hindi Translation, p. 10.):

अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधो यो विसंयोगः पृथक् पृथक् ।

उत्पादात्यन्तविघ्नोज्ज्यो निरोधोऽप्रतिसंख्यया ॥

effort, any activity of contemplation or realisation or any operation of prescience or knowledge on the part of man. Obviously, the one refers to the mental illumination which results from a purposive cultivation of right knowledge through the contemplation of the true nature of things and which dispels that image of things which the mind, obsessed with attachment and yearning, formulates; in other words, it is a transformation in the view of things brought about by a changed perspective, rather than a transfiguration of their basic nature. As regards the other, it, being independent of any deliberate contemplative activity on the part of man, has been interpreted as a cessation of things in their basic form caused by the missing of some component or ingredient (*pratyaya-vaiḱalya*). Thus Stcherbatsky takes it to mean the cessation "produced not through knowledge, but in a natural way, through the extinction of the causes that produced a manifestation, as for example, the extinction of the fire when there is no more fuel."¹ Similarly Suzuki states that "*apratisaṅkhyānirodha*, literally meaning 'annihilation effected without premeditated efforts' is a state of pure nothingness due to the want of proper conditions."² Not only modern scholars, but also ancient thinkers, like Śaṅkara, regarded this cessation (*nirodha*) as non-existence (*abhāvamātra*).³ That this view goes against the conceptions of ancient scholiasts is manifest from the *Sphuṭārthā* commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa* by Yaśomitra.

Yaśomitra expatiates on the import of the concept of *apratisaṅkhyānirodha* by citing the instance of a person whose eyes and mind are concentrated on a blue object. For him, at that moment, all other objects, yellow, red, white etc., as well as sound, smell, taste and touch, pass from the present into the past.⁴ This means that the consciousnesses, of which they are the subject-matters, do not arise, since they can appear only with reference

¹ Th. Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 89.

² D. T. Suzuki, *Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, pp. 264-382.

³ Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* II. 2. 24, Thibaut's translation in *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 412-13.

⁴ *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* of Yaśomitra, edited by Narendranath Law, Calcutta 1949, p. 19.

यथैकस्मिन्नीले रूपे व्यासक्तं चक्षुर्मनश्च यस्य स एकरूपव्यासक्तचक्षुर्मुनाः ।
तस्य यानि रूपान्तराणि गृह्यमानास्त्रीलादन्यानि नीलान्तरपीतलोहितावदादीनि
वर्णरूपाणि संस्थानरूपाणि च शब्दगन्धरसस्पर्शव्यानि च सर्वाणि । अत्ययन्ते
प्रत्युत्पन्नमध्वानमतिक्रामन्ति, अतीतमध्वानं प्रतिपद्यन्ते इत्यर्थः ।

to present subject-matters, not past ones.¹ As, at that moment, the subject-matters of those consciousness are not present, within the ken of the observer, they fail to arise in respect of them. A mental activity, like consciousness, has four components (*pratyaya*), contributory condition (*hetu*), psychic operation (*samanantara*), subject-matter (*ālambana*) and sense-action (*adhipati*). The absence of anyone of them impedes the occurrence of that mental activity or the appearance of that consciousness. Because, at that moment, the psychic operation (*samanantara*) is occupied with the generation of consciousness of that blue object only, no other consciousness can appear, for two consciousnesses can not simultaneously arise.² This non-appearance of the consciousness with regard to things other than the blue object, at that time, is connoted by the concept of *apratīśaṅkhyānirodha*.³

From this discussion it is clear that the cessation, called *apratīśaṅkhyānirodha*, means the non-appearance of consciousness in respect of a thing or an aspect of it, because of the preoccupation of the observer with some other thing, or some other aspect of it. It does not signify the end of that very thing itself. This view has been ably brought out by some modern scholars. For example, Kenneth K.S. Ch'en observes: "To explain the last of the uncreated *dharma*s the school referred to the example of a man so intent on enjoying the setting sun that he does not hear a voice calling him, or of one so intent on one particular colour that he cannot see the other colours present. The man does not perceive the voice or the colours which are present at the time because the conditions for their

¹ Ibid., p. 20.

तानि नीलान्तरादीन्यनन्तरोक्तान्यालम्बनान्तराणि येषां ते तदालम्बनाः ।
पञ्च विज्ञानकायाः । ते न शक्यमुत्पत्तुमिति भावसाधनमेतत् । न हि ते समर्था
इति विस्तरः । न हि ते पञ्च विज्ञानकाया अतीतं विषयं स्वालम्बनमपि शक्ता
ग्रहीतुं वर्तमानालम्बनत्वात्पञ्चानां विज्ञानकायानाम् ।

² Ibid.,

चतुर्भिरेव हि प्रत्ययैर्हेतुसमनन्तरालम्बनाविपत्तिप्रत्ययैश्चित्तचैत्ता उत्पद्यमाना
उत्पद्यन्ते । तेषामन्यतरवैकल्येऽप्यनुत्पत्तिः । समनन्तरप्रत्ययवैकल्यादित्यपरे । सम-
नन्तरप्रत्ययो हि तदानीं चित्तचैत्तलक्षण एकस्यैव तस्य नीलविज्ञानस्योत्पत्ताववकाशं
ददाति । नेतरेषां नीलान्तरादिविज्ञानम् । युगपद्विज्ञानोत्पत्त्यसंभवात् ।

³ Ibid.,

तदेवं जातीयकानामनागतानां धर्माणां प्रत्ययवैकल्यात् प्रतिसंख्यामन्तरेणो-
त्पादस्य नियतरोधभूतो यो धर्मः सोऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोध इत्युच्यते । न हि प्रत्ययवैकल्य-
मात्रादत्यन्तं तदनुत्पत्तिरुपपद्यते ।

entry into his range of perception are not present. Thus the voice and the colours pass into extinction without entering his consciousness. This is an example of what the school meant by extinction caused by the absence of a productive cause, or cessation without consciousness".¹ Similarly Edward Conze writes: "To take an example, a sight-organ and a mind-organ are occupied with a certain sight-object. All other objects of sight, sound, etc. then pass from the present into the past. In consequence, acts of consciousness, which might have those sights, sounds etc. for their object, cannot arise. Because the causes of their birth are insufficient, there exists an absolute obstacle to the birth of those acts of consciousness."² Thus it is clear that the cessation, called *apratisaṅkhyānirodha*, arises from the absence of consciousness in respect of an object, quality or function on account of the preoccupation of the mental faculty with some other thing at a particular moment; it does not signify the end of the existence of that object, quality or function as objective reality or natural fact. This concept refers to the mental view or consciousness of things rather than the things themselves. Thus it is in accord with the overall Buddhist position that things exist not only as objective realities but also as subjective constructs and it is the latter that are capable of being originated and terminated through psychic activity.

The aforesaid position of Buddhism has been ably enunciated by some Chinese Buddhist thinkers. For instance, Hui Yüan (344-416) in his *Ming-pao-ying-lun* (Treatise on the Understanding of Retribution) held that deeds produce *karma* only when there is a definite intention behind them.³ Chih Min-tu emphasized the positive reality of matter (*bhūta*) and called *śūnya* a state of mind signifying the non-attachment of man to the objects of the world.⁴ Chih Tun added that *śūnyatā* stands for the causality of the material reality, Yu Fa k'ai and Tsung-ping identified it with *dharmakāya* or the spiritual element in man, Chu Tao-I called it everlasting and Chu Seng-fu established its qualityless character. Kumārajīva's pupils Seng Chao (384-414) and Tao Sheng (d. 434) also interpreted *śūnyatā* in positive terms. Seng Chao dismissed the concept of *abhāva* (non-existence)

¹ Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, *Buddhism in China: A Historical Study* (Princeton, 1964), p. 302.

² Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy* (London, 1962), p. 162.

³ Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, *Buddhism in China*, p. 118.

⁴ E. Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China*, (Leiden, 1959), pp. 99-103.

and said that an object is both *yu* (is) and *wu* (is not) at the same time, from two respective viewpoints, and Tao Sheng considered *Buddha-tathatā* identical with the reality of the world.¹ In this manner these thinkers brought out the positive existence and reality of the world and interpreted the concept of *śūnyatā* with reference to it.

In India itself, inspite of the negativist terms in which Buddhism was presented, particularly in monkish circles, there were some who clearly saw that they were used figuratively. Among them we may mention the great Kumārila who pithily observed as follows:—

“As a matter of fact, this denial of objects (the reality of the external world) was declared by the Buddha with the sole object of alienating the affections (of men from such worldly objects); and, somehow or other, some people (the so-called followers of the Buddha) fell into a mistake (and accepted it to its utmost extent, as the denial of all eternal substratum of cognitions).”²

We, the modern interpreters of Buddhism, had better avoid the mistake, noted by Kumārila, and present Buddhism, in its true perspective, in positive terms. To do so, we may take the cue from the *Vibhāṅga* where we have specimens of different causal formulas, including those applicable to the course of life, starting from *kuśala-mūlas*, instead of the *akuśala-mūlas* like *avidyā* and *trṣṇā*.³ It is a pity that this line of approach has been ignored as a result of negativist formulations emphasized in monkish quarters and exaggerated by opponents like Śaṅkara who depicted the Buddhists as voidists, nihilists and pessimists. It is high time we correct our outlook and rectify our standpoint and view Buddhism in a true light.

¹ Ibid., pp. 123-24, 127, 134, 139, 173, 175-76, 191, 228.

² *Ślokavārttika*, translated by Ganga Nath Jha, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1909, p. 148.

³ B. M. Barua, “*Pratītya-samutpāda*”, *B. C. Law Volume*, I, p. 587.

EDŪKA (OR TERRACED) AND MULTIPLE-ROOFED TEMPLES

N. R. BANERJEE

Perhaps the most distinctive style of temple architecture in Nepal is represented by the multiple-roofed temples, often with multiple terraces, of which the one going by the name of *Kāshīhamandapa* (Plate I), standing upon a single plinth, has imparted its name to the capital city of the mountain country. Corresponding to the multiple roofs over the *sanctum sanctorum* are often a series of concentric tiers or terraces forming multiple plinths upon which the temple stands. Neither the multiple roofs nor the multiple terraces can be without purpose or utility. Though the temples we are now considering are of very late date in the evolution of temple architecture in general, there can be no doubt that there must have been earlier prototypes, which the ravages of time and man have wiped out of existence. It would indeed be an interesting study to trace the origin of this particular style and its evolution over the centuries and expansion in space, taking in its stride the minutiae of local differences adapted to regional requirements and artistic and architectural tastes.

EDUKA TEMPLES AT AHICHCHHATRA

The 1940-44 excavations at Ahichchhatra (in District Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, India) by the Archaeological Survey of India brought to light, apart from the interesting sequence of cultures on the site, the unmistakable remains of two large terraced temples of bricks. Distinctive in character and unusually large in size, these temples have only been briefly mentioned in the comparatively meagre reports of the excavations that have been published so far. Nevertheless, the structural characteristics of these temples have been indicated by V. S. Agrawala, as of the *edūka* style,¹ described in the *Vishṇudharmottara Purāṇa*,² a treatise on architecture and iconography, of the fifth-seventh centuries A.D. The style apparently conforms to the architecture of the *Ziggurats* of ancient Sumer, as suggested by Agrawala, though to trace a genetic or chronological connexion between the Sumerian specimens and the Indian prototypes would be far-fetched, at any rate on the present showing.

¹ V. S. Agrawala, "Terracotta figurines of Ahichchhatra, District Bareilly, U. P.", *Ancient India*, No. 4, p. 167.

² *Vishṇudharmottara*, III, lxxxiv, 1-4.

Agrawala also refers to the occurrence of the word *edūka* in the Vana Parva of the *Mahābhārata*,¹ including a variant in the form of *jāruka*, presuming that it was apparently a Sanskritized form of *Ziggurat* with which the buildings seem to have had structural resemblance.

Regardless of the etymology of the word *edūka*, the apparent resemblance alone of the temples in question to the *Ziggurats* of ancient Sumer would not establish any genetic, not to speak of chronological, connexion between the Sumerian specimens and the Indian prototypes, if not derivatives, on the present evidence, though such an evolution is not to be ruled out.

LITERARY REFERENCES TO EDUKA

The *Amarakośa*, which is dated early in the Gupta period, no doubt during or after the reign of Chandragupta II, mentions *Edūkam* (2.2.4) in the sense of a wall containing bones in the following words :

“*Bhittiḥ strī kuḍyamedūkam yadantarnyasta kīkasam*”.

The word *kīkasam* in the sense of bones is explained thus in the *Manushya-varga* : *Syāttharparah kapālo strī kīkasam kulyamasthi cha*.

EDUKAS AND STUPAS

Thus a sepulchral association of the structures called *edukas* is easily established, and this would point to the *stūpa* as a representative of the style. They have been held from the most ancient times as receptacles of the corporeal remains of the Buddha or Bodhisattvas, and later as objects of worship and veneration, i.e., in other words, a house of god or the godhead, or the temple. In the evolution of temple architecture the role of the *stūpa* is therefore significant.

But the circular tumulus has a history from still earlier times, as mentioned in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*,² wherein the practice of the Easterners to raise a circular tumulus over the skeletal remains and to demarcate it with a circle of stones, conforming to what is known in archaeological parlance as the megalithic stone circle, which abound in different parts of India, has been amply described. The same *Brāhmaṇa* also recognizes a rectangular or four-cornered type of enclosure as well. In course of time the *stūpa* tumulus got encased in structural material like stone or brick,

¹ Agrawala, op. cit., fn. 4.

² *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (XIII, 8, 1, 4); D. N. Shukla, *Vāstu Śāstra*, I, Chandigarh, 1960, p. 71.

and was raised over a platform, forming a raised plinth or terrace. According to tradition, the eight original *stūpas* over the remains of Buddha were broken up by Aśoka and he is credited with the raising of 84000 *stūpas* all over the country, besides repairing the original *stūpas*. He must, therefore, be regarded as the one who popularized the cult of the *stūpa*. At some stage, may be in the Kushāṇa period, the worship of the *stūpa* got intermixed with the worship of a non-sepulchral votive and miniature *stūpa*, of structural form, known as the *chaitya*. The miniature form of the *chaitya* paved the way for the throwing up of a structure over it, which came to be called *Bodhi-ghara* or *Bodhi-griha* of course through an intermediate stage of the rock-cut caves, with a solid *stūpa chaitya* in it, of which several types, viz., circular, elliptical, oblong, quadrilateral and octagonal, respectively, have been recognized.¹

Coomaraswamy² lends support to the interpretation of the *chaitya* as a Buddhist and Jaina *stūpa* or as a funeral mound to honour heroes, or a shrine or temple, since it is described in the *Rāmāyaṇa* as having railings (*vedikā*), terraces, stairs and a high roof and an *āyatana* (sanctum).

The idea intended to be conveyed in the foregoing lines is to indicate the possible evolution of the temple form from an *edūka* or *stūpa* to the structural temple. Prakrit literature recognizes the word *eluga* or *eluya*, which has been explained as a threshold or a monument for containing the ashes of a dead person.³ The sepulchral content of the *edūka* indicated by the *Amara-kośa* has been supported by several other writers of antiquity.

The commendation by the *Vishṇudharmottara* of the *aiḍūka* worship, despite the obvious significance of the structural form with its contents of polluting skeletal remains, contrasts, therefore, with the disparagement by the *Mahābhārata* of the worship of the *edūkas* as contained in the following verses 65-67 of the Vana Parva (Adhyāya 190)⁴:

Edūkān pūjayishyanti
varjayishyanti devatāḥ|
Śūdrāścha prabhavishyanti
na dvijāḥ yugasamkshaye|| 65

¹ H. Sarkar, *Studies in Early Buddhist Architecture of India*, Delhi, 1966, pp. 1-44.

² A. K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, 1927, pp. 47-48 ; H. Sarkar, op. cit.

³ P. Shah, *Vishṇudharmattara*, II, p. 173.

⁴ Ibid., p. 171.

Āśrameshu Maharshīṇāṃ
Brāhmaṇāvasatheshu cha/
Devasthāneshu Chaityeshu
Nāgānāmālayeshu cha// 66
Eḍūkachiṇā prithivī
na devagrihabhūṣitā// 67.

This can perhaps be construed to mean the indirect disapprobation by the *Mahābhārata* of the Buddhist practice of the worship of the *stūpa* and of the growing influence of Buddhism in the country.

Fortunately, however, the fears of the *Mahābhārata* were not justified, for other forms of Brahmanical temple structure, free from the polluting aspect of bones, notwithstanding the warning of the *Mahābhārata*, came up all over the country, though the *stūpas* or *chaityas* also continued to flourish side by side.

A happy reconciliation between the structural temple and the sepulchral *eḍūka* seems to have been achieved in the later *aḍūka* structures described and commended by the *Vishṇudharmottara*, as the temple of Śiva. The concomitant recommendation for the installation of the images of Lokapālas has been taken to be a reconciliation with Buddhism again. That the temple form is to be addressed to Śiva is perhaps justified, as Śiva is associated with the *śmāśāna* or the cremation or burial ground, and would only show a parallel development, as rightly recognized by P. Shah, who observes a similar development in the *stūpas* or *chaityas* of later times, which were weaned away from their sepulchral association and were built in the habitation areas of towns and cities, to serve symbolically as objects of reverence and worship.

One significant aspect of the description of the *aḍūka* temple or structure must be emphasized at this stage, namely, the terraces on which they are to be built.

Chapter 84 of the *Vishṇudharmottara*¹ prescribed at least three superimposed platforms, terraces or plinths (*bhadrāpīṭhas*) over which the *linga* is to be installed. For access to the deity the text prescribes four staircases on the four sides, indicating an idea of the height that was intended for the shrine proper. In this context it may be stated that earliest extant treatise on ancient Indian architecture (*Vāstuśāstra*) is represented by the *Bṛhatsamhitā* of Varāhamihira, and is dated to circa 550 A.D. It is thus almost a

¹ P. Shah, *ibid.*, pp. 168 ff.

contemporary of the *Vishṇudharmottara*, which is no doubt a collation from the then known works. The importance attached in it to the *edūka* form of architecture is significant in the context of the present discussion.

THE EVOLUTION OF STUPAS AND TEMPLE ARCHITECTURE

The intimate interrelationship between the terraced *stūpa* of Buddhist association and the terraced structural temple in extent, marking a logical culmination in the latter, may be emphasized here. It is the *Mahāvārṇsa* which prescribes how a *stūpa* should be built. The platform on which it was to be built is called *medhi* and the tumulus or mound proper is called *aṇḍa*. On the flattened top of it is to be a rectangular enclosure on a solid platform conforming to an inverted pyramid, *harmikā*, meaning the abode of gods. At the top of the *stūpa* a staff called *yashti* is to be fixed, and over the *yashti* are to be a series of three and later seven umbrellas or flattened discs called *chhatrāvali* representing the corresponding number of heavens. It is not to be expected that practice should always conform to theory, and in course of time divergences arose. The number of *medhis* does not seem to be prescribed, and in keeping with the requirements of symmetry, proportion and harmony, there have been several concentrically superimposed platforms or terraces. Likewise the number of parasols has increased to thirteen or twentyfive and in the cases of Nepal and the Kanishka *stūpa* at Peshawar. The *stūpa* was last of all to be surrounded by a railing and pierced with gateways and the composite complex was taken to represent what is known as *Meru* (Mountain).

The process of the evolution of the *stūpa* into a *chaitya* first within a rock-cut cave and then within a structural enclosure must have helped the process as well of the development of temple architecture in India. The first steps in the direction were the flat-roofed rock-cut caves, such as abound in the hills at Udayagiri, near Sanchi; the next natural stage would be represented by the flat-roofed structural temples of stone at Tigowa, Eran and Sanchi. Further progress was perhaps marked by the Pārvatī temple at Nachna (in District Panna, Madhya Pradesh) with its superimposed box-like chamber over the *garbha-griha*, culminating, in its style, in the *śikhara* shrine of Viṣṇu (commonly called the Daśāvatāra temple) at Deogarh (in District Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh).¹ The process, however, did not stop short there. But the basic structural form may have been reached in this

¹ See N. R. Banerjee, "New light on the Gupta Temples at Deogarh", *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, Vol. V, Nos. 1 & 2, 1963, pp. 37 ff.

temple, which has been dated in the sixth century A.D. It is of significance that a corresponding component of the crowning members in Dravidian architecture is called *stūpa* or *stūpikā*, no doubt in keeping with its shape, in miniature, of a *stūpa*. This culmination would be accounted for by a reconciliation as stated above between the symbolic significance of the sepulchral *stūpa* and the structural temple.

This would indicate also a structural resemblance or correspondence between the two, in the substructural terraces, and the superstructural roofs in some cases, or the sheer height in some others. The curvature of the profile of the circular or cylindrical *stūpa* is also to be seen in the curvilinear outline of temple architecture, as obtained in Orissa later and is also to be met with limitedly in a less pronounced aspect elsewhere.

The process of evolution and development broadly outlined above need not be generalized as to details, nor is it to be conceded that the pattern of development was uniform throughout or that it went through all the stages indicated. It would be perfectly explicable that in some regions the beginnings of structural development caught up at an advanced stage of another region through diffusion. It would not be difficult to establish the chronological tables of the structural relics, where they exist, and interconnexions and contacts can be traced or even emphasized. It would not be correct to conclude that, in view of some overriding parallelisms or similarities between the structural styles of different regions that may exist, one region owed even the rudiments of structural form to the other, for there could not have been any structural vacuum anywhere. Time and contacts brought different regions together, and helped each other to be mutually influenced and re-oriented to the extent considered expedient or environmentally practicable. It is not, however, suggested that temples did not exist in the earliest days of the Aryans. It is only meant that the temple form as we know was inspired greatly by the form of the *stūpa* architecture as it gradually envolved itself.

ARCHITECTURE IN NEPAL

In Nepal, the beginnings of structural architecture, in the form of temples on residential houses have not been adequately traced. The earliest structural remains must be the two circular based *stūpas* at Pulchowk, near Jawalakhel, and near the Industrial Estate at Lalitpur (Patan), without any projecting parts of the plinths. These two, along with three others, largely modified in form, all in Lalitpur, have been traditionally and often hesitantly attributed to Aśoka. Two other *stūpas*, namely the ones at

Swayambhunatha¹ and Bodhanatha², respectively, are also thought to be as old as the Aśokan *stūpas*, but proof is lacking. Likewise another *chaitya*, of doubtful association with the times of Aśoka, is the one at Chabahil attributed to Aśoka's daughter, Chārumatī. The *chaitya* itself is structurally very far removed from the pristine form of the Aśokan or Śuṅgan *stūpa*, being perhaps the result of later modification in the course of repairs, of which the famous *stūpa* at Sanchi is an outstanding example.

But the votive stone-built *chaityas* of the Lichchhavi period abound in the valley and are unmistakable. They are all of a group, distinguished by structural similarity and decorative features and are often labelled by inscriptions occurring on some of them. Though a detailed study of the *stūpa* architecture of Nepal is yet awaited, the general features of the *chaityas* are clear. At the earliest date, these rise on three square plinths, which become proportionately smaller in size as they rise in height. They are finally surmounted by a domical *stūpa* or a *stūpa* which is sometimes a hemisphere, and often an elongated hemisphere. The form of the early finial fixed into a rectangular or square socket cut into the top of the dome is not clear as the original finds are mostly missing. These served as the basic form of later *chaityas*, which had a cylindrical *stūpi*, somewhat flattened at the top with the thirteen-ringed crown of umbrellas and were marked by the introduction of the four Dhyāni Buddhas, namely Akshobhya, Ratnasambhava, Amitābha and Amoghasiddhi on the eastern, southern, western and northern sides, respectively of Tantric origin. These in turn served as the prototype of the chortens in northern Nepal and Tibet.

In the miscellany of structural styles prevalent in Nepal, the terraced shrine occupies a prominent place.³ Both the *śikhara* type of temples and those of the pagoda or *devala* style characterized by multiple roofs are raised over a high platform built in successive tiers, each higher one becoming recedingly smaller in size. The pagoda style is a distinctive development

¹ D. Snellgrove, *Buddhist Himalaya*, Oxford, 1957, p. 95 says, "As there are no means of knowing the date of the original foundation of this *stūpa* without excavating to its central foundations and this no archaeologist is likely to attempt to do, it is all but useless to speculate on its age."

² Ibid., p. 98, writes, "Its origin is just as vague as that of Swayambhu, respectively, has also been given an equally heavy antiquity."

³ N. R. Banerjee, "An Introduction to Nepalese Art," *Nepalese Art*, Kathmandu, 1966.

in Nepal and its ancestry can easily be traced back to the seventh century A.D. when the palace of the reigning king of Nepal evoked appreciation and applause from a Chinese traveller. The reference obviously was to the *Kailāsakūṭabhavana*, the palace of the line of Amśvarman from which most of their inscriptions were issued. The earliest inscriptional reference to *Kailāsakūṭabhavana*¹ goes back to the end of the 6th century A.D. The terraced plinth must circumstantially be as old as the tradition of storeyed and balustraded *śikhara*s. The close connexion between the Lichchhavis and the Guptas which the coins of Chandragupta I² and the inscriptions of Samudragupta³ clearly indicate, and the uniformity of the scripts which the Lichchhavis and Guptas employed in their inscriptions would point also to a close intimacy of the storeyed *edūka* style of structure at Ahichchhatra during the Gupta occupation of the region. The fact that this style did not find much favour in India and practically died out need not, however, indicate or point to the focus or centre of its expansion. That the terraced style came to stay in Nepal and remained popular right throughout her long history could be easily set down to her climatic conditions which called for height and a sturdy and solid base for structures to ward off the effects of heavy rainfall in the higher altitudes. Though stagnant pools of water are not indeed a common experience in the Kathmandu valley, owing to the thirstily porous nature of the soil, or of the sloping nature of the topography, the temples had to be built at a considerable height to avoid the upward influx of moisture from the earth through capillary action. This phenomenon is grappled with even in the meanest private architecture in Nepal by introducing a vacuum between the earth and the level of the ground floor, and using it for fodder or for the domestic animals.

Soon, however, the novelties of the style wear off on the Indian soil, and apart from the expenses of the avoidable mass of substructure the soaring heights of the structures themselves rendered superfluous the intervening height of the plinth. The tradition of the style was, however, limitedly conveyed to posterity through a few persistent specimens, such as the temples at Ahichchhatra and elsewhere, described below, represent.

The main purpose of the style was, undoubtedly, to achieve an imposing height for the shrines by the dual means of a soaring *śikhara* or

¹ The inscriptions of Amśvarman who used the era beginning in A.D. 595 were issued from the palace called *Kailāsakūṭa-Bhavana*.

² John Allan, *Catalogue of Gupta Coins*, Plate III, pp. 8 ff.

³ J. F. Fleet, *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, Vol. III, pp. 8-9.

pyramidal or circular top and a lofty base. This would render each shrine into a *Meru*, or mountain, symbolically representing in miniature the enormity of the abode of God. In course of time the possibility of achieving the desired height and effect architecturally in the superstructure itself rendered superfluous the need to raise the height of the base. This was specially the case where the climatic conditions did not press for it. The choice was perhaps accentuated by the limited scope for beautification and embellishment offered by the plinth.

The introduction of the multiple roof over the temples may have been inspired initially by the numerous concentric rings on the *stūpas*.

It is to be noted that the terraced substructure of the *stūpa* evolved in Nepal in the period of the Lichchhavis, who for a time ruled contemporaneously with the Guptas, and should constitute in import and form an *edūka* structure corresponding to the definition provided in the *Vishṇu-dharmottara*.

Though a *chaitya-griha*, implying a *stūpa* or *chaitya* within an enclosed and roofed chamber, is yet to be discovered in Nepal, it cannot be gainsaid that the temple form evolved fairly early in Nepal.

The Changu-Narayana inscription¹ of Mānadeva, dated A.D. 464 (=386 V.S.), would perhaps indicate the earliest reference to a temple in Nepal.

But the earliest tangible reference to any temple would be Amśuvarman's description of the temple of Paśupati in his inscription.

A set of three panels in stone, of *circa* sixth century A.D., depicting scenes from the *Kumārasambhava* of Kālidāsa along with four pillars lying fixed alongside a cistern by the side of a street in Naghaltole, Kathmandu, would easily indicate a temple, but whether its top was of the *śikhara* type is more than one can say.

Perhaps the earliest *śikhara* shrine to be discovered in the Kathmandu valley, and attributable to the 10th-11th centuries A.D., is to be found in the premises of the Paśupati temple at Deo Patan. The temple itself is probably dedicated to Brahmā or Śiva, judged by the bas-relief figure (*lalāṭa-bimba*) of Brahmā or, alternatively, of Śiva, carved on the lintel. Its spire or *śikhara* is of comparatively recent origin, being apparently built after the roof had got damaged. This style of architecture was not,

¹ R. Gnoli, *Nepalese Inscriptions in Gupta Characters*, Part 1, Rome, 1956, pp. 1-5.

however, very popular, nor common in Nepal, and the reasons therefore are not far to seek.

The multiple-roofed temple with or without multiple plinths became in fact the characteristic temple type of Nepal. This type has after been erroneously called as the pagoda style. The word pagoda is current in Burma in the sense of a *stūpa-chaitya* and corresponds to the *dagaba* of Ceylon, conveying the same broad sense, though derived from *dhātugarbha*. It should, at all, be applicable to the *stūpa* form, though presumably in view of the flared out roof, following the convexo-concave outline of the pagoda, the style came to be so designated. But the inscriptions of the Mallas, during whose long reign (1200-1769) this style of temples must apparently have flourished, describe the temples as *Devala*, in the Newari language. Tentatively, this style of architecture may, therefore with reason be designated as the *Devala* style.¹

One would very much like to get the complete evidence of this type to present a connected account of its evolution and development.

The multiple-terraced temple, in the context of what has been stated above, would belong, therefore, to the category of the *Edūka* or *Aidūka* temple of the Sanskrit texts. But the multiple terraces were not without their utility. In fact, for very important reasons of practical utility, they became even essential to structural edifices in Nepal. It is well known that Nepal is a land of heavy rain fall, and its water-table, especially during the rainy season, is very high. In ancient times, the subsoil water and moisture have been major sources of trouble to the dwellers of the region, particularly in the absence of a damp proof course, which has come into vogue only recently. One way to circumvent this obstacle of the ascent of the subsoil moisture by capillary action has been to build the sub-structures up to a considerable height. This has been achieved with grace and visual effect, by breaking up the height proportionately into terraces rising in a receding order. At the same time the eminence thus gained has suited the requirement of the abode of gods.

Conversely, the superstructure had to be of suitable height to match with its plinth complex. Corresponding to the break-up of the base into different terraces, the height of the temple proper had necessarily to be broken up into tiers, in the receding order, and each lower roof had, of necessity, to be wider than the one immediately above it. This gave rise

¹ Anticipatingly this name has already been employed in this sense in *Nepalese Art* (Kathmandu, 1966).

to a pleasing elevation of graduated courses. The roof had to be made to slope downwards with an adequate gradient for the rain water to glide down smoothly, with provision for the sliding down of snow in the higher altitudes. The sloping roofs, incidentally, matched with the outline of the hillocks and mountains of the back-drop, and may as well have been inspired by them. The height of the plinth made it obligatory as a natural corollary to raise the height of the superstructure, which was more important functionally than the plinth. The multiple roofs came to be conceived in the course of roofing the superstructure, and at the same time to harmonize it with the substructure, and the surroundings, besides the important considerations of proportion. The breaking up of the roof into several stages also provided the artist with a wider scope for decoration and embellishment which were lavished didactively on the wooden brackets, called *punāls*, supporting the projected eaves. The carvings on the wooden brackets of foliage and decorative patterns, besides divine and mundane figures, enabled the architect to create an atmosphere at once of mystery and beauty.

One of the earliest extant temples of the style is the Kāshṭhamaṇḍapa (Plate I) in the heart of Kathmandu, and has in all probability imparted its name first to the locality or little township which grew up around it, and in course of time to the capital of the entire kingdom. As an exception it stands on a single plinth.

There are of course many temples with a single terrace, but it is rare to see a single roofed temple. The multiple roofs also correspond to the multiple floors of even residential houses, and the roofs of the temples had to be provided as much to differentiate one storey from another as to account for the reduced sizes of the supervening floors, with multiple roofs. So, even when the plinth was simplified and reduced to one single terrace, the multiple roofs remained. In view of the established priority of the Lichehavi *chaityas* over the enshrined temples, it cannot be gainsaid that the terraced temple was the fundamental type to begin with. Even the *sikhara* temple, say the Krishna temple at Lalitpur, built in A.D. 1637, stands on terraces, serving as its plinth.

Not very far away from it, in the Durbar Square at Lalitpur in front of the Palace, there are several temples of the style pleasingly combining multiple terraces with multiple roofs. The Taleju Bhavani temple within the enclosure of the Palace of Pratapa Malla built early in the 17th century at Kathmandu, is a good example of the style.

The Jaisi Deval near Jagantol, of late medieval times, at a short distance to the south of Kāsthmaṇḍapa, rises on seven tiers and has three roofs.

The much repaired Kumbheśvara temple, at Lalitpur, originally built in the 14th century, is a good example of the multiple-roofed temple, but, like the Kāsthmaṇḍapa, is erected on a single low plinth.

Perhaps the most notable example of the style, combining five roofs with five terraces, is the Nyatapola temple (**Plate II**) at Bhaktapur, built by Bhūpatindra Malla in A.D. 1690. Instances can be multiplied, but they need not detain us here. Perhaps it would be possible some day to work out a completely sequential history of all the temples of the style, with a study of minute architectural and decoration details. Broadly speaking, it would be worth while studying the relationship of the number of storeys on the roof with the number of plinths, including the exceptions.

Thus this style of temple architecture¹ may be said to have evolved from the *Edūka* or *Aiḍūka* form of architecture, described in the ancient architectural text. It passed through intermediate stages of the storeyed architectural text. It passed through intermediate stages of the storeyed *stūpa* and its later incorporation in its principle of the embodiment of the godhead in the temple structure on the crowning point, in an elaborate combination of *stūpa*, *āmalaka*, *pūrṇa ghaṭa*, *chhatrāvalī*, to form the elaborate *gajura*, within a triangular frame of gilt metal. The *gajura* over the temples of Nepal is a distinctive feature of her own, and the idea of the incorporation of the *stūpa* in it in miniature is suggested tentatively, on the basis of the parallel nomenclature of *stūpi* existing as far away as in south India. The multiple roofs reflects, inversely the storeys of the plinth in the superstructure in symmetrical unison, and is possibly and suggestively derived from the essential substructural feature of the *Edūka*. The crowning member has its distant inspiration in the earthen *kalāśa* (pitcher) which was anciently placed in an inverted position on the top junction of the ridges of the roofs over the primitive hut. It served primarily to prevent leakage of rain water into the chamber below, and later as a decorative feature, besides serving, in its upright position, as the *pūrṇa ghaṭa*, implying prosperity and welfare. The *pūrṇa ghaṭa* has thus come to be combined with the *stūpa* in miniature in the respondent pinnacle on the summit of the temple, that first attracts the attention of devotees and beckons to it with

¹ See N. R. Banerjee, "Architecture in Nepal, old and new, and a plea for a Synthesis", *Ancient Nepal*, No. 4.

a mysterious force. The *āmalaka* while serving as a decorative feature, serves also as a spacer that pleasingly breaks the line. Though in miniature it still strikes, because of its bright golden colour, the eyes of the approaching devotee or visitor about to enter into a temple, and claims representatively the reverence of the intending worshipper even from a distance and prepares him for the worship on submission that would follow.

TWO EDUKA TEMPLES AT AHICHCHHATRA (INDIA)

In this context, it would not be inappropriate to say that the history of architecture, particularly temple architecture, in South and South-East Asia would remain inadequately documented without the evidence of Ahichchhatra, as some of it constitutes distinctive landmarks in the evolution of the architectural form and pattern in the area.

The structures in question comprise (i) a terraced temple (**Plate III**), exposed on site AC I, crowned by the broken shaft of a large Śiva *linga* and (ii) a terraced temple (**Plate IV**) at site AC II.¹

The Śiva temple (AC I) rises to a height of 75 ft. above the surrounding plains and dominates the countryside by its imposing form and height. It is built in the shape of a terraced tower of five concentric platforms, square in shape, rising in receding tiers and culminating into a square sanctum at the top. The four sides are aligned along the cardinal directions. The temple faces the west, and is approached by a staircase, built, in two stages, medially on the eastern side. Originally, however, it could as well be approached from the eastern side by means of an intricate system of transversely lateral stairs running up along the vertical face of each platform. The stairs commenced from a common landing and went upwards to the edges of the next higher platform, thus providing access from one platform to the other. The remains of the staircases are now available between the second and third and between the third and fourth platforms only. The opening of the passage from the working level on the ground to the second platform above has been blocked by a brick wall. This seems to have been done, after devastating floods in the river, early in the Gupta period, on the eastern side of the mound, made it necessary to block off a large part of the site in the eastern direction by means of a brick-

¹ A. Ghosh and K. C. Panigrahi, "Pattery of Ahichchhatra (U.P.)", *Ancient India*, No. 1, p. 38; V. S. Agrawala, op. cit., p. 167; *Archaeological Remains, Monuments and Museums* (Archaeological Survey of India), 1964, p. 51.

built partition wall running east-west, skirting along the base of the Śiva temple, covering in the lowest terrace in the north-east corner and joining up with the defence walls at each end, around the ancient habitations. The blocking up of the passage from the first or lowest platform to the second by the filling up of the then existing gap through the centre of the second platform by means of coursed bricks followed as a natural consequence of the obstruction caused by the partition wall. In fact, the coming into existence of the partition wall interdicted any further use of the eastern approach to the sanctum on the top. Henceforth the temple was approached only from the western side.

The nature of the means of the access from the fourth to the fifth or topmost platform enclosing the *sanctum* is not determinable now.

As an additional support or buttress to the terraces, cross walls were laid at regular intervals against the vertical faces of the platforms on each tier of the terraces, on the northern and southern sides. The spaces in between the buttresses were filled up with clay and debris to render them solid and strong to serve as foundation cells as it were for the superstructures.

Furthermore, there are central projections of the platforms of the three lower terraces imparting to the massive structure the semblance of a *tri-ratha* plan. At the same time, the remains of the square projections in each corner of the lowest platform are suggestive of a *pañchāyatana* complex.

The 7 ft. 10 in. long broken shaft of the *liṅga* on the top is not standing at the centre of the *sanctum*, but a little towards its north-west corner. It is rectangular at the base, measuring 3 ft. 4 in. \times 3 ft. 8 in. which rises to a height of 2 ft. 10 in., octagonal in the middle, accounting for the next 3 ft. of its height, and the circular top, which should have risen proportionately, but has only a length of 2 ft. left to it.

The stratigraphic evidence obtained by excavations carried out on the site has shown that the area, bounded off to the north-east by the partition wall, ceased to be occupied after the Gupta period, say after the seventh century A.D. The temple itself was built over the ruins of an apsidal temple (Plate V) of the Kushāṇa period.¹

Thus the date of the temple can be fixed at a point between the Kushāṇa period and the early phases of the Gupta rule. From its size, it

¹ Agrawala, op. cit., p. 167. The considerations of the study are also based on the observations of the author who carried out further excavation at Ahichchhatra in 1964 and 1965.

may have been marked out as a symbol or commemoration of Samudragupta's victory over Achyuta, whose coins have been found on the site, and may actually have been raised during the rule of Chandragupta II, early in the fifth century A.D. It would thus represent a very early example of the architecture of the Guptas in this region.

In view of the continued use of the temple till this date it may be admitted that periodic additions and alterations were always possible during its lifetime. In fact, V. S. Agrawala has dated the narrative plaques in terracotta, which were found in a frieze running round one of the upper terraces, between *circa* A.D. 450 and 650, on stylistic grounds. The probable fact that the Buddhist *stūpas*, containing corporeal remains of bones, may have gone by the name of *edūkas*, would be a contra-indication against a late date. The almost complete absence of this form of architecture for the Brahmanical pantheon elsewhere within the Gupta empire would also indicate an earlier date rather than later. The other temple (Plate IV) at Ahichchhatra too was similarly built.

In this context it may be mentioned that Yuan Chwang who visited Ahichchhatra early in the seventh century had observed many *stūpas* on the site but not one of them has survived. The principal evidence of Buddhist images, limited in themselves, in stone and terracotta, comes on the site from the Kushāṇa levels. It would, therefore, be fair to assume Kushāṇa dates for most of the *stūpas* on the site, some of which were obviously standing during the visit of Yuan Chwang. Circumstantially they were obviously of much smaller size than the two Brahmanical temples in the supposedly *edūka* style under consideration. The erection of towering monuments in this style would be an obvious means of setting up glorious relics of the victory and resurgence of the Brahmanical order over the Buddhist, despite the prevalence and pursuit of a tolerant attitude towards the others that may have vied with it.

Against the background of the fact that the roofed Gupta temples we know of have a sequence of evolution with earlier prototypes excavated into solid rock as cave temples to begin with, the temple with multiple plinths would imply a departure from the apparently earlier known and established tradition of *edūkas*, which must have been the prevalent style of the *stūpas*. This departure must, therefore, have taken place before the adoption of the enclosed and covered structural form, a beginning in which was made with cave temples, as those in the Udayagiri area would

indicate. This circumstance *ipso facto* would plead for an earlier date than that indicated by Agrawala.

OTHER EDUKA TEMPLES IN INDIA

This type of terraced temples for structures to serve as religious edifices have several prototypes in India and elsewhere.

One of the earliest is a three-terraced structure dated to the Gupta period at *Sarnath*, District Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, near the site of the Dhamekh Stūpa and monasteries. It is, however, completely covered by a lofty tower built in 1588, which is known by the name of Chaukhandi. From the find of an image of the Buddha in *Dharma-chakra-mudrā* and other relics and the prevalence of niches on the walls for statuary it may be safely inferred that it was a *stūpa* in the *eduka* style of the Gupta period.¹

Not very far from Sarnath is Sravasti on one side in District Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh, known by then humdrum rural name of Saheth-Maheth and Nalanda in District Patna, Bihar, where further examples of the terraced style of structures are available.

At *Sravasti* (Saheth)² there were at least four structures which were built in the terraced manner. These have been described as *stūpa* No. 5, and temple Nos. 1—3, respectively. Of these the best preserved example is the *stūpa* No. 5, which rises in four terraces, of which the lowest is rectangular in plan, measuring, in the exposed parts, 83 ft. east-west and 71 ft. north-south. The central terraces are squarish. The lowest of these, forming the second terrace measuring 58 ft. × 50 ft. supports a third square terrace with central projections as in *tri-ratha* plans supporting a fourth enclosing an octagonal cell. The shrine or *stūpa* is approached from the east over steps built of brick-walled rectangular enclosures filled with debris. The terraced form is believed to have resulted from subsequent additions to the *stūpa* after the previous ones had fallen into ruins or had been otherwise damaged. The *stūpa* No. 5 at Sravasti appears, from the symmetrical arrangement of its structural parts, to have been the result of an integrated growth. There are indeed a few more structures at Sravasti, namely the Kachchikuṭī and Pakkikuṭī, which were obviously

¹ A. Cunningham, *Archaeological Survey of India, Reports*, I, III, VI and VIII (1871-80); F.O. Oertel, "Excavations at Sarnath", *A.R.A.S.I.*, 1904-05, (Calcutta, 1908), pp. 68 ff.; V. S. Agrawala, *Sarnath*, 1957, pp. 13-14.

² *A.R.A.S.I.*, 1921-2, pp. 105 ff.; 1929-30, pp. 193 ff.

rectangular in plan. From the extant remains and published accounts it is not possible to say if they were terraced, though there is every possibility in view of the prototypes described above that they were indeed so. A third structure, called the temple of Shobhnāth, enclosed within a rectangular courtyard should, circumstantially, have been a terraced temple though the available description is badly inadequate to convey any definite impression. The existence of at least two flights of stairs connecting three terraces can, however, be seen in the published photograph (pl. XXXII top). The character of its upper part does not lend itself to any reconstruction as the installation of a Muslim tomb on top must have done away with the incompatible original features.

The extensive Buddhist site at *Nalanda*¹ contains monasteries, *stūpas* and temples and all of them show clear-cut evidence of successive occupation and periodic reconstructions over the ruins and debris of the earlier period. Of these the main *stūpa* has seven stages. Most of the structures range in date between Samudragupta in 4-5 century A.D. and the end of the Pāla rule in the 12th century A.D. In Fahien's time (A.D. 399-414) there was nothing beyond a small *stūpa* on the site.

The place received considerable patronage from the Pāla kings who are credited with founding monasteries and shrines at Vikramaśilā, Somapura, Odantapura and Jagaddala respectively.²

The main *stūpa* and the three temples³ on the site are each built over a square plinth. The *chaitya* Nos. 12, 13 and 14 show an elaboration in that they have rectangular projections in the corners. The *chaitya* No. 12 houses a shrine on each of the four projections forming a *pañchāyatana* and all this complex stands on a square plinth. All these shrines (*chaityas*) are approached from the east by means of a flight of stairs enclosed between walls giving access to the basal plinth. The stone temple No. 2, standing to the east of the block of monastery has a square base surmounted by a second terrace over which rises the oblong cella, apparently showing two stages of construction. It should, therefore, conform to the type of a terraced temple, of the Brahmanical faith. The sculptural panels in stone tilted against the facade of the plinth on all sides all agree in style and subject with those at the terraced temple at Paharpur. The entrance is

¹ A. Ghosh, *A Guide to Nalanda*, 1946.

² Schiefner, *Taranathas Geschichte des Buddhismus in India*.

³ H. G. Franz, "Die Ausgrabungen in Nalanda", *Indologen Tagung* 1959, Goettingen, 1959.

from the eastern side. The sculptures are stylistically datable to the sixth century A.D., and the temple would be dated likewise or somewhat later.

The recent excavations at *Devnimori*¹ in District Sabarkantha, Gujarat, have revealed the remains of a monastery and a *stūpa* built in the 3rd-4th centuries A.D. The remains of the *stūpa* consist of an oblong platform or terrace, supporting a *pradakshināpatha* around the central *stūpa*. Likewise, the excavations at Antichak, District Bhagalpur, Bihar, at the supposed site of Vikramaśilā have exposed partially the brick built oblong or square plinth of a massive structure possibly representing a *stūpa*. Further excavation will reveal the structures and it is premature to anticipate its true character. It would belong to the class of *stūpas* and temples at Nalanda.

EDUKA STRUCTURES OR TEMPLES IN PAKISTAN

Perhaps the earliest specimen of the storeyed *stūpa* in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was the great *stūpa* at Shahji-ki-Dheri near *Peshawar*, attributed to the reign of Kanishka. "It consisted of a basement in five stages (150 ft.), a superstructure (*stūpa*) of carved wood in thirteen storeys (400 ft.), surmounted by an iron column with from thirteen to twenty-five gilt copper umbrellas (88 ft.) making a total height of 638. ft."²

One of the earliest *stūpas* of the style in Pakistan is the *stūpa* at Mirpurkhas³ in Sind in Pakistan. Dated to *circa* A.D. 400, it was built over a square terrace measuring 50 ft. on each side made of mud-bricks encased in a frame of burnt-bricks which formed the outer walls of the terrace or plinth. On the western face were a small opening leading to three cells in a body of the plinth showing the use of the stone arch. The sculptural embellishment indicate its clearly Gandhāra character.

But the most imposing structure in the unmistakably *edūka* style is the main temple at *Paharpur*.⁴ In plan it is a cruciform structure built of burnt bricks in three terraces supporting a central cella at its top. The lowest terrace is over 350 ft. in length and breadth respectively, and the total extreme height of the temple rises to 70 ft. above the level of the court-

¹ *Indian Archaeology 1961-62—A Review*, pp. 3-4 ; *Indian Archaeology 1962-63—A Review*, p. 3.

² A. K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, 1927, p. 53.

³ H. Cousens, "Buddhist Stupa at Mirpurkhas, Sind", *A.R.A.S.I.*, 1909-10 (Calcutta, 1914), pp. 80 ff.

⁴ K. N. Dikshit, *Excavations at Paharpur* (MASI. No. 55 Delhi, 1938).

yard. It is surrounded by a square cloister with shrines against its inner wall all round. The quadrangle is pierced by a lofty gateway on the northern side. The access from one platform to the other was by a flight of stairs, the platforms themselves serving as *pradakshināpatha* (circumambulatory). It was built towards the end of the 8th century A.D. It is richly decorated with narrative terracotta plaques fitted against the walls of the plinth in each successive terrace representing both Buddhist and Brahmanical pantheons. From the inscribed letters found on some the date of its construction in the 10th century A.D. can be conceded. The plaques were obviously put in their places without any plan, periodically, as and when they were executed by the artists.

MULTIPLE-ROOFED TEMPLES IN INDIA

The subject of temples with gables or multiple roofs in India has been dealt with at some length by Percy Brown.¹ The same topic has also been dealt with variously and piecemeal by James Fergusson² and Benjamin Rowland³, respectively, besides Coomaraswamy.⁴

Temples with actual multiple roofs or with merely strong semblances of the same, occur in widely separated regions namely, Kashmir, Chamba (Himachal Pradesh), Kathiawad (Gujarat), besides Karnataka and Kerala on the west coast of the south Indian peninsula.

These again may be divided stylistically into two homogeneous groups. One group encompasses Kashmir and Gujarat marked by temples with two or three superimposed roofs and a pyramidal profile. The other group comprises temples bearing strong resemblances to the Nepalese temples and are distinguished by multiple sloping roofs, in wood or in stone.

The Kathiawad temples are represented at Gop, Kadvar, and Bileshwara. Those in Kashmir comprise mainly the temples at Pandrethan, dated variously to the 10th (Fergusson) or 12th century (Rowland), and the temple at Payer. The former has three roofs and the latter only two. But Cunningham had noted a stone model with four roofs.

The temples have a slight projection and entrance door on each side of the four faces of the square plan with a gabled top. This aspect and

¹ *Indian Architecture* (Buddhist and Hindu), pp. 131-33.

² *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, pp. 76 ff. ; 255-72, 287.

³ *The Art and Architecture of India* (Buddhist-Hindu-Jain).

⁴ *Op. cit.*

the absence of any adjuncts or axial additions have led to the classification of this type of temples as of the *maṇḍapa* style.

It was held by Percy Brown that both the Kashmir and the Kathiawad groups of temples were contemporaneous, and they are datable to the last half of the first millennium A.D. The Kathiawad temples are attributed to an extraneous tribe called the Mers. The similarity between the temples of these two widely separated regions stops short at the twin features of the pyramidal shape and the superimposed aspect of the roof. As a distant echo of the style, Brown has also included the *jagamohana* of the Orissan temples within this group, though, strictly speaking, such an inclusion is not justifiable in view of the comparative lessening of the overhanging aspect of the roof in these cases, and the absence of the projected profile.

Brown was of the view that these temples were "rather in the manner of the stories of a Chinese pagoda". It is not yet determinable if there is any genetic or inspirational connexion between the two. It is more likely that the style evolved independently in the two regions as responses to local requirements.

The numerous multiple-roofed structures in Kerala on the other hand recall at once similarities to the multiple-roofed temples of Nepal. They occur in Beypur and Thiruvalla in Kerala and at Mudabidri and Bhatkal and other places in the South Kanara District of Karnataka, besides a three-roofed pavilion at Guruvayankeri also in Kanara.

The temple of Śiva, called Mahādeva Kovil, at Beypur is described by Brown as "a deliberate copy of a double roofed Nepalese temple of the medieval period". Technically there seems to have existed a fundamental difference between the multiple-roofed temples of the two regions in the method adopted to support the eaves. The ubiquitous corner brackets correspond indeed to the corner *ṭunāls* of Nepal, but the intermediate brackets are arranged vertically instead of at an angle or on an inclined plain by a suitable arrangement for the transference of the load on to these vertical brackets. These must be supporting an additional beam in a recess pushed considerably behind the outer line of the eaves.

The temple of Thiruvalla in the Travancore area of Kerala has three superimposed roofs. The lowest roof is distinguished by a gable roofed projection in the centre of each side, resulting in the breaking up of the line of the profile, alternately protruding and receding. The two other

roofs also carry diminutively a gable roofed projection in the middle of each side serving as a dormer window to let in light and allow entrapped gases to escape, besides promoting general ventilation as suggested by Brown. Though utilitarian in function and purpose, they also serve to enhance the beauteous effect of the broken outline.

The fifteenth century Chandranātha temple at Mudabidri in South Kanara, in two storeys has similar projections on each side as in Beypur, but not the gabled part on the side facing the entrance.

Besides this, there is another temple at Mudabidri which is basically a longitudinal hall, with three superimposed but plain and sloping roofs built with planks (slabs). It is further distinguished by a longitudinal ridge over the uppermost roof.

The stone-built Anantaswāmī temple at Karkala, near Mangalore, is also built on this principle.

Though built mostly of stone, the shape and outline of the roofs of these temples suggest wooden prototypes. There are at least sixteen examples of this type of temple in South Kanara, including those at Bhatkal.

The three-roofed pavilion resting on a set of five pillars supported on a raised plinth is a quaint and yet unique variant of this form of multiple sloping roofed temples.

Belonging to the same category, but not to the same form, are the numerous cenotaphs, if not actual tombs, of Jaina priests at Mudabidri. Built of bricks they occur in groups, and though generally low in height they rise up to 33 ft. and have as many as eight storeys.

The roofs comprise a series of superimposed sloping roofs each of about the same size, to suggest a vertical column with a symmetrically broken outline. The corner of each eave is upturned and each is separated from the other by an intervening vertical facet. Being cenotaphs they are not dated by any inscription or record.

The nearest example in style as well as in space, of the multiple-roofed temples in India corresponding to the temples of Nepal is the one typified by the temple at Chergaon on the Satluj in Chamba, Himachal Pradesh. It is a temple built essentially of wood, with three superimposed and sloping roofs. The topmost tier of the roof is distinctively circular, a form with which we are familiar in Nepal. Peculiarly, however, and unlike anything in Nepal the temple has an *ardha-maṇḍapa* added to it longitudinally

against the entrance in an axial plan. This adjunct is provided with two closely superimposed roofs, the upper one with a ridge and a gable front.

Brown has indicated that the presence of these so-called *pagoda* type structures in Nepal may be accounted for by the often accepted connexion between the Nayars of Kerala and the Newars of Nepal. As the tentative theory would indicate a directional trend to Nepal from the homeland of the Nayars, the absence of examples in the intermediate regions is not easily explained. If this theory were true the Nepalese structure should be traced to Kerala, though such a view is not tenable on the basis of available evidence.

In the same breath Brown has also adverted to a possible influence from China over the sea route, indicated by the use of Chinese fishing nets used in the coastal areas of Kerala. Neither theory can yet be proved. It may, however, be stated that the style is rooted in the soil of Kerala, as much as the Nepalese in the Nepalese soil, and fits in perfectly with the surroundings and the climate. There cannot be any doubt that the sloping as well as the multiple roofs of Kerala or Karnataka temples were fully functional, and not merely imitatively ornamental as may be easily concluded. A more detailed study of these temples is necessary before any firm conclusions as to style, date, source of inspiration, stages of evolution and fields of distributional expansion, if any, can be firmly drawn.

A distinction must at this stage be made between the *Edūka* structure, the most distinctive feature of which was the raised plinth in multiple tiers and the *maṇḍapa* structure distinguished by the multiple, sloping and superimposed roofs. The plinths of the Kerala, Karnataka, Gujarat, Chamba or Kashmir temples in this category do not have the essential *edūka* aspect.

EDUKA EDIFICES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

This style of architecture exercised considerable influence in Burma, Cambodia and Java, as also limitedly in Siam, in South-East Asia.¹

Burma

In Burma, the temple of Nat-Hlaung Gyaung at Pagan, attributed to circa A.D. 931, and the *stūpa* of Mangalazedi at Pagan, dated to A.D. 1274, besides the Mahābodhi temple, also at Pagan, and dated to 1215, the *stūpa* of Bawbawgyi, of the tenth century, at Hmaawaa (old Prome),

¹ See Percy Brown, *Indian Architecture* (Buddhist and Hindu), pp. 166 ff. ; Philip Rawson, *The Art of South-east Asia*, London, 1967.

and the *stūpa* of Shivesandaw of the mid-eleventh century A.D., at Pagan, besides of course the temple of Thatbinnyu of the eleventh century A.D., at Pagan, provide examples of the *eḍūka* style of architecture.

The temple of Nat Hlaung Gyaung is built of brick with sparing use of stone. The plan is square, and rises in receding terraces to support a conical superstructure. The conical *stūpa* of Mangalazedi at Pagan, rises on a circular form of delicately charming outline over three concentric terraces, square on plan, and is characteristically approached by a flight of steps on each of the four sides.

The Mahābodhi temple at Pagan, built on the model of the Mahābodhi temple of Gaya, has a lofty basement over which rises the truncated pyramid of the *śikhara*. The *stūpa* of Bawbawgyi is conical at the top over of square base of five concentric platforms in diminishing tiers.

The *stūpa* of Shivesandaw in Pagan is likewise conical in outline built on base of five receding tiers, crowned by an *āmalaka* finial.

Cambodia

Cambodia provides numerous examples of architectural relics built in the *eḍūka* style. These comprise, principally, the temple of Takeo in Angkor Thom, Phnom Bakheng, Bakshi Chamkrong, Phimeanakas and the Angkor Wat itself, all concentrated in the area of the twin cities of Angkor Thom and Angkor Wat.

The temple of Takeo, dated to A.D. 889, is unfinished; nevertheless two basement terraces below and two terraces above are clearly distinguishable. It is approached by flights of stairs placed at the centres of each side in each level.

The temple of Baksei Chamkrong, dated to A.D. 947, is situated in the centre of the topmost platform of a series of five concentric and square platforms, and is approached by stairs on all sides.

The temple of Phnom Bakheng dated to the beginning of the tenth century A.D. and dedicated to the memory of the king-god, namely, Yaśovarman, who ruled in A.D. 889-910, consists likewise of five concentric platforms.

Another temple of this style is that of Phimeanakas which rises in three receding tiers of concentric platforms, and is dated to the tenth century A.D., with the topmost platform surrounded by a fenestrated gallery on all sides. As in the other cases, access to the temple is obtained by

means of stone staircases through the centre of each side, and the stairs themselves are flanked on each landing by a pair of seated lions, recalling the distinctive feature of Nepalese type of *edūka* temples.

The most elaborate of all the temples in Cambodia is the Angkor Wat itself, of which the central complex of shrines, in three storeys, stands in the centre of a complex of three oblong terraces. As in all other cases, the innermost shrine was approached by means of flights of stairs on each of the four sides of the oblong platforms. Like the Phnom Bakheng, it was also dedicated to a king, namely, Sūryavarman II (1112-52), who founded the city of Angkor Wat, subserving the conception of the divine king.

It has been suggested that the lofty height of the temple attained through the arrangement of the terraces was deliberately designed to serve the conception of the *Meru* or temple mountain, to symbolize in microcosm the macrocosm of the abode of gods.

Java

Of the numerous examples in Java, are the temple of Loro Jangrang in Pambanam, besides the renowned *stūpa* of Barabudur.¹

The Śiva temple at Loro Jongrang (A.D. 860-915), is built at the pinnacle of a lofty platform, raised in two terraces, with stairways on all four sides. The plan of the world-famous Barabudur *stūpa*, rising over nine successive storeys, of which the lower six were square platforms with recessed sides and the upper three, circular terraces, to form a *pañcharatha* at the base, is a symmetrical structure of great beauty in the *edūka* style, that came into existence in the eighth century A.D.

The storeyed form, the niches containing or enshrining the deity, into the sides of the *stūpa* or in its cella and the crowning pinnacle of the *stūpa* may have lent not a little of its influence to evolve the shape of the *sikhara* shrines which should appear to form a logical conclusion of this style.

Siam

In Siam too the influence of the storeyed base is to be seen limitedly in the temple of Lophur, called the Wat Mahādhātu, built about the twelfth

1 J. Ph. Vogel, *Buddhist Art in India, Ceylon and Java*, 1936, pp. 91 ff.; J. E. Van Lahuizen-de-Leeuw, "Preservation of Archaeological Remains in Indonesia", *Indologen Tagung* 1959, Goettingen, 1959, pp. 200 ff.



Plate I Temple of Gorakhnath, called Kāṣṭhamāṇḍapa, Kathmandu. Courtesy : Director,
Deptt. of Archaeology, Nepal.

N. R. BANERJEE



Plate II Nyatapola temple at Bhaktapur, Nepal.
Courtesy : Director, Deptt. of Archaeology, Nepal,



Plate III Terraced Temple of Śiva at Ahichchhatra (AC I). Courtesy : ASI.



Plate IV Terraced Brick Structure (AC II), Ahichchhatra. Courtesy : ASI.

N. R. BANERJEE



Plate V Remains of an apsidal brick structure superimposed by the terraced temple of Śiva
at Ahichchhatra. Courtesy : ASI.

century A.D. It is a temple of the *śikhara* style built over a platform which is broken into three receding tiers, and is cruciform on plan with projections in the angles between the crossed arms. The plinth is a little elongated on the entrance side to accommodate a portico or *antarāla*. Though not strictly curvilinear in outline, it tapers to a curved outline near the top.

The basal platforms of these temples were no doubt derived from the *jagatī* (platform) described in the *Vishṇudharmottara* of which the norm of three successive ones was recommended for the principal architectural type called the *Himavat*, meaning, of course, the mountain or Meru.

That the form of architecture as well as the religions they subserved travelled to these parts of South-East Asia from India is an accepted fact. Even the sculptural art of these regions bears unmistakable evidence of the influence from India in theme as in style. In course of time local *minutiae* and *differentiae* were evolved and grafted on both architecture and iconography.

Ceylon

Ceylon, India's nearest neighbour in the extreme south, was also not free from the style of storied *stūpas*. The earliest of these, the Ruwanwaeli Dagaba at Anuradhapura was built by King Duṭṭhagāmaṇi in the second century B.C. The *stūpa* consists of the *dagaba* proper in domical shape, with three basal platforms, circular on plan, rising above two concentric square platforms rising in diminishing size. Like the normal *edūka stūpa*, the platforms are connected by means of a flight of steps at each landing on each of the four cardinal sides, while the principal entrance is through a colonnaded portico built on the ground on the eastern side.

Far removed from this early *stūpa* in point of time is the *stūpa* of Wata-dege at Polonnarwa, built by Parakkama Bāhu in the twelfth century. This *stūpa* or shrine is entirely circular on plan and rises on circular platforms.

Both these types differ substantially from the standard pattern of the textual style of the *edūka* shrine, and are both far removed from the times of the *Vishṇudharmottara*. It would, therefore, be a mistake perhaps to look for the inspiration of the Ceylonese styles to the *edūka* norm of the northern text.

It has been suggested¹ that the idea of the Ziggurat of Sumer, which is in fact a storeyed tower, and a high abode of god may have travelled to the Gandhāra region from the Near East during the rule of the Parthians about A.D. 100. The Kumrahar plaque showing a storeyed tower supporting a *stūpa* dated to the first century A.D., is perhaps the earliest known evidence of the *edūka* style of construction. The Kanishka *stūpa* found in the neighbourhood of Peshawar, of a slightly later date, indicates the wide expanse of the basic conception which is clinched by the comparable relief reported from Mathura datable to the second or third century A.D. If the Kumrahar specimen is not indigenous in conception and execution, it was perfectly possible for the Kushāṇas to have picked up the idea in the Gandhāra region and transmitted it throughout their extensive empire and even beyond into the regions of their original home.

It is also conceded that it was the Kushāṇas who were responsible for the introduction of Buddhism into China in the second and third centuries A.D. It was possible, therefore, for even structural ideas so intimately connected with religion to be so conveyed by the Kushāṇas to China. The matter assumes importance in view of the proved evidence of storeyed pagoda in the reliefs at Yunkang and Lungmen in North China about A.D. 450 or 500. This would lend support to the literary evidence of multi-storeyed wooden pagodes in China from about the same period or a little earlier. It is, however, claimed by Will Durant that "the oldest standing pagoda is at Sung Yüehssu built in 523 A.D. on the sacred mountain of Sung San in Honan".²

It is suggested that the idea travelled from the Gandhāra region to China, where, on plan, the type evolved was polygonal.

The storeyed form travelled also to Korea and Japan in the sixth and seventh centuries. The storeyed form of the substructure was adopted in China, but in Japan it was the multiple-roofed pagoda that became popular as early as the seventh century A.D. as exemplified by the pagodas of Horyūji and Muroji (9th century) near Nara. The ideas may have been transmitted by pilgrims as well as missionaries. These would vindicate

¹ See Dietrich Seckel, *The Art of Buddhism* (Art of the World), 1944. See also the views of V. S. Agrawala on similar derivation of the storeyed temple from the Ziggurats of Sumer as referred to elsewhere in the article (*ante* 81-2).

² Will Durant, *The story of civilization* (*Our Oriental Heritage*), 1942, p. 741; Dietrich Seckel, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

the standpoint that there must be intimate connexion and combination between the multiple-terraced plinth on the one hand and the multiple-terraced roofs on the other, of which some of the Nepalese specimens present convincing evidence. Examples of a temple with a single plinth but multiple roofs are many, but example of temples with multiple terraces and a single roof are comparatively rare in Nepal.

Even Tibet has shown the full play and expansion therein of the *edūka* style in the *stūpa-chaityas* called *Chortens*. The most distinctive among them is the one at Gyantse which is built in the centre of the top-most tier of a series of five polygonally concentric plinths rising upwards in receding tiers. These are basically square on plan, but a central projection on each side has broken the outline symmetrically and pleasingly into alternately advancing and retreating lines. In style it is comparable to the *stūpa* at Barabudur in Java and that of Bodhanātha at Kathmandu, described elsewhere in these pages.

The hoary antiquity of the terraced temple in distant Iraq and the possibility of the transmission of the form and idea through many intermediate links to Gandhāra and thence to India have been indicated. The priority of the date of some of the Indian specimens, and the possibility of a directional trend from these quarters, in view of the entrenched tradition and shape of Aśokan *stūpas*¹ as far away as Lalitpur (Patan), near Kathmandu is an arresting phenomenon and would be deserving of some consideration. The fact of the possible structural influence from the days of Aśoka gains support from the evidence of the inscribed Aśokan pillars at Lumbini and Nigalihawā recording the fact of Aśoka's personal visit to the regions, well within the borders of Nepal.

As to when the multiple roofs were devised or got incorporated with the terraced temple form in Nepal, the evidence is not clear. Balakrishna Sama has expressed the view that this distinctive roof form dates from the

1 This tradition can either be totally dislodged or established by an actual excavation of these *stūpas*. The fact that the Piprahwa *stūpa* containing some skeletal remains of the Buddha himself has been excavated, would perhaps be a strong argument against any sentimental objection to the undertaking of excavations on these *stūpas* in Nepal, the personal and chronological associations of which are unknown and presently only a matter of surmise often coloured by subjective thoughts, which leads one nowhere.

Vedic times.¹ He has traced its evolution from a pavilion for the performance of the Vedic sacrifices to serve as a *Yajña-sālā* or *Yajña-maṇḍapa*,² wherein sacrificial fires had to be lit. To meet the needs of allowing the

¹ Balakrishna Sama, "Nepālī Maṇḍapa-Śailiko Utpatti ra Vikās", *Nepālī Lalit Kala*, Annual No., 2023, pp. 9-12.

In this context it would be interesting to consider the view of Comaraswamy (op. cit., 1927, p. 147) that "these edifices preserve the elements of much older styles, of which the monuments are no longer preserved in India ; they illustrate too a halfway stage between Indian prototypes and Chinese derivatives." The opinion of Percy Brown (op. cit., p. 162) on the same subject is of topical interest. To quote his words, "In the sphere of architecture, Nepal illustrates with marked significance, the impact of two of the most forceful civilizations in the East, that of India on the one hand, and of China on the other, the two meeting within the region of Nepal's mountainous borders". Though the two views are identical, proof is lacking to illustrate the contacts with China though the connections with Indian architectural prototypes are obvious.

Fergusson writing in 1876 (op. cit., p. 280) held the view that the multiple-roofed temples were "unlike anything found in Bengal, and all their affinities seem with those in Burma or China."

Benjamin Rowland writing in 1953 (op. cit., p. 158), however, saw an Indian inspiration traceable to the thirteen-storeyed and nearly 700 ft. high *stūpa* at Shahji-ki-Dheri.

² See Agrawala, *Indian Art*, Varanasi, 1965 pp. 40-45. The original *Agnīśālā* which formed part of the palace was later on called the *Devagriha*. In its original form it must have been built of wooden pillars, so inferred from the use of the word *skambha*, meaning pillar in the *Rigveda*, and a big pillar was called *Mahat-skambha* (RV. VI. 47. 5). The roof was obviously of thatch (straw), laid in several layers on a bamboo framework called *āyāma*, supported over a ridge called *Vishuvat* (later *baladaṇḍa*), indicating the sloping sides, held in place by means of ropes. The openings at the joints between the *āyāma* and the *vishuvat* (*baladaṇḍa*) were called *aksha* (eye) in Vedic literature or *dhūmanetta* (or the outlets for smoke) in later Pali literature. These were covered with pots placed in a row to prevent rains from falling inside. In course of time a single such pot came to be called the *kalaśa*, in which all the lines converged.

It became the *pūrṇaghaṭa*, called *kalaśa* with the complex of *pallavas* (leaves) and *vijapūraka* in a logical culmination, as the final of Brahmanical temples placed over the *āmalaka-silā*. See P. K. Agrawala, *Pūrṇa Kalaśa or the Vase of Plenty*, Varanasi, 1965, p. 28.

smokes to escape, the height of the roof was gradually raised by stages and provided with openings at the sides for the gases to find an exit. At the same time, the *maṇḍapa* has to be covered to protect the fires and worshippers from the rains. He has also suggested that the style should be called the *maṇḍapa* style, though as has been indicated elsewhere (*ante p. 90*), the style may perhaps be called the *Devala* style in view of the name given to the temples of the medieval period in the inscriptions of Nepal.

All the same time it may be stated that the surmised evolutionary trend indicated by Balakrishna Sama for the multiple-roofed form, is at once interesting and attractive, but archaeological proof, as emphasized by Sama himself, is as yet lacking.

The evidence of the great master craftsman of Nepal, Arniko, having gone to China and assumed responsibility for her major structural works was of a much later date than the date of the earliest occurrence of the pagoda style in China. The evidence of the pagoda form in China cannot, therefore, with reason, be traced to Nepal, though it may be assumed that they received Nepalese influences at a later date.

The presence of the roofed structures in Gujarat, Kerala and Kanara (Mysore), Chamba (Himachal Pradesh) and Kashmir in India, may perhaps be attributed to indigenous origins.

The occasional preference for the terraced form of the temples in the different parts of South-East Asia has indeed to be traced to India from where the religious beliefs that at once inspired and sustained the temple forms also emanated.

The case of Barabudur in Java (Indonesia) is unique, as some overall parallelism is indicated between it and the Bodhanāth *stūpa*, beyond Chabahil, near Kathmandu. Apart from the as-yet-unestablished date factor of this Nepalese *stūpa*, the lack of intermediate links, and the minutiae of differences between the two would preclude any inter-connexion.

Thus it may be stated that while the evidence for the emergence, evolution and expansion of the *edūka* or multiple-terraced structures can be worked out fairly satisfactorily, tracing it to early *stūpa* architecture, it is not possible as yet to trace either the emergence and evolution of the multiple-roofed form of the superstructure, except in its simplest form of the ridged roof of the Vedic times, or the incorporation of the latter with the former, notwithstanding the basic inter-connexion between the two. The situation calls for further archaeological research. At the same time

any literary descriptions of the old masters of architecture on the multiple-roofed form of the temple as such would also throw welcome light on the vexed problem.

It can, however, be safely stated that Nepal was the meeting ground of the *Edūka* tradition on the one hand and the multiple roofs on the other. As the latter feature comes apparently much later than the former into existence, the coalescence of the two in Nepal is just fortuitous and imparts to the temple architecture of Nepal a new dimension not much known or adopted elsewhere except limitedly in China.

THE VEDIC VIEW OF DHARMA

DR. R. S. MISRA

The word *dharma* is derived from the root *dhṛ* which means to be or exist, to be maintained or preserved. Dharma is that which sustains human society and the world.¹ It is, according to Śaṅkara, the reason of the maintenance of the world.² Kaṇāda defines *dharma* as that which leads to the attainment of *Abhyudaya* and *Niḥśreyasa*. The word *abhyudaya* in the present context means the attainment of heaven. It signifies man's well-being and prosperity in this world and the attainment of *svarga* or heaven after death. The word *niḥśreyasa* means the attainment of *mokṣa* or liberation. It signifies man's freedom from *karma* and rebirth, from the cycle of birth and death. The soul after attaining liberation no more returns to this world. It is no more involved in the world-process and is not subject to the conditions of existence or finitude. But the attainment of heaven does not signify man's freedom from Karma, rebirth and finitude. Man, according to the Vedic view, goes to *svarga* or the abode of immeasurable joy, by virtue of the *punya* or merits that he cultivates in this life. This *punya* is acquired by the performance of the acts, sacrifices etc. as are enjoined by the Vedas. Man not only attains heaven on account of his *punya*, but his stay there is also strictly conditioned by it. When his *punya* or the fund of merit is exhausted, he has to enter again the world of mortals. He is again involved in the cycle of birth and death. This situation of man is inevitable so long as he does not free himself from subjection to Kāla, Time. Heaven lies within temporal order. It is a time-conditioned existence. It is *devaloka*, the world of gods and not *Brahmaloka*, the abode of Brahman or Godhead.

An extreme view of *dharma* is taken by the Mīmāṃsā school of Hindu philosophy. According to it, the Vedas teach only one kind of *dharma* and it is that which is expressed through commands or injunctions. It is what is called *pravytti-lakṣaṇa dharma*. Jaimini in his *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* defines *dharma* as that which is characterised by *codanā* or command.⁴ Śabara-

¹ ध्रियते लोकोज्जेन ।

² जगतः स्थितिकारणम् ।

³ यतोभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः, *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, 1.1.2.

⁴ चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः ।

svāmī, in his commentary on the *sūtras* of Jaimini, observes that *codanā* signifies words or commands which impel men to action.¹ It is the *vidhi-vākya* or the commandment of the Vedas. The main purport of the Vedas, according to the *Mīmāṃsā* view, is to command men to perform their religious acts and duties. The statements which propound knowledge or what may be called the metaphysical statements of the Vedas are, according to this view, action-oriented ; they are meant to promote action and have no meaning in themselves. They are, ordinarily, called *arthavāda*. The religious duties or *karmas* are broadly divided by the *Mīmāṃsakas* into three categories, namely, the *nitya* *karmas*, the *naimittika* *karmas* and the *kāmya* *karmas*. The *nitya* *karma*, for example *sandhyā*, is obligatory. It has to be performed daily without any break. The *naimittika* *karmas* like bathing during the eclipses or performing *śrāddha* ceremony are to be done on appropriate occasions. The performance of *nitya* and *naimittika* *karmas* is necessary. Their non-performance would result in the acquisition of sin, *pratyavāya*. The *kāmya* *karmas* are to be performed only when one desires to attain some specific objects or rewards. For example, one has to perform sacrifice if one wants to attain heaven.²

It is generally thought that the performance of *Yajña* is dominated by a mechanical spirit. To a certain extent it may be true if we confine our view just to the external aspect of sacrifice. But the principle of sacrifice assumes a cosmic significance in the Vedas. We find there the elevation of sacrifice into a world-principle. The whole world is conceived as universal sacrifice. As Dr. V. S. Agrawala in his illuminating work *Sparks from the Vedic Fire* observes, "All manifestation of Agni or Energy at a point and within a system is *Yajña*. The creation on the cosmic plane is universal sacrifice (*Virāt Yajña*) in which the creator offers himself as the *Āhuti* (offering). It is called a *Sarvahut Yajña* in the *Rigveda* (X. 90.8-9). Who is the *Purusha* or *Prajāpati* of this cosmic *Yajña* ? It is Agni, Infinite Nature, the Cosmic Energy with its inherent active principle, i.e., *Aditi* and *Dakṣa* together".³ *Yajña* represents the universal creative activity. It is the source of all creation, the creation of living beings as well as of inanimate existence. According to the *Bhagavadgītā*, *Prajāpati* created beings with *Yajña* in the beginning and asked them to grow and multiply

¹ चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनमाहुः ।

² स्वर्गकामो यजेत ।

³ P. 7

by taking recourse to Yajña.¹ This Yajña was to fulfil all their desires. Yajña provides constant momentum to the wheel of samsāra. Yajña is given a still deeper meaning in the Vedic tradition. It is ultimately identified with God himself.² Thus Yajña is conceived in the Vedic tradition as an all-embracing principle. It is the dynamic principle of creation, the cause of the origination, growth and sustenance of all beings and is conducive to the *śreya* or the good of man.

These supernatural truths or the mysteries of *dharma* are revealed, according to the Mīmāṃsā view, only by the Vedas. Man's knowledge of *dharma* is not derived from reason or sense-experience but from the Veda or Revelation. Man's reason is inherently incapable of unravelling the mysteries of *dharma*. It can have no awareness of the transcendental factors that condition human existence and the purpose or goal of human life. So, it cannot define the nature of man's duties or actions which he is to perform in order to achieve the goal of his life and to promote the well-being of human society and the rest of creation. One has to turn to the Vedas, the eternal source of revelation, in order to know the mysteries of religious life and activities and of the cosmic and supracosmic existence.

But reason is not superfluous according to the Mīmāṃsā view. It plays an important rôle in so far as it gives a systematic and meaningful interpretation of the Vedic statements and reconciles the contradictions that seem to exist between them. Reason, according to this view, is meant to interpret the truth of *dharma* in a systematic and consistent manner; it is not meant to discover it. Thus, this view does not decri reason. It simply shows its obvious limitations in discovering the supreme mysteries of *dharma*.

The Mīmāṃsā view of *dharma* reminds one of the Judaic view of religion as expressed through the commandments of Moses. In both cases, *dharma* or religion is understood as of the nature of commandment. Its main purpose is to teach man what he is to do and what he is not to do. The fulfilment of man's life or his destiny depends on strict compliance of the law. In both cases, the commandment or the law is received by man from an external authority, whether it is the Vedas or it is Jehovah or God. The unconditional obedience to the law or commandment is the chief characteristic of *dharma* or religion according to the Mīmāṃsā, as well as, Judaism.

¹ सह्यज्ञाः प्रजाः सृष्ट्वा पुरोवाच प्रजापतिः ।

अनेन प्रसविष्य ध्वमेव वोऽस्त्वष्टकामवुक् ॥ 3. 10.

² यज्ञो वै विष्णुः (*Taittirīya Samhitā*, 1.7.4).

In one case, sin results from man's transgression of the commandment of God. In another case, it results from his transgression of the commandment of the Vedas. Thus, the Mīmāṃsā and the Judaic views bear close parallel to each other, in respect of their understanding and interpretation of *dharma*, in spite of their fundamental and radical differences in other respects.

The most characteristic and comprehensive definition of the Vedic conception of *dharma*, which is free from the extremism of the Mīmāṃsā view and includes the definition of *dharma* as stated by Kaṇāda, is given by Śaṅkara. The Vedas, according to Śaṅkara, speak of two kinds of *dharma*, *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa* and *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa*. The *pravṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* is that which is expressed in the form of commands or injunctions, which impel men to action. It leads to the *abhyudaya* of man—the attainment of prosperity and well-being in this world and heaven after death. The *nivṛtti lakṣaṇa dharma* is characterised by withdrawal from or renunciation of action. It brings about the *niḥśreyasa* or liberation of man. Śaṅkara says in the introduction to his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* that *Bhagavān*, the Lord, after creating the world and with a desire to maintain its existence, taught *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa dharma* as expressed in the Vedas to *Prajāpati*, the lords of created beings like Marichi and others and *nivṛtti-lakṣaṇa dharma* to *ṛshis* or seers, like Sanaka, Sanandana and others.

In the light of his twofold classification of the Vedic *dharma* as stated above, he defines *dharma* as the reason of the maintenance of the world and as the direct cause of the *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreya*s of human beings; it is lived and practised by Brāhmaṇas and other peoples belonging to different *varas* or castes and *āśramas* or stages of life, who are desirous of their *śreya* or ultimate good.¹ The real good of man lies, according to Śaṅkara, in his attainment of liberation. The *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa dharma* or the way of action, which is primarily meant to bring about a prosperity and joy for the people in this world as well as in the higher world of gods can also purify their *antaḥkaraṇa*,² if it is done without any desire for its fruits and as an offering to *Īśvara*.³ This purification of psychic life makes one fit to attain knowledge

¹ जगतः स्थितिकारणं प्राणिनां साक्षात् अभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसहेतुः यः स धर्मो ब्राह्मणाद्यैः वर्णिभिः आश्रमिभिश्च श्रेयोधिभिः अनुष्ठीयमानः ।

Commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, Introduction.

² The word *antaḥkaraṇa* stands for the entire psychic life of man. It includes *manas* or mind, *ahmākāra* or ego and *buddhi* or intelligence.

³ अभ्युदयार्थः अपि चः प्रवृत्तिलक्षणो धर्मो वर्णाश्रमान् च उद्दिश्य विहितः स देवादिस्थान-प्राप्तिहेतुः सन् ईश्वरार्पणबुद्ध्या अनुष्ठीयमानः सत्त्वशुद्धये भवति फलाभिसन्धि-वर्जितः । G. B. Intro.

of the Real which culminates in one's liberation. Thus the *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa-dharma* also becomes indirectly the cause of man's liberation by purifying man's psychic life.¹

The real merit of the Vedic view of *dharma* as interpreted by Śaṅkara lies in the fact that it embraces all the dimensions of human existence, his cosmic as well as the supracosmic or transcendental existence. It is true that he does not regard the *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa dharma* as binding on a *mumukṣu*, as *mokṣa* or liberation is not something which can be created or brought about by the performance of sacrifices and other religious duties as are enjoined by the Vedas. Śaṅkara believes in a dimension of existence which is absolutely unconditioned ; which is free from the limits of space and time, from the cycle of birth and death and the law of Karma. It can be attained by man only through knowledge or *vidyā* and not by the performance of any action. But Śaṅkara does not deny the efficacy of Vedic karma or *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa dharma* for man's existence in the world. It is necessary not only for man's progress and prosperity in life but also for his existence and well-being. Not only that. It is according to him, as we have seen above, responsible for the existence of the world. Thus the Vedic Dharma does not only concern itself with renunciation of life and liberation of man, but it also seriously aims at the richness and prosperity of man's life and well-being in the world. But man is not supposed to involve himself in the world and in its riches in such a way that he loses sight of his divine life, his immortal existence.

This understanding of Dharma makes it amply clear that the oft-repeated criticisms of the Vedic Dharma that it is world-denying and life-negating or that it is unethical are facile, superfluous and baseless. They are levelled mainly due to a partial and one-sided interpretation of the Vedic view of Dharma.

Another important feature of the Vedic view of Dharma, as interpreted by Kaṇāda and Śaṅkara, is that it is absolutely universal in character. It gives ample freedom to man to choose his own object of worship and devotion, and his own way of religious life. Dharma is not taken as centred, exclusively, in any Deity or Godhead, personal or impersonal, immanent or completely transcendent to man and the world, and it is also not identified with any particular way. The *summum bonum* or goal of man's life is *nirāśreyaśa* or liberation which has to be attained by man by following any way that suits his temperament and his situation in life. In this respect, the Vedic view of

¹ शुद्धसत्त्वस्य च ज्ञाननिष्ठायोग्यताप्राप्तिद्वारेण ज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वेन च निःश्रेयसहेतुत्वम् अपि प्रतिपद्यते । Ibid.

Dharma presents marked contrast to some of the other great religions of the world, namely, the Zoroastrian and the Semetic religions. These religions are centred in a Deity or Godhead who is conceived and understood in different ways, and the ways of religious life are also more or less fixed in them. This understanding of religion and religious life does not leave much room in these religions for man's freedom in respect of belief, thought and the way of life. All these are determined by a particular Revelation. Salvation of man, according to these religions, is supposed to lie in believing unconditionally the truths contained in that particular revelation and in acting strictly in accordance with them. Their slogan of one God, one Prophet, one revelatory Book and one way of life breeds inevitably a strong sense of intolerance in them towards other religions. This fact is clearly borne out by the history of these great religions.

It is true that every religion, including Hinduism, has its own sets of beliefs, dogmas and the ways of life. But Hinduism is, to a large extent, free from the narrowness of approach, attitude and outlook that characterise Semetic religions, in spite of their loud claims of universality. Universality is something qualitative in character. It is be judged essentially not by the number of adherents that a religion can claim for itself and its geographical extension or by its capacity to convert people by force or by persuasion, but by the freedom it grants to man in matters of faith and thought and in *choosing* his own way of life. In this respect, Hinduism is undoubtedly the most universal of all the religions of the world.

BRAHMAN AND ĪSVARA IN ŚAMKARA'S *GĪTĀ BHĀṢYA*

CHURAMANI DUTTA

I

True to the Vedāntic tradition, Śamkara derives the doctrines of his system from the synthesis of the triple texts, namely, the *Upaniṣads*, the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Bhagavadgītā*. Among these triple texts, the *Brahma Sūtras* is an aphoristic summary of the doctrines of the *Upaniṣads*. "As explained by Śamkara, most of these *Sūtras*, except the first four (of Book One) and the first two chapters of the second book, are devoted to the textual interpretations of the *Upaniṣad* passages.... The rest of the work is mainly occupied in showing that the conclusion of the *Sūtras* was always in strict agreement with the *Upaniṣad* doctrines."¹ And the *Bhagavadgītā* is a masterly exposition of the quintessence of the *Upaniṣadic* teachings and in many places, it serves as a commentary to the *Upaniṣadic* passages. It is, thus, quite reasonable to hold that the *Upaniṣads* are the main source of Śamkara's philosophy. Śamkara, like other orthodox thinkers, accorded the ultimate validity to the scriptures. The ultimate truth can only be found in the *Upaniṣads*; reason, discrimination and judgement should be employed to discover the real purport of the *Upaniṣads*. He is such a staunch believer in the authority of the scriptures that Prof. Das Gupta is inclined to believe that all that Śamkara cared for was 'to show that his interpretation was the only interpretation that was faithful to the *Upaniṣads*, and that its apparent contradictions with experience could in some way be explained.... He was not writing a philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the whole truth as taught and revealed in the *Upaniṣads*'.² Indeed, the *Upaniṣads* contain almost all the seeds of Śamkara's philosophy. Prof. Max Müller says: 'When we consider how abstruse many of these metaphysical ideas are which form the substance of the Vedānta philosophy, it is most interesting to see how Śamkara succeeds in discovering them all in the ancient *Upaniṣads*.'³ George Thibaut, also,

¹ Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge 1957), Vol. I, p. 434.

² Op. cit., pp. 434-35.

³ Max Müller, *Three Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy*, pp. 135-36.

holds that 'the philosophy of Śaṅkara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the *Upaniṣads*.'¹

The teaching of the *Upaniṣads* is predominantly monistic. Behind the many different and controversial viewpoints, one perennial philosophy runs through the *Upaniṣads*. They very emphatically assert the ontological absolutism of *Brahman*. Like the *Upaniṣads* Śaṅkara holds that *Brahman* is the only ontological reality.² All that is there is *Brahman* only and nothing else. The Advaita philosophy is generally explained as : *Brahman* is the only Reality ; the world is ultimately false ; and the individual soul is non-different from *Brahman*.³

The etymological meaning of the word '*Brahman*' is 'to grow' or 'to be great.' Śaṅkara says that 'if we consider the derivation of the word '*Brahman*' from the root '*bṛh*'— which means 'to be great,' we at once understand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to *Brahman*.⁴ *Brahman* is immutable and characterless and hence 'that which grows' cannot be the literal meaning of '*Brahman*' from ontological standpoint, because growth presupposes change. Śaṅkara, therefore, holds that the absolute or the infinite is called *Brahman* because of its greatness.⁵ It is called *Brahman* because of Its being the greatest.⁶ Dr. Naulakha says that 'so far as Shankara is concerned we can definitely say that to him *Brahman* is "the great," "the absolute," the self-existent...' ⁷

In his *Gītā Bhāṣya*, Śaṅkara describes *Brahman* as the Real by which all this world, including the Space, is pervaded just as pots, etc., are pervaded by the space⁸. *Brahman* is the highest reality.⁹ It is without change and perfectly immutable in Its essential nature. It is indestructible because it does not undergo increase or decrease. This *Brahman* is not exhausted in

¹ George Thibaut, *Sacred Books of the East* (Motilal Banarasidas 1962), Vol. XXXIV. Introduction, p. cxxvi.

² *ekameva hi paramārthasatyaṁ brahma*. SB. Tait. Up. II. 6.

³ *brahma satyaṁ jagannīthyā jīvobrahmaiva nāparaḥ*.

⁴ *brahmaśabdaśya hi vyutpādyamānasya nityasuddhatvādayo'rthah*. Śārīraka-Bhāṣya=SB. I.1.1.

⁵ *niratisāyaṁ bhūmākhyāṁ bṛhadvādbrahmeti viddhi*. S.B. Kena Up. I.5

⁶ *bṛhattamatvādbrahma*. S.B. Tait. Up. II.1.

⁷ R. S. Naulakha, *Śaṅkara' Brahmanvāda* (Kitabghar, Kanpur, 1964), p. 68.

⁸ *tatam vyāptam sadākhyena brahmaṇā sakāśam ākāśena eva ghatādayaḥ*. Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya-Gītā=SBG. II. 17.

⁹ *paramārthatattvaṁ brahma*. SBG. II. 59.

Itself, for unlike the body it has no parts.¹ *Brahman* which has been described as the Real, Consciousness, Infinite and Bliss in the *Śruti*, is free from all such wordly defects as hunger, thirst and is inconceivable in any particular form or aspect. It is entirely free from all differentiation as taught by the Scripture.² Śaṅkara says that the sages who have brought birth and death under their control see Oneness or homogeneity or *Brahman* in all creatures. Further he says that *Brahman* is not heterogeneous either owing to any heterogeneous attributes in itself, because consciousness has no attribute, and *Brahman* is pure consciousness. Hence *Brahman* is homogeneous and one.³ *Brahman*—the Supreme Self, says Śaṅkara, is immortal and immutable, Eternal Dharma and the Bliss Immortal.⁴

Brahman, the Supreme Self is called Imperishable⁵ (i.e. *Akṣara*), as the *Śruti* also declares : 'O Gārgī ! it is at the command of this Imperishable, Supreme Self that heaven and earth remain held in their places'.⁶ *Akṣara* (i.e. Imperishable) here, does not stand for the syllable 'Om', because, says Śaṅkara, the epithet 'supreme' applies better to *Brahman*,—the Imperishable, who transcends all, than to syllable 'Om'.⁷ Śaṅkara says that those who understand the teaching of the *Vedas* describe the indestructible Imperishable *Brahman* as devoid of all attributes whatsoever⁸, and he quotes a famous passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*⁹ which speaks of Imperishable as neither gross, nor subtle, etc. *Brahman*, the Imperishable is not accessible to words and cannot therefore be defined. It is not manifest to any of the organs of knowledge. It is unthinkable, because whatever is visible to the senses can be thought of by the mind also ;

¹ na etat sadākhyaṁ brahma svenarūpeṇa vyeti vyabhicarati nirvayaivatrat dehadvat. SBG. II. 17.

² aśanāyādi sarvasaṁsārādharmavarījitam, neti neti eti nirastāśeṣaviśeṣaṁ brahmaśabdena ucyate. SBG. IV. 25.

³ SBG. V. 19.

⁴ amṛtasya avināśīṇaḥ avikāriṇaḥ śāśvatasya ca nityasya dharmaprāpyasya ānandarūpasya avyabhicāriṇaḥ. SBG. XIV. 27.

⁵ akṣarākhyam param brahma. SBG. VIII. 20.

⁶ etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane, gārgī, dyāvāprthivyaū vidhṛte tiṣṭhataḥ. Bṛh. Up. III. 8.9.

⁷ paramam iti ca niratiśaye brahmaṇi akṣara upapannataram viśeṣaṇam. SBG. VIII. 3.

⁸ akṣaram avināśi vedārthajñā sarvaviśeṣanivartakatvena abhivandati. SBG. VIII. 11.

⁹ Bṛh. Up. III. 8.8.

but as the Imperishable is unmanifest, it is invisible to the senses and therefore unthinkable.¹

Brahman is unknowable, inconceivable and ungraspable, seems to be the most well-considered view of Śaṅkara.² But, on the other hand, it has also been said to be the highest object of our enquiry, the highest goal of human aspiration.³ This clearly shows that Śaṅkara did not deny the possibility of all knowledge of *Brahman* : it is only perceptual, conceptual and objective knowledge of *Brahman* that has been denied by Śaṅkara. *Brahman*, according to Śaṅkara, is of the nature of pure consciousness ; it is the foundational consciousness which is the transcendental ground of all empirical selves, as well as all reality. It is thus the most fundamental postulate of all knowledge. Consciousness is not a phenomenon among the phenomena, but necessary implicate of all knowledge whatsoever. It makes the knowledge of all phenomena possible, but cannot be known as an object of knowledge. Śaṅkara says that *Brahman*, the Knowable, is not an object of consciousness, like a pot, accompanied with the idea of either existence or non-existence and is, therefore, not said to be existent or non-existent. On the other hand, the Knowable is beyond the reach of the senses and as such can be known through *śabda* (i.e. Revelation).⁴

Brahman, it has been said, is neither existent nor non-existent. Śaṅkara points out that every word employed to denote a thing indicates that thing which is associated with a certain mode of relation. But *Brahman* does not belong to a class or genus, as devoid of all attributes.⁵ Again as devoid of attributes, it possesses no quality ; and being actionless, it cannot be indicated by a word implying an act. The *Śruti* declares : 'It is without parts, actionless and tranquil'.⁶ And as It is one, without a second, It cannot be said to be related to anything else. It is, therefore, correct to say that

¹ *akṣaram avyaktatvād aśabdagocaram iti na nirdeṣṭum śakyate ataḥ anirdeśyam... yad hi karaṇagocaram tad mansā api cintyam tadviparitatvād acintyam akṣaram.* SBG. XII. 3.

² *anindriyagocaratvāt acintyaḥ.* SBG. II. 25.

³ *akṣarasamjñakam avyaktam paramāgatim.* SBG. VIII. 21.

⁴ *idam tu jñeyam atindriyatvena śabdaikapramāṇagamyatvād.* SBG. XIII. 12 ; II. 21.

⁵ *vidhvasatasarvaviśeṣaṇam.* SBG. XII. Intro. ; VIII. 11 ; XIII. 1.2 ; ŚB. III. 2.11, 16 ; IV. 3.4.

⁶ *niṣkalam niṣkriyam śāntam.* Śvet. Up. VI. 19.

It cannot be denoted as existent or non-existent.¹ One may very easily, here, suppose that if *Brahman* is neither existent nor non-existent and is quite beyond speech and thought, *Brahman* must be void or non-entity. But Śaṅkara calls *Brahman* as Knowable. Ānandagiri explaining Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya, says that to prevent this supposition, the Lord teaches that *Brahman* exists (i) as the Inner Self (*pratyak*), (ii) as the source of all activity of the senses and the like, (iii) as the source whence arises our consciousness of existence with reference to all duality which is imaginary, (iv) as Īśvara or the Lord of the universe. Further, Śaṅkara says : 'there is no contradiction in terms to hold that *Brahman*, the Knowable, is neither existent nor non-existent',² because the *Śruti* says : "It is other than the known and above the unknown".³ By negating existence and non-existence in relation to *Brahman* Śaṅkara simply means to say that *Brahman* is not an object of knowledge in the sense in which a table or a cow is an object of knowledge. 'Table' or 'cow' or 'mountain' or 'stars' or 'planets' are objects in relation to a knowing subject. But *Brahman*, we have seen, is the transcendental ground of all empirical selves, being the pure consciousness. If *Brahman* is not an object of knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term, it follows that the categories of the understanding such as cause and effect, substance and attribute, which we apply to common objects have no bearing so far as *Brahman* is concerned.

Śaṅkara, again, says that *Brahman*, the Knowable cannot be held void, as It manifests through the adjuncts of external and internal senses and their functions. That is to say, *Brahman*, the Knowable, seems to express itself through the functions of the senses, actually the Knowable does not function when the senses are functioning.⁴ All the varieties caused in *Brahman*—the Knowable, by the variety of *kṣetra* is but illusory and hence it has been said that It should be known as devoid of all the

¹ *na tu brahma jātīmat, ato na sadādisābdavācyam. nāpi guṇavat yena guṇasābdenocyate, nirguṇatvāt ; nāpi kripyāśābdavācyam, niṣkriyatvāt. na ca sambandhikatvādadvayatvādaviśayatvādātmatvācca na kenacicchābdenocyate.* SBG. XIII. 12.

² *yat tu uktam viruddham ucyate jñeyam tad na sat tad na asat ucyate it. Na viśuddham.* Ibid.

³ *anyad eva tad viditād atho aveditād adhi.* Kena Up. I.4.

⁴ *antaḥkaraṇabahiṣkaraṇopādhibhūtaiḥ sarvendriyaguṇaiḥ avabhāsate iti sarvendriyaguṇābhāṣaṇ sarvendriyavyūpārāiḥ vyāpṛtam...ato na karaṇavyūpārāiḥ vyāpṛtam tad jñeyam.* SBG. XIII. 14.

variety.¹ The *Sampradāyavādins* also maintain that which is devoid of all duality is described by superimposition and denial.² *Brahman*, says Śaṅkara, is like space, one and indivisible, still appears to be different in different bodies. It appears as bodies just as a rope appears a snake. It supports beings during the period of sustenance of the universe and devours them at the time of dissolution just as a rope gives rise to an illusory snake.³ Śaṅkara says that 'the absolutely true *Brahman*, free from space, attribute, action, fruition and difference, being one without second, is regarded by dull persons as non-existent.'⁴ The differenceless *Brahman* which we reach by an everlasting 'No', seems to be empty and not *Brahman* in itself, while It is the fullest reality. If anything exists *Brahman* must be real.

Again, the logical analysis of Śaṅkara's conception of 'Real' points to a being which must be pure existence, consciousness, infinite, eternal, complete, self-identical, self-explanatory and of the nature of bliss. Śaṅkara defines 'Real' as 'that about which our consciousness does not vary'.⁵ In his *Śārīraka Bhāṣya* Śaṅkara reiterates that 'for whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be true or real thing'.⁶ Now, if unalterableness or non-contradiction is accepted as the true mark of the real, there is nothing, in the external world, of our experience which will exist for all times. Nothing finite is stationary and eternal. There is nothing in the external world which is self-existent and unrelated. They are all effects and hence subject to change.⁷ What is beyond contradiction and change is pure existence only. Śaṅkara says that in all our experiences twofold consciousness arises with reference to one and the same substratum. For example, when we experience 'the pot is', 'the cloth is', 'the horse is', etc., we have, on the one hand, the cognition of the pot, etc., and, on the other hand, the experience or consciousness of existence. Of the two, the consciousness of the pot, etc., is temporary,

¹ SBG. XIII. 13.

² *adhyāropāpavādābhyāṃ niṣprapañcāṃ prapañcyate*. Quoted by Śaṅkara in SBG. XIII. 13.

³ *avibhaktāṃ vyomavat...vibhaktāṃ iva ca sthitaṃ deheṣu eva vibhāvya mānatvāt...tad jñeyaṃ bhūtabhrtr ca sthītikāle, pralayakāle ca grasanśīlāṃ yathā rajjvūdiḥ sarpādermūthyākālpitasya*. SBG. XIII. 16.

⁴ *digdeśagūṇagatīphabhedaśūnyaṃ hi paramārthasādhavayaṃ brahma mandabudhināmasadaiva pratibhāti*. SB. Ch. Up. VIII. Introduction.

⁵ *yad viśayā buddhirna vyabhicarati tat sat*. SBG. II. 16.

⁶ *ekarūpeṇa hi avasthito yo'rthaḥ sa paramārthaḥ*. ŚB. II. 1. 11.

⁷ *vikāśa vyabhicarati*. SBG. II. 16.

but not the consciousness of existence.¹ In fact, the consciousness of existence as such persists in all cases of experience, whether correct or incorrect. Śaṅkara points out that everything is based on the 'Sat' (i.e. the Existence), for everywhere the idea of 'existence' is present. Not even the mirage and the like exist without a basis.² Existence-as-such is self-existent, unrelated and unalterable; it will continue to remain what it is. A self-existent thing or being cannot 'enter into a relation with other things. It cannot move out of itself. If a thing enters a movement or a process of change it can in no sense stand outside this process. It cannot be said to have a self-identical or self-existent being. The self-existent must be at the same time immutable'.³ Such an ultimate and all-pervading existence is the only true and ultimate reality.

Pure existence, again, is of the nature of consciousness, for when we try to grasp immutable and pure existence, we attain it in our consciousness itself, not as an object of consciousness but as consciousness itself. Consciousness and existence are inseparable. The immediate experience of consciousness is the experience of consciousness as existence, as something that indubitably is. Śaṅkara says that existence is thought or consciousness and thought is existence; and so the two not exclude each other.⁴ 'Metaphysically the conception of self-existence', holds Radhakrishnan, 'involves the ideas of eternity, immutability and completeness'.⁵ The ideas of eternity, immutability and completeness point to infinity, because finite things and beings cannot be eternal, immutable, and complete. Radhakrishnan says: 'Nature is never satisfied with the level it has reached. It always aspires to other levels...; in the continuous flow of nature there is neither repose nor halt.'⁶ But infinite is of the nature of bliss, declares the *Śruti*; ⁷ finite is limited and painful. Pure existence is, therefore, self-existent, self-identical, non-dual, eternal, immutable, complete, infinite

¹ *sarvatre dve buddhi sarvairupalabhyete...tayorbuddhyoḥ ghaṭādibuddhiḥ vyabhicarati, na tu sabdabuddhiḥ. Ibid.*

² *sadāspadam hi sarvaṃ sarvatra sabdabuddhyanugamāt. na hi mṛgaṭṛṣṇī-kāḍyo'pi nirāspadā bhavanti. SBG. XIII. 14.*

³ G.R. Malkani, "Inexplicability in Philosophy", *The Philosophical Quarterly* (April 1940), p. 50.

⁴ *sattaiva bodhaḥ bodha eva ca hi satta, nānyaḥ parasparavyāvṛttir asti. SB. III. 2. 21.*

⁵ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (1951), Vol. II, p. 477.

⁶ S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealistic View of Life* (1953), pp. 312-13.

⁷ *na hi alpe sukhaṃ asti, bhūmaiva sukham. Ch. Up. VII. 22.1,*

and of the nature of consciousness and bliss. Śaṅkara, therefore, is justified to regard *Brahman* as the ultimate reality, which is pure existence, consciousness and bliss. *Brahman* cannot be said to be non-existent, or non-entity or void only because It is beyond thought and speech and is not comprehended as existent or non-existent. It is the most authentic being and substratum of all finite existence. It never fails to be, since It is the underlying existence of all finite things and beings. At the same time it cannot be comprehended by any categories of understanding. There is not an object of experience which can be predicated of *Brahman*, because that object will be finite which the Infinite must transcend. Truly speaking, to qualify a being or entity is to limit it. The limitless or Infinite Absolute Reality cannot, hence, be qualified.

Now if *Brahman* is the only reality, one without second, it is implied that the origin, subsistence, etc., of the world of actual experience, must be traced to It. To imagine anything other than *Brahman*, as the cause of the world, is to rob it off the absoluteness and oneness. But *Brahman* is immutable and in Its essential nature transcends all empirical characters.¹ It is homogeneous and devoid of all differences, external as well as internal (*sajātīya*, *vijātīya* and *svagata*). *Brahman* is an absolute being, and unless it is robbed off Its absoluteness, it cannot be brought under the categories of understanding. 'Brahman by Himself', writes Dr. Jha, 'we cannot speak of ; He is beyond Speech and Mind (*avāñmanasagocara*) ; nothing can be predicated of Him.... As soon as we begin to speak of *Brahman*, He, in reality, ceases to be *Brahman*, and becoming reflected in, and associated with, His nature, He becomes what we have been taught to call *Īśvara*'.² Śaṅkara has maintained that 'by that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, *Brahman* becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its change, while in Its true and real nature It at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe'.³ It is, then, designated by Śaṅkara as *Saguṇa* or *Apara Brahman* or *Īśvara*.

In his *Gītā Bhāṣya* Śaṅkara describes the lower *Brahman* or *Īśvara* as *Nārāyaṇa* who is above the undifferentiated *Māyā*, out of which (when

¹ *sarvasaṁsārādharmavarjitam*. SBG. IV. 25 ; SB. *At. Up.* I.1.1.
nirastasarvopādhibhedam. SBG. XIII. 2 ; XII. 1.

sarvaviśeṣanivartakatvena. SBG. VIII. 11.

² Dr. G. N. Jha, *Shāṅkara Vedānta* (1939), p. 81.

³ *avidyākalpitena brahma pariṇāmādi sarvavyavahārāśpatatvani pratipadyate. paramārthikena ca rūpeṇa sarvavyavahārātītam aparīṇatamavatiṣṭhate.* SB. II.1.27.

in apparent union with Īśvara) the Mundane Egg is evolved which contains the three worlds, viz., *bhūh*, *bhuvah* and *svah*, within itself.¹ He further says that the primeval creator *Viṣṇu*, known as *Nārāyaṇa*, with an intention to maintain the order in the universe and for the preservation of the spiritual life on the earth, has incarnated Himself as *Kṛṣṇa*.² This Supreme Lord is ever equipped with infinite knowledge, sovereign power, strength, energy and effulgence.³ Though He is unborn and indestructible, the Lord of all beings, eternally pure and conscious, says Śaṅkara, but He appears as an embodied being controlling His *vaiṣṇavī* tripartite *Māyāśakti*.⁴ His birth is of the nature of *Māyā* and peculiar to Īśvara.⁵

Īśvara is the determinate (*saguṇa*) *Brahman* regarded as a Supreme Person. *Puruṣottama*—the Supreme Being or Person, says Śaṅkara, is the well known name of the Lord, and He is superior to the perishable and the imperishable as well.⁶ There is no higher being than Him. All the created beings abide within the *Puruṣa*. Īśvara is called *Puruṣa* as He rests in the body and He is full or complete. The whole world is pervaded by *Puruṣa* as pots etc., are pervaded by space.⁷ Īśvara or God is the Highest Self, the Supreme Light, Eternal, Unborn and Omnipresent.⁸ He is the Primal cause even of *Brahmā*—the *Hiraṇyagarbha*.⁹ He is the source of the Gods and the Great *Rṣis*; none else exists as the source of His existence. He is, therefore, beginningless and unborn. The seven Great *Rṣis* such as *Bṛghu* as well as the *Manus* were created by Him.¹⁰ He is

¹ *Nārāyaṇaḥ paro'vyaktadaṇḍamavyaktasambhavam/*

Aṇḍasyāntastvime lokāḥ saptadvīpā ca medinī. SBG. Opening verse.

² *nārāyaṇākhyo viṣṇuḥ kṛṣṇaḥ kila sambabhūva.* SBG. Introduction.

³ *sa ca bhagavān jñānaiśvaryaśaktibalavīryateobhīhasadā sampannaḥ.* Ibid.

⁴ *janmarahitam akṣīṇajñānaśaktisvabhāvaḥ.....vaiṣṇavī māyāṁ trigu-
ṇātmikāṁ, tāṁ, prakṛtiṁ svāṁ vaśikṛtya dehavāna iva bhavāmi.* SBG.
Introduction, IV. 6, 7.

⁵ *janma māyayā...aprākṛtam aiśvaram.* SBG. IV. 9.

⁶ *īśvarasya puruṣottama etad nāma prasiddham...kṣarākṣarābhyām uttamat-
vād...evaṁ māni bhaktōjanā viduḥ kavayaḥ kāvyādiṣu ca puruṣottama iti
anena abhidhānena abhigrṇati.* SBG. XV. 18.

⁷ *puruṣaḥ puriṣayanūt pūrṇatvād vā...yasmāt puruṣād na paraṁ kiñcit...yena
puruṣeṇa sarvamīdaṁ jagattatani vyūptamākāśeneva ghaṭādi.* SBG. VIII. 22.

⁸ *paramātmā paraṁ tejāḥ nityaṁ sarvadevānām ādau bhavaṁ devam ajāṁ
vibhūṁ vibhavanśilam.* SBG. X. 12.

⁹ *brahmaṇo hiraṇyagarbhasya api ādikartā kāraṇam.* SBG. XI. 37.

¹⁰ *aham ādīḥ devānāṁ maharṣīṇāṁ ca na mama ādīḥ vidyate atah aham
ajāḥ anādīḥ ca.* SBG. X.3 and 6.

the origin and end of the whole universe. The Supreme *Brahman*, named *Vāsudeva*, says Śaṅkara, is the source of the whole world. From Him alone evolves the whole universe in all its changes, including existence, disappearance, action, effect and enjoyment.¹ There is no cause besides Him. All creatures moving and unmoving are manifested out of *Avyakta*, the *Aparā Prakṛti* which is *Avidyā* itself—the seed of the whole multitude of created beings.² God is the Creator, the sustainer and the destroyer of the universe with the help of *Prakṛti* which is subject to God, He causes all beings to emanate again and again from the *Prakṛti*. He is the Great Abode of the Universe, i.e., in which the universe rests during the time of dissolution. All these creations at the time of dissolution are absorbed in the lower *Prakṛti* of God, i.e., *Māyā*, and they are again produced at the time of the next cycle.³ This does not mean that God subsists in those beings in a material form ; as the wind rests in the space, so do all beings rest in the Lord without any contact at all as long as the world lasts.⁴ He is the Lord of *Māyā* which is always under the control of the Lord, and as such it does not affect Him anyway. He is seated in the *Māyā* as its Lord and hence He is called *Kūṭastha*.⁵ He is pure consciousness, a mere witness of the creation.⁶

God is the inspirer of moral life. He is the Lord of all sacrifices and austerities, both as their author and as their Deity, hence He is called *Adhiyajña*.⁷ "Sacrifice (*Yajña*) is verily *Viṣṇu*", says the *Śruti*.⁸ He is the supervisor of the actions done by an individual here and is the dispenser of their fruits. He confirms the faith of a man in whatever form he worships God, who is manifested as *Viṣṇu* and other deities, with devotion

¹ *parambrahma vāsudevākhyāni sarvasya jagataḥ utapattiḥ matta eva sthitinā-śakriyāphalopabhogalakṣaṇāni vikriyārūpāni sarvaṇi jagat pravartate.* SBG. X. 8.

² *avyaktād sthāvarajaṅgamalakṣaṇāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ abhivyaḥyante.* SBG. VIII. 18. 20.

³ *sarvabhūtāni prakṛtim aparāni yānti māmikāni madīyāni pralaya-kāle. punaḥ tāni bhūtāni utpattikāle utpādayāmi.* SBG. IX. 7.

⁴ *vāyuh ākāśe iva mayi asanīśleṣe sthitāni sarvabhūtāni sthitikāle.* SBG. IX. 6.

⁵ *tasmin kūṭe sthitam kūṭastham tadadhyakṣatayā.* SBG. XII. 3.

⁶ SBG. IX. 10.

⁷ *bhoktāraṇi yajñānāni tapasūni ca kartṛrūpeṇa devatārūpeṇa ca.* SBG. V. 29.

⁸ *Adhiyajñaḥ sarvayajñābhīmānī devatā viṣṇvākhyā.* SBG. VIII. 4.

⁹ *yajño vai viṣṇuḥ.* *Tait. Sam.* I. 7. 4.

and faith. Possessed of that faith established by God Himself man obtains the objects of his desires destined by the Lord, because He alone knows the relation between actions and their fruits.¹ He is the goal and the fruit of action. He is the witness of what is done and what is not done by all living beings.² He is the Friend of all who are pious, faithful and devoted, doing good to them without expecting any return.³ He relieves the distressed from the sufferings and pains of the world who worships Him with faith and devotion.⁴ He bestows right knowledge to His devotees, which burns up the seed of evils which leads them across the cycle of death and birth.⁵ He is the object of devotion. Śaṅkara says that the Universal Form has been shown to *Arjuna* for the purpose of worship.⁶ *Arjuna* acclaims, 'Because Thou art the Mighty Being, hence Thou art the proper object of delight and worship'.⁷

Brahman has been conceived by Śaṅkara from somewhat two different standpoints. *Brahman*, from the ontological standpoint, is the absolute, ultimate reality, perfectly self-identical, unqualified and immutable; but from the ordinary, practical standpoint *Brahman* is conceived as the cause, the creator, the sustainer, the destroyer of the world. There are, thus, two views regarding the ultimate reality—higher and lower. Śaṅkara says: '*Brahman* is apprehended in two aspects—one as possessed of the limiting adjuncts of the multitudinous names and the forms, and the other as free from all limiting conditions and opposed to the earlier'.⁸ There is non-difference between *Brahman* and *Īśvara*; the apparent distinction is due to individual's ignorance. Higher and true knowledge gives the

¹ *yayā eva pūrvam pravṛttaḥ svabhāvato yo yām devatā tanum śraddhayā arcitum icchati sa tayā madvihitayā śraddhayā yuktāḥ san tasyā devatūtanvā ārādhanaṁ ceṣṭate. tasyā ārādhitayā devatūtanvāḥ īpsitān paramēśvareṇa sarvajñena karmaphalavibhāgatayā nirmītān. SBG. VII. 21-22; VIII. 9; V. 29.*

² *sākṣī prāṇinām kṛtākṛtasya. SBG. IX. 18; V. 29.*

³ *sarva prāṇinām pratyupakāranirapekṣatyā upakūṛiṇām. SBG. V. 29; X. 18.*

⁴ *ārtinām matprapannāmārtiharaḥ. SBG. IX. 18.*

⁵ *SBG. V. 29; XVIII. 65, 66; XI. 54.*

⁶ *samastajagadātmarūpaṁ viśvarūpaṁ tvadīyaṁ darśitam upāsanārtham. SBG. XII. Introduction.*

⁷ *SBG. XI. 37.*

⁸ *dvirūpaṁ hi brahmāvagamyate, nāmārūpavikūrabhedopādhiviśiṣṭam, tadvi-
paritām ca sarvopādhivivarjitam. SB. I. 1. 11.*

highest positive view of *Brahman* as pure existence, knowledge or consciousness and infinite bliss. But lower knowledge applies attributes, like creatorship and rulership of the universe to the attributeless pure being and calls Him *Īśvara*.¹ Śaṅkara says that that very *Brahman* becomes the lower *Brahman* where It is taught as possessed of some distinct name and form, etc., for the sake of meditation.² In its Nescient condition, says Śaṅkara, *Brahman* can come within the categories of devotee, object of devotion and so on.³ It is through His *Īśvara śakti* that *Brahman* shows His Grace to His devotees. *Īśvara* is only that power in manifestation and hence *Brahman* Itself, for power or potentiality or energy cannot exist separated from in whom it is inherent.⁴ *Īśvara* is the personal aspect of the impersonal *Brahman*. The Imperishable *Brahman* for the sake of meditation is qualified as omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, etc.⁵

II

The *Gītā* teaches theism, and regards *Īśvara* or God as the supreme reality. Here, the supreme Being of the *Upaniṣads*, the all pervading unknowable One, has assumed the form of *Kṛṣṇa*. *Kṛṣṇa* has all those attributes which are usually ascribed to the Supreme Being. He is the incarnation of the ultimate Reality which is unmanifest, changeless and supreme, but men of little knowledge regard Him as an ordinary man. The Lord says: "Veiled by My *Yogamāyā* I am not revealed to all". Here He has been spoken as Supreme Brahman (*paramabrahma* X. 12), Great Lord (*maheśvara*, IX. 11), 'the Imperishable, the being and not-being and what is beyond that',⁶ Great Soul (*mahātman*, IX. 12, 20, 37, 50). As Supreme Being, He is incomprehensible (XI. 11, 42), infinite of form, having no end, middle or beginning (XI. 16), boundless (X. 19), everlasting (XI. 18), primal (XI. 31), unborn (X. 3 ; VII. 25), changeless (XI. 18 ; VII. 24, 25) and immutable. He is all marvellous (XI. 11), terrible (XI. 20), facing every-

¹ *vidyāviśayo jñeyam nirguṇam satyam avidyāviśaya upāśyam saguṇam kalpitam. Ratnaprabhā. I. 1. 11.*

² *tadeva yatra nūmarūpādiviśeṣeṇa kenacidviśiṣṭam upāsanāyopadiśyate, tadaparam. SB. IV. 3. 14.*

³ *tatrāvidyāvasthāyām brahmaṇa upāśyopāśakādīlakṣaṇaḥ sarvo vyavahārah. SB. I.1.11.*

⁴ *Īśvaraśaktiyā bhaktānugrahādiprayojanāya brahma pratiṣṭhate pravarttate sā śaktiḥ brahmaiva aham śaktiśaktimatoḥ ananyatvād. SBG. XIV. 27.*

⁵ *SBG. XII. 3, 4.*

⁶ *akṣaram sad asat tatparam yat. XI. 37*

where (*viśvatomukham*, XI. 11), possessed of immeasurable strength and infinite might (XI. 40), resplendent and filled with glory (IX. 17, 30). He is the Supreme Person (*Puruṣottama*). In the conception of *Puruṣottama* God becomes the immanent principle of the universe, yet He is not completely merged in it, but transcends it as well. The Lord says : "As I surpass the perishable and am higher even than the imperishable, I am celebrated as the Supreme Person in the world and the *Veda*" (XV. 18). It will be erroneous to establish an identity between *Puruṣottama* and *Akṣara Brahman*. *Puruṣottama* is held, in the *Gītā*, higher than *Akṣara Brahman*. He is the Highest Being and the supreme reality in the *Gītā*. He is the foundation of the immortal, infinite and absolute.¹

God of the *Gītā*, hence, is personalistic and not non-qualitative absolutistic. But, it will be equally erroneous to hold that the *Gītā* throws the absolutistic conception of reality overboard. There are many references about the Absolute here and there. The non-qualitative, differenceless *Brahman* has been described throughout the *Gītā* as *Tat* (V. 16, 17 ; VII. 29 ; VIII. 1 ; XIII. 13, 15-17), *Brahma*, (V. 19, 20, 24, 26 ; VII. 29 ; VIII. 1, 3 ; X. 12 ; XIII. 12, 30 ; XVIII. 50), *Parama Brahma* (VIII. 3 ; X. 12 ; XIII. 12), *Amṛta Avyaya Brahma* (XIV. 27), *Akṣaram* (III. 15 ; VIII. 3 ; XI. 18, 37 ; XII. 1. 3), and *Paramātmā* (V. 7 ; XIII. 22, 31). A close analysis of the *Gītā* clearly shows that 'Akṣaram' and 'Tat' are used to denote the non-qualitative aspect exclusively, because the *Gītā* uses 'Paramam' or 'Anirdeśyam' or 'Avyakta' to qualify 'Akṣaram' (vide VIII. 3 ; XI. 18, 37 ; XII. 1.3). "From the point of view of *Vedānta*, the *Parabrahman* alone is *Akṣara*, that is, something which is never destroyed, and also *Avyakta*, that is, imperceptible to the organs, the same terms 'akṣara' and 'avyakta' are used in the *Gītā* for referring to the form of the *Parabrahman* which is beyond Matter" (See *Gītā*, VIII. 20 ; XI. 37 ; XV. 16, 17).² Again, the intimate and inalienable identity of God and soul is proclaimed in the *Gītā*. He is the self seated in the hearts of all creatures (X. 20). He is the real knower of the field (*kṣetrajña*) in all fields (XIII. 2).

The first hexade of the *Gītā* teaches the absolutistic conception of reality. *Kṛṣṇa*, who is deliverer from the ocean of death-bound existence,³ says : 'With the help of SELF lift up thy self, not allow thy self to fall. For thy self can be friend and foe as well. The self of man is his friend when

¹ *brahmaṇo hi pratiṣṭhāham amṛtasyāvyayasya ca*. XIV. 27.

² Tilaka, *Gītā Rahasya* (1935), pp. 275-6.

³ *Samuddhartā mṛtyu saṁsārasāgarāt*. XII. 7.

by the SELF he has conquered his self ; but when a man is not lord of his self then it becomes his own enemy.' Here SELF has been used for the pure absolute SELF whereas 'self' has been used for the self enveloped by ignorance, i.e., attached to the senses, mind and ego. In Chapter V. the *Gītā* uses 'Prabhuḥ', 'Vibhuḥ', 'Tat' for this SELF. Radhakrishnan writes : "Prabhuḥ is the sovereign self of the knower, the Real Self which is one with all that is. Vibhuḥ refers either to the Self of the *jñānin* or the Supreme Self, which are identical."¹ The *Gītā* further declares that who has conquered one's self (i.e. internal sense) and has attained tranquillity, his Supreme SELF abodes in him (VI. 7). Here, the word 'Paramātmān' has been used with reference to the absolute *Ātman* itself. The *Ātman* when erroneously identified with the senses, mind and ego, it is ordinarily engrossed in the turmoil of pain and happiness ; but when such erroneous identification has been removed, the same *Ātman* shines like the Supreme Self. *Mahābhārata* says : "When the *Ātman* is bound by the constituents of *Prakṛti*, it is called the *Kṣetrajña* or *jīvātman* ; and when it has become free from these constituents, the same *Ātman* is called *Paramātmān*".² This is the state of blessedness of the person who has established himself in unity with the universal Self. The embodied self is generally moved by the world of dualities, but when it controls the senses, mind and rises above egoity, the world of dualities vanishes ; the self becomes free. The Lord says that the *Yogī*, having controlled his mind, ever keeping himself in harmony of soul, attains peace, the supreme *Nirvāṇa* (VI. 15). Further he says that when the disciplined mind is established in the Self alone, free from all desires, it (i.e. the mind) is said to be harmonized. Such a harmonized *Yogī* is always absorbed in the *Ātman*. Fleeting glimpses should not be confused with the insight into *Ātman* which is the only safeguard against all delusions. In adoration to such a *Yogī*, the Lord says : 'When the mind is resting in the stillness of *Yoga*, in which he beholds the self through the self and rejoices in the self, then the seeker knows the joys of Eternity (*sukhamātyantīkam*) : which is to be grasped by the (harmonized) intellect but is beyond the reach of the senses. He being once established is not moved from Truth or Reality' (VI. 20-21). 'He whose self is harmonized by *Yoga* sees the self abiding in all beings and all beings in the self' (VI. 29). Such a harmonized *yogin* becomes liberated from all sins, happily

¹ Radhakrishnan's comment on V. 14. 15.

² *ātmā kṣetrajña ityuktaḥ saṃyuktaḥ prakṛtair guṇair, taireva tu vinirmuktaḥ paramātmetyudāhṛtaḥ. Śāntiparvan 187. 24.*

enjoys the beatific happiness arising from the contact with *Brahman* (*brahmasamsparsam* VI. 28). In Chapter V the Lord says that when the self is no longer attached to the external contacts (i.e. objects and senses, etc.) one finds the happiness that is in the self. Such a one who is self-controlled in *Yoga* on Brahman enjoys undying bliss (V. 21). He gets at It, reaches It, enters into It and is fairly established in It (*brahmavid brahmaṇi sthitaḥ*). The Lord further says that he who finds his happiness within, his joy within and likewise his light only within, that yogin becomes divine and attains to the beatitude of Brahman (*brahmanirvāṇa*). The holy men whose sins are destroyed, whose doubts are cut asunder, whose minds are disciplined and who rejoice in (doing) good to all creatures, attain to the beatitude of *Brahman*. To those austere souls (*Yatis*) who are delivered from desire and anger and who have subdued their minds and have knowledge of the Self, near to them lies the beatitude of *Brahman* (V. 24-26). They live in the consciousness of spirit. The Lord says that who worship the Imperishable, the Undefinable, the Unchanging and the Immobile, by restraining all the senses, being even-minded in all conditions, rejoicing in the welfare of all creatures, they too (*eva*) come to Me (XII. 34). But the Lord warns that the difficulty of those whose thoughts are set on the Unmanifested is greater, for the goal of the Unmanifested is hard to reach by the embodied beings (XII. 5). The Lord, therefore, preaches worship of the personal Lord in accordance with the *Bhāgavata* religion which the *Gītā* preaches.

In describing the nature of the Supreme Deity, the *Gītā* speaks of its two forms—the perceptible to the eyes (*vyakta*) and imperceptible (*avyakta*). Now, the form which is perceptible to the eyes must be possessed of qualities; but it will be unjust to hold that ordinarily imperceptible form must be qualityless. The imperceptible, also, therefore, may be divided into (i) possessed of qualities (*saguṇa*), (ii) qualified and qualityless (*saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*), and (iii) qualityless (*nirguṇa*). The Lord has referred His perceptible form in the *Gītā* by indicating Himself in the first person; and after showing His Cosmic Form to *Arjuna*, He has ultimately advised *Arjuna*, that as it was easier to worship the perceptible form than to worship the imperceptible form, he should put faith in Him (XII. 8). But side by side the Lord has also stated that this perceptible form is illusory and that His imperceptible form which is beyond that perceptible form is His principal form. He says: 'I am imperceptible to the organs, ignorant people consider Me as perceptible and do not take cognisance of My superior and imperceptible form which is beyond the perceptible form

(VII. 24). In the next verse He says: 'as I am concealed in my *Yoga-Māyā*, ignorant people do not recognise Me'. In Chapter IV He has said that though He is unborn, and eternal, yet He embodies Himself in His own *Māyā* and takes birth. In Chapter VII He says that: *Prakṛti* made up of three constituents is My Divine Illusion, those who conquer that Illusion become merged in Me; and those low-natured fools whose perception is destroyed by it, are not merged in Me (VII. 14-15). He has ultimately said: O *Arjuna*! *Īśvara* resides in the hearts of all living beings in the form of Self (*jīva*), and controls their activities by Illusion as if they were machines (XVIII. 61). In the *Śāntiparva* of the *Mahābhārata* the Lord says to *Nārada* after showing His Cosmic Form (similar to that of the *Gītā*): 'that My form which you see is an Illusion (*Māyā*) created by Me; but do not, on that account, carry away the impression that I am possessed of the same qualities as are possessed by created things'.¹ And just few verses ahead He says: 'My real form is all-pervasive, imperceptible and eternal and that form is realised by the Released' (*Śāntiparva* 339. 48).

A close analysis of the above statements points out that the doctrines laid down by the *Gītā* are (i) the superior and real form of *Parameśvara* is His imperceptible form; (ii) His changing from imperceptible to perceptible is His *Māyā*; and (iii) unless a man conquers this *Māyā*, and realises the pure imperceptible form, which is beyond, he cannot attain Freedom. The *Gītā* stresses again and again the unity of Godhead; the same *Vāsudeva* has two aspects, the *Nirguṇa* (qualitiless) and *Saguṇa* (possessed of qualities). The same *Vāsudeva* is *Nirguṇa* in Himself but *Saguṇa* in relation to the universe. The immutability of the absolute and the activity of *Īśvara* are both taken over in the conception of *Puruṣottama*. I do not believe that the Lord meant an idea of higher or lower between *Nirguṇa* aspect and *Saguṇa* aspect at all. Only from the religious point of view the personal *Puruṣottama* is higher than the immutable self-existence. Both attain Him alone. It seems to me that both aspects of the Supreme Realization are described in XVIII. 51-55 in which the Lord sums up the entire *Gītā*. He says: "Endowed with a pure understanding, firmly restraining oneself, turning away from the objects of senses and casting aside attraction and aversion, dwelling in solitude and ever engaged in meditation and concentration and taking refuge in dispassion, and casting aside self-sense, force, arrogance, desire, anger, possession, egoless and tranquil in mind, he becomes

¹ *māyā hyeṣā mayā sṛṣṭā yaṁ māṁ paśyati nārada,*
sarvabhūtaguṇiḥ yuktam naivam tvaṁ jñātumarhasi (339.44).

worthy of becoming one with *Brahman*. Having become one with *Brahman*, and being tranquil in spirit, he neither grieves nor desires. Regarding all beings as alike he attains supreme devotion to Me. Through devotion he comes to know Me, what My measure is and who I am in truth ; then, having known Me in truth, he forthwith enters into Me."¹

The *Upaniṣadic* idealism is transformed into theistic religion in the *Gītā*, providing room for love, faith, prayer and devotion. Hence the impersonal absolute casts in as *Puruṣottama* for the purposes of religion. "The *Gītā*, anxious to adapt the *Upaniṣad* idealism to the daily life of mankind", says Radhakrishnan, "supports a divine activity and participation in nature. It tries to give us a God who satisfies the whole being of man, a real which exceeds the mere infinite and the mere finite....It reconciles all abstract opposition". The principle of reconciliation of impersonal and personal aspects of the Absolute is present in the poetic *Upaniṣads*. The *Īśa Upaniṣad* describes the real as both immutable and changing. The *Gītā* tries to make a synthesis of the immutable absolute Self and the changing principle of the universe. The supreme spiritual Being with energy is *Puruṣottama* ; the same in a state of eternal rest is *Brahman*. It is, therefore, correct to say that though the *Gītā* teaches the devotion of the personal God, there are ample references which promulgate the philosophy of the Absolute Self. We have seen, above, that the assumption of form of the formless is less than real. Radhakrishnan writes : 'On ultimate analysis the assumption of the form of *Puruṣottama* by the absolute becomes less than real. It is therefore wrong to argue that according to the *Gītā* the impersonal self is lower in reality than the personal *Īśvara*, though it is true that the *Gītā* considers the conception of a personal God to be more useful for religious purposes."

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (1956), Vol. I, p. 539.

SOME INTERESTING SCULPTURES OF VĀRĀHĪ FROM NORTH INDIA

R. C. AGRAWALA

National Museum

The iconography of different gods and goddesses in early Indian art was still in a flexible stage. The ancient region of Mathura has yielded a number of early *Mātrikā* reliefs wherein the mothers are either shown seated or standing side by side but without any vehicle or emblem having any bearing on their exact identification. They are mostly datable to the Kushāṇa period. A few contemporary panels present the seated females as usual but they have got faces of birds and animals including goat, owl, parrot, elephant, etc. Of these, No. 33.2331.4 from the Mathura Museum measures only 5 inches in height. It (Plate I) depicts 5 out of the 7 female figures in *bhadrāsana*; the beginning portion is mutilated; each of them carries a child in the left lap, whereas the right hand is raised up in *abhaya* pose, in the typical Kushāṇa style. May we think that the faces of the females therein have been borrowed from their respective vehicles? The problem needs further confirmation and careful analysis in the light of literary texts if any. Another fragmentary relief from the Mathura Museum (No. 1002) depicts 3 divine mothers with faces of a boar and a lion; the sculpture is also datable to the Kushāṇa period.¹

Vārāhī, the consort of boar-headed Varāha Incarnation of Vishṇu, is also shown as *Varāhāsya* (boar-headed); she is usually associated with a buffalo (*mahisha*) as her vehicle. Of this variety, one inscribed statue of the Chedi Art (10th century) was noticed by me at Antarā (near Shahdol) in Madhya Pradesh (Plate II). The boar-faced and multi-armed goddess is seated over a buffalo in *lalitāsana* pose. The importance of the sculpture is enhanced by the depiction of 'boar-headed attendants on both the sides,' a device which is quite rare in mediaeval Indian Vārāhī sculptures. The identification of the main goddess is marked on the pedestal, bearing the inscription *Śrī-Vārāhī* in legible letters.

In some images, we notice a corpse (*preta*) as the vehicle of Vārāhī, as in the specimen from Jagannāth Temple Ābu and now preserved in

¹ *Journal of the U. P. Historical Society*, Lucknow, Old series, XXII, 1949, pp. 161-162.

Archaeological Museum at Mount Ābu, in Rajasthan.¹ This finds support from a literary injunction as recorded in the *Devī Bhāgavata Purāṇa*,² such as “Vārāhī Śūkarākārā Prauḍha Pretāsanā mātā”. Such images of goddess Vārāhī are of course very few indeed. Another important aspect of Vārāhī is her association with a fish (*matsya*) under the impact of Tāntric traits ; sometimes she holds a fish between her teeth while she carries a fish in one of her hands as her emblem.³ Such sculptures are not reported from the Deccan and Southern India so far.

A 10th century statue of Vārāhī at Bherāghāṭa (M.P.) is equally interesting (Plate III) because the boar-headed goddess is seated over a boar (*śūkara*) instead of a buffalo. The pedestal bears the inscription “Śrī Vārāhī” quite clearly. The boar as her vehicle, though unusual, recalls to our mind a verse from the unpublished Orissan Text, the *Vārāhī Tantra*.⁴ It runs as below : *Jaṭā-jūṭadharām devīm, sphārīta-nayana-trayam/Sphārītam mukhadantañcha, Mahā Varāha-vāhanā* ; she is called *Matsya-Vārāhī* having three eyes, matted locks on the head and the great boar as her vehicle. The existing sculpture, from Bherāghāṭa (M.P.), answers to this description to some extent though not in toto. The antiquity of this particular tradition may be traced back to the 6th century A.D., at the present moment. Two sculptures of greenish-blue schist, from Īḍar-Dūngarpur regions of Western India, are worth scrutiny in this direction ; both are mutilated because of the disappearance of weapons and bust above the naval portion. In both of them we notice the ‘boar animal as the vehicle’ of the goddess. The one, depicting both the *devī* and boar in standing pose, was found at Sāmālāji⁵ in Gujrat (Plate IV) whereas the other in seated pose hails from Āmjhara, in Dungarpur⁶ district of Rajasthan (Plate V). Both these fragmentary sculptures of course fail to throw any light on the weapons and animal head of goddess Vārāhī. Even then, the details of the *vāhana* therein are of great interest, in the

¹ *Bulletin of Museum & Picture Gallery, Baroda*, XIII, figure 8 on p. 13.

² Veṅkaṭeśvara Press Edition, V. S. 1982, *Skandha* 5, Chapter 28, verse 24.

³ For details consult R. C. Agrawala's papers in *Oriental Art*, London, Autumn 1963, p. 167 ; *The Orissa Historical Research Journal*, Bhubaneswar, XII (3), 1964, pp. 161-63 and plates 33-35.

⁴ J. N. Banerjea's paper in the *V. V. Mirashi Felicitation Volume*, 1965, Nagpur, p. 353, i.e. “Vārāhī Temple at Chaurāshī.”

⁵ Now preserved in the Baroda Museum.

⁶ Now exhibited in the Udaipur Museum (No. 151) ; R. C. Agarwala, *Arts Asitaques*, Paris, 12 (1965), p. 180 and plates.

light of Vārāhī statue from Bherāghāṭa under scrutiny. Let us investigate into the matter still further.

Reference to animal and bird headed mothers is available in Indian literature such as *Biḍālī*, *Śakuni*, *Ulūkī*, *Kukkuṭī*, *Gardabhī*, *Śūkara-mukhī* (Boar-faced), *Aja-mukhikā*, *Sarpakarnī*, *Jvālā Mukhī*, *Śyenī*, *Kharānanā*, *Vaḍavāmukhī*, *Mahishānanā*, *Hayānanā*, *Śukī*, *Śimśumāra-mukhī* etc., as discussed by V. S. Agrawala (*Prāchīna Bhāratiya Lokadharmā*, Hindi, p. 14 ; *Agni Purāṇa*, 219.8, verses 8-11, *ibid.*, 146,6 ; *Mahābhārata*, *Śalya Parva* and *Vana Parva* as cited by N. P. Joshi in his paper published in the *Bulletin of Museums and Archaeology in U.P.*, Lucknow, No. I, 1968, p. 19). According to the *Mahābhārata* (*Vana Parva*, 228, verses 8-9, Gita Press edition), the mothers were grouped under two heads, i.e. *Śivā* and *Aśivā* ; the latter perhaps included mothers having ferocious faces as rightly suggested by Dr. N. P. Joshi. The *Vishṇudharmottara Purāṇa* (G.O.S. No. 137, Baroda, Vol. II, 1961, pp. 226-2273) refers to a number of *sāmisha mātrikās* which were probably of a terrific nature, resembling the *Dākinīs* in the famous Gaṅgadhāra-Jhālāwār Inscription of the 5th century A.D. The iconography of bird and animal headed mothers needs further investigation and research.

Plate I Courtesy : Curator, Mathura Museum,

Plate II by R. C. Agrawala.

Plate III Director-General of Archaeological Survey of India.

Plate IV Director, Baroda Museum.

Plate V Director of Archaeology & Museums, Rajasthan, Jaipur.

R. C. AGRAWALA




Plate I Stone relief (Mathura Museum No. 33.2331) showing animal and bird-faced Mothers. Kuṣāṇa period. Ht. 5 inches.



Plate II Inscribed Vārāhī seated over a buffalo. From Antarā near Shahdol, M.P. Chedi art, 10th century.



Plate III Vārāhī. Seated over the boar mount. From Bherāghāt, M. P. Chedi art, 10th century.



Plate IV Vārāhī with her boar mount. From Sāmalājī, 6th century. Now in the Baroda Museum.



Plate V Vārāhī from Amjhara. Udaipur Museum, No. 151.

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SOME BRAHMANICAL SCULPTURES IN THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM, SARNATH

KRISHNA KUMAR

The Archaeological Museum at Sarnath has a very rich collection of the Buddhist sculptures, but it is less known for some of its rare iconographic representations of the Brahmanical deities, which have been only cursorily dealt with by Sahni.¹ The following is an attempt to illustrate, describe and identify three such images together with three architectural pieces in the light of relevant literary and archaeological evidences and also to work out their probable date and significance, if any.

1. VIṢṆU

It is a four-armed type *sampāda-sthānaka-mūrti* of Viṣṇu² (Plate I). Its head with plain *prabhāvalī*, two upper hands and feet together with *pādapīṭha* are lost. The deity wears *dhotī*, *kaṭibandha*, *ekāvalī-hāra* (consisting originally of twelve small beads and three spacers out of which six beads and one spacer are lost), *kaṅkaṇa*, *yajñopavīta* and *vaijayanṭī-mālā*. The rope-like twisted curls of his hair are spread over the shoulders in tiered fashion. His two lower hands hold *cakra* and *gadā*, shown respectively over the heads of the slightly damaged figures of Cakrapuruṣa on the left and Gadādevī on the right. While Cakrapuruṣa standing in *tribhaṅga* wears *dhotī*, *kaṭibandha* (with its knot and tassels hanging on his left), *ekāvalī-hāra*, *ratnakunḍala* and *kaṅkaṇa*, his hair is tucked up in a top-knot. His left arm is in *kaṭyavalambita*, while right arm is raised up touching the *cakra*, which is shown in the form of an oval halo (*śiraścakra*) behind his head. Gadādevī, also standing in *tribhaṅga*, wears *dhotī*, *uttariya* (passing from her back, and resting over her two arms), *patrakunḍala*, *grāiveyaka*, *aṅgada* and *kaṅkaṇa*. Her hair is arranged in the form of a beautiful bun (*keśabandha*) on the top. Her left arm is in *kaṭyavalambita*, while right arm rests on the handle of a *gadā* shown by her side.

Sahni has rightly assigned this image to the Gupta period.³ While like most of the Viṣṇu figures of this period, it lacks *śrīvatsa*-mark, in respect of the reversed position and the evolved character of the *āyudha-puruṣas*.

¹ Sahni, D. R., *Catalogue, Museum of Archaeology at Sarnath* (Calcutta, 1914), pp. 165 ff. & 314 ff.

² Ibid., p. 319 (Cat. No. G 28 ; Acc. No. 610).

³ Ibid., p. 309.

which persisted in later periods, it differs from the Viṣṇu image from Rajgir in Bihar, where Sudarśana-*cakra* and Kaumodikī-*gadā* are shown respectively on the right and left side of the deity and the long *yajñopavīta* serves as *vanamālā* as well. The knot of *kaṭibandha* of Viṣṇu reminds us of the *dvārapāla* figure of Udayagiri of early 5th century A.D.

Although our figure is severely damaged (making its artistic evaluation difficult), there is yet enough to show that originally it was a figure done in superior modelling and demonstrating classic simplicity and serenity, characteristic of Gupta art. The hieratic stiffness emphasised by straight, frontal and static posture of Viṣṇu is balanced by the suavely swaying and animated figures of the two *āyudha-puruṣas* in *tribhaṅga*. The style stipulates the piece as an authentic product of the high Gupta period.

2. CAITYA DORMER FRAGMENT

The fragment in question represents a *candraśālā*, within which figure of Hari-Hara is carved.¹ It possibly formed part of the *śikhara* of a Brahmanical temple (Plate II). The figure is four-armed and seated over a couch in *ardha-paryāṅkāśana*. Besides *dhotī* (with the folds marked by wavy lines), *ekāvalī-hāra* (with eight small beads and three spacers), *aṅgada*, and *kaṅkaṇa*, he wears *kirīṭa-mukuta* and *ratnakunḍala* on left half and *jaṭāmukuta* with *ardha-candra* and *makarakunḍalā* on right half of the head. While he holds *cakra*² and *akṣamālā* in upper left and right hands, respectively and a *kamaṇḍalu* (water-jar with long neck), in the lower left hand, the right hand is in *varada*. The figure is in a fairly good state of preservation, excepting the left part of chin which is severely damaged.

Sahni apparently did not understand the significance of wheel in the upper hand of the deity : he identified this figure as Bodhisattva Maitreya with question mark;³ but from the foregoing description, it evidently represents the composite image of Hari-Hara or Śaṅkara-Nārāyaṇa. While left half of the figure with *kirīṭamukuta*, *ratnakunḍala*, *cakra* and *kamaṇḍalu*, represents Viṣṇu ; the right half with *jaṭāmukuta*, *ardhacandra*, *makarakunḍala* and *akṣamālā* represents Śiva.

¹ Sahni, op. cit., p. 255 (Cat. No. D. (i) 16 ; Acc. No. 658).

² The *cakra* is shown in such a manner that the edge almost faces the spectator. This fashion is often noticed in the sculptures of the early Pallava and Cālukya period. See Sivaramamurti, C., "Geographical and Chronological Factors in Indian Iconography", *Ancient India*, No. 6 (January, 1950), p. 48.

³ Sahni, op. cit., p. 255.

Unlike most examples of the classic Gupta age, the extra arms of the image seem natural ; they wield the attributes with ease. There is a dignity about the postures. The poise is heightened by the very imperceptible tilt of the head. The demeanour is noble even if it does not radiate that intense numinous power characteristic of many contemporaneous images of the lower Central India and the Deccan. There is at the the same time a strong terracotta feel and seems as though it is a handi-work of an artist accustomed more to work in the medium of earth rather than stone. Sahni has correctly placed this image in the late Gupta style.¹ On the grounds of its art style it may be dated to the earlier part of the 6th century.

3. HARI-HARA-HIRANYAGARBHA

It is a three-faced and eight-armed syncretistic image in *samapādashānaka* of Sūrya in the form of Hari-Hara-Hiranyagarbha.² (Plate III). While the central head with its *kirīṭa-mukuta* is damaged, the side ones wearing *jaṭāmukuta* are preserved, but carved in low relief. Since all the hands³ are mutilated, none of the attributes survives. However, the outline of the lotuses, which Sūrya component originally held in his two hands are still discernible on either side of the plain *prabhāvalī*. Sūrya is shown in the northerner's dress ; besides *dhotī*, he wears *ratnakunḍala*, *hāra*, *grāiveyaka*, *yajñopavīta*, *vaijayantīmālā*, *avyāṅga*, *aṅgada* and *upānata*. Most probably his body was partially covered with *varma*, but due to the exfoliation in stone this part is damaged beyond recognition. On his left, Sūrya is flanked by the bearded and *dhotī*-clad figure of Piṅgala standing in *tribhaṅga*. While his left arm is in *kaṭyavalambita*, he holds some indistinct object (may be a pen with ink-pot) in the right hand. On right side of the deity stands Daṇḍin, also in *tribhaṅga* ; wearing *dhotī* and *grāiveyaka*, while he holds a *daṇḍa* in left hand, the right arm is in *kaṭyavalambita*. Over the shoe-clad feet of Sūrya, originally there was a small figure of Bhūdevī or Mahāśveta, seated in *paryāṅkāśana*.⁴ Although the figure has almost vanished, but the remnants of her feet are still found just below the Sūrya's feet. Above

¹ Sahni, op. cit., p. 255.

² Ibid., p. 341 (Cat. No. G 1 ; Acc. No. 623) ; Majumdar, B., *A Guide to Sarnath* (Delhi, 1937), pp. 69 ff.

³ Though Sahni and Majumdar have noticed only six arms, a close examination of the sculpture clearly indicates that it was an eight-armed type image.

⁴ This goddess is also shown near Sūrya's feet in the Navagraha panel on a lintel (Cat. No. G 38) in the same gallery. Sahni has identified her as Chāyā, the consort of Sūrya. Sahni, op. cit., p. 323.

the plain *pādapīṭha* are carved the figures of a swan and a bull, respectively on the left and right side of Bhūdevī. In the centre of the *trirathapādapīṭha* were originally carved the figures of three horses with Aruṇa, the charioteer, over the central horse ; now except for the two horses, the rest are completely lost.

Although Sahni¹, Majumdar² and Agrawala³ have identified this image with the Hindu triad, from the foregoing description it can be seen that, it represents an eight-armed variety of Sūrya in the form of Hari-Hara-Hiraṇyagarbha—a syncretistic image, in which the features and attributes of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva are blended, but those of Sūrya predominate.

In the *Aparājītaprccchā* is found the description of a four-faced and eightarmed image representing the four deities as follows :—

*Caturvaktraṁ ca-aṣṭa-bāhuṁ catuṣkaikīnivāsanam
rjva-āgato mukhaḥ kāryaḥ padma-hasto Divākaraḥ ;
Khaṭvāṅga-triśūla-hasto Rudro dakṣiṇataḥ śubhaḥ,
kamaṇḍalūṁ ca-akṣasūtramapare syāt Pītāmahaḥ ;
Vāme tu sāmsthitas-ca-aivaṁ śaṅkha-cakra-dhara Hariḥ
evaṁ vidhaṁ prakartavyaṁ sarva-kāma-phala-pradam.*

(*Aparājītaprccchā* 213.32-34)

Several seated and standing images of this divinity have also been found at Kalanjara⁴ in Uttar Pradesh ; Bangaon⁴ (near Damoh), Madhia⁶ (in Panna District) and Khajuraho⁷ in Madhya Pradesh ; Kiradu⁸ and Budhadita⁹ in Rajasthan ; Pavagarh¹⁰ and Delmal¹¹ in Gujarat ; Chanda¹²

¹ Sahni, op. cit., p. 314.

² Majumdar, op. cit., p. 69 ff.

³ Agrawala V.S., *Sarnath* (New Delhi, 1957), p. 26.

⁴ Pathak V. S., "Śaivism in Early Mediaeval India, etc", *Bharatī*, No. 3 (1959-60), pp. 51 ff.

⁵ Hiralal, 'Trimurtis in Bundelkhand', *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XLVII, pt. DXCV. (May, 1918), pp. 136 ff.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid. ; Awasthi, R., *Khajurāho kī Devapratimāyān* (Hindi ; Agra, 1967), pp. 177 ff.

⁸ *Progress Report, A.S.I., W.C.* (1907), p. 41.

⁹ Tripathi, L. K., "The Sun Temple of Būdhādita," *Bhāratī*, No. 9, pt. II (1965-66), p. 183.

¹⁰ *Progress Report, A.S.I., W.C.*, (1912), p. 58.

¹¹ Sankalia, H.D., *Archaeology of Gujarat* (Bombay, 1941), p. 163.

¹² Awasthi, op. cit., p. 173, fig. 82.

in Maharashtra ; and Chidambaram¹ in Tamilnadu. The fourth face, in all such images, is presumed to be on the back side of the sculpture, hence not carved. Thus, while the central face represents Sūrya-Nārāyaṇa combined, the left and the right heads, respectively belong to Brahmā and Śiva. Each one of the four deities depicted, is provided with two arms. Beside Daṇḍin and Piṅgala, in some cases Bhūdevī or Mahāśvetā is also shown seated or standing near the feet of Sūrya ; while her one hand is in *abhaya*, the other carries a *ghaṭa*.

Since none of the attributes of our image survives, its iconography cannot be fully compared with any of the examples cited above. Although it bears general resemblance with those of Khajuraho, in certain respects it differs from them. First, neither of the consorts of Sūrya is shown ; second, like Pavagarh image, the mounts of Brahmā and Śiva are also carved, but unlike the example from Limboji Mata Temple at Delmal it does not substitute the horse-driven car of Sūrya with Garuḍa-mount of Viṣṇu.

In spite of the fact that its iconographic scheme and sculptural schema are balanced, the modelling betrays a sort of stolidity, characteristic of most of the mediaeval productions, made particularly after the early 11th century. The execution of ornaments is not excellent, unlike some of the contemporaneous images in Rajasthan, Central India and Gujarat. Although Sahni has proposed a broad dating, i.e., the late mediaeval period (900-1200 A.D.), as he calls it,² the modelling of torso, the type of ornaments and the suavely swaying attendant figures would indicate early 11th century as the most probable date of the execution. The examples of this kind in parallel styles exist in plenty : one has only to look at the temple-walls of the Devi Jagdambī and Citragupta at Khajuraho and the Sun Temple at Modhera (1027 A.D.) for confirmation.

It is a well known fact that the Saura cult was very popular in the mediaeval period in Northern India, and still enjoys a following in eastern part of the country, especially in Bihar, where twice in a year, in the months of Caitra and Kārttika of Hindu Calendar, Chaṭha Pūjā (Solar worship) is performed with great enthusiasm.

The syncretistic tendency had its germ in the Vedic Age and was very much favoured in the mediaeval period, throughout the length and breadth of Northern India.³ In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and the epic and Purāṇic

¹ Sastri, H. K., *South Indian Images of Gods and Goddesses* (Madras, 1916), p. 236, fig. 144.

² Sahni, op. cit., p. 314.

³ Banerjea, J. N., *The Development of Hindu Iconography* (Calcutta, 1956), pp. 540 ff.

literature, the incorporation of the Vedic prototypes of the later Brahmanical triad—Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva in the list of the Dvādaśādityas,¹ adumbrates the beginning of the conception of the syncretistic image of Hari-Hara-Hiraṇyagarbha. While Pathak rightly holds that the image of Hari-Hara marks the beginning of the Miśra Pāśupata School or Pañca-devopāsanā,² the figure of Hari-Hara-Hiraṇyagarbha seems to represent its climax. The idea underlying this image is beautifully expressed in the following couplet invoking Sūrya :—

*Brāhmī Māheśvarī caiva Vaiṣṇavī caiva te tanuḥ/
Tridhā yasya svarūpantu Bhānor bhāsvān prasīdatu||*
(Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa 109.71).

The introduction of Bhūdevī, a consort of Viṣṇu, or Mahāśvetā (who is Durgā or Sarasvatī) over or near the feet of Sūrya, in such images in Northern India, denotes the desire to emphasise the presence in syncretistic form of Viṣṇu otherwise done by his mount—Garuḍa—as in Delmal example. It, at the same time, indicates the presence of the Śakti element,³ though rather subdued.

The subordinate position of the deities other than Sūrya-Nārāyaṇa in these icons clearly shows that these were probably worshipped by the Smārtas who were affiliated to the Saura sect.

4. AGNI

It is a badly mutilated two-armed variety in *samapāda-sthānaka* of Agni⁴ standing over a plain *pādapīṭha* (Plate IV). While the head and the hands are lost, the torso and the feet (especially right one) are preserved though damaged. Clad in *dhotī* (folds indicated by wavy lines) and *uttarīya*, it wears a *kaṭibandha* displaying herring-bone pattern. The two hair plaits and a cord on left shoulder indicate that it wore a *jaṭā* and *yajñopavīta*, too. The tassels of *dhotī* and *uttarīya* are shown flowing (to the right and the left of the image), which is symptomatic of his ride in a car having Mārutas as its wheels or Vāyu as his charioteer. The *prabhāvalī* is covered with the flames (*jvālā-puñja*) emanating from the body of the divinity. What attributes he carried in his two arms is not known.

¹ Ibid., pp. 228 ff.

² Pathak, op. cit., p. 54

³ Krishna Kumar, "An Ekānamśā Relief of Ellora," *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XLIV, pt. III, No. 132 (December, 1966), p. 834.

⁴ This image is not described in Sahni's Catalogue (Acc. No. 535).